THE APHORISMS

OF THE

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

GAUTAMA,

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY BY

VIŚWANÁTHA.

BOOKS III & IV.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

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THE

NYÁYA APHORISMS OF GAUTAMA.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

a. Without whose favour one is like a log, or the like; through a little of whose favour a person gets through the net of delusion; I continually worship, having placed her in the lotus of my heart, with a view to increase of eloquence, her the pre-eminent goddess Saraswatí.*

b. Now, as a fit occasion offers, the 'objects of right notion' *(prameya)* being to be examined, the set of six, beginning with Soul, which was first enunciated, [in the list at B. I. §9,] is to be examined in this Third [Book]; therefore the matter of the Book is just the Examination of the Set of Six beginning with Soul.†

* तरुप्रभृतितुल्यता भवति यत्कृपामन्तरां यदीयकरुणाकणात् तरति मोहजालं जनः। विधाय हृदयाम्बुजे रुचिरवाक्प्रचाराय तां नमामि परदेवतां सततमेव वाणीमहम्॥

† अथावसरतः प्रमेयेषु परीक्षणीयेषु प्रथमोद्दिष्टमात्मा-

c. Of this, the examination of the quaternion, beginning with soul, is the matter of the First Diurnal Portion; and in this here are nine Sections. Among these there is, in the first place, the Section on the division of Sense.*

d. Here the doubt having arisen whether a Sense *(indriya)* be intelligent or not, there is an aphorism to set aside that which the assertor of the intelligence of Sense alleges, viz., let it be that the senses, which it is settled are the instruments [of perception], are intelligent,—as this is simplest;—and so, since the word Soul has various meanings, [and may possibly mean something material, as, e. g., the Senses,] or, since the Senses are not material, [and may therefore very well be that immaterial thing which is called the Soul,] there is no confusion† [of the material with the immaterial—says this mistaken person—in our hypothesis of the identity of Soul and Sense].

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

THAT THE SENSES ARE NOT THE SOUL.

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् ॥ १ ॥

Sense does not constitute Soul.

Aph. 1.—[A Sense is not Soul,] because, through both Sight and Touch, we apprehend a single object.

दिषट्कं तृतीये परीक्षणीयं । तेनात्मादिषट्कपरीक्षैवाध्यायार्थः ॥

* तत्रात्मादिचतुष्कपरीक्षा प्रथमाह्निकार्थः । तत्रच नव प्रकरणानि । तत्रादाविन्द्रियभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

† तत्रेन्द्रियं ज्ञानवन्नवेति संशये करणत्वेन सिद्धानामि-

a. Because of the apprehension of only a single object through both Sight and Touch. Sight and Touch are different kinds of knowledge; and the 3d. [or instrumental case-affix attached to the words in the aphorism,] implies "sort,"—[the knowledge here referred to being, e. g., of the visual and tactual kind]; therefore the meaning is,—because there is an apprehension of a single subject with the possession of both visible and tangible properties;—and thus, from the consciousness that "I who saw the jar, I the same do touch it," Soul is single, and distinct from Sense.†

b. He ponders a doubt in regard to this.‡

न विषयव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 2.—Nay [—that argument, says some one, will not do], because the objects are different.

a. Since the Sight, the Touch, &c., have, as their determinate [and exclusive] objects, what possesses Colour, Tangibility, &c., the visible, and so on, is indivisibly united with the Sight, and so on; and thus the cognition of non-distinction [—as if the

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न्द्रियाणां चैतन्यमस्तु लाघवात् तथा चात्मशब्दस्य नानार्थत्वादिन्द्रियाणामभौतिकत्वाद्वा न साङ्कर्यमितीन्द्रियचैतन्यवादिनस्तन्निराकरणाय सूत्रम् ॥

* एकस्यैव दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामर्थस्य ग्रहणात्। दर्शनस्पर्शने ज्ञानविशेषौ। तृतीया च प्रकारे। तेन चाक्षुषस्पार्शनोभयवत्त्वेनैकस्य धर्मिणः प्रतिसन्धानादित्यर्थः। तथा च योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहं स्पृशामीत्यनुभवादात्मेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्त एक इति।

† अत्र शङ्कते ॥

seen, the touched, &c., constituted but one object—] is erroneous:—such is the import.*

b. He clears up this.†

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ ॥

The objection repelled. *Aph.* 3.—The objection will not do, because the real existence of the Soul [is inferred] from that very difference among these.

a. The above-stated objection is not proper,—because, from the very difference alleged among the objects, [it is inferred that] the soul really exists;—that is to say, a Soul, distinct [from the Senses], is conjectured‡—[which confers a unity on the otherwise separate deliverances of the Senses].

b. Here ends the section on the differentness of Sense§ [from Soul].

c. But then, having pondered the following doubt, viz., let the Body be [what is called] the Soul, because we have such cognitions as "I, who am white [in body], do know," &c.,—he condemns it.‖

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* चक्षुस्त्वगादीनां रूपस्पर्शादिवन्नियतविषयत्वाच्चक्षुरादेश्चाक्षुषादिसमवायित्वमित्यश्चाभेदप्रत्ययो भ्रान्त इति भावः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ उक्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः । उक्तविषयव्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादतिरिक्तात्मकल्पनादित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाप्तमिन्द्रियभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

‖ ननु गौरोऽहं जानामीत्यादिप्रतीतेरस्तु शरीरमात्मेत्याशङ्क्य दूषयति ॥

SECTION II.

THAT THE BODY IS NOT THE SOUL.

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

How the Body is not the Soul.

Aph. 4.—Because of the non-existence of sin [which, on the supposition that the Body is the soul, would take place,] on the burning of the Body.

a. 'Because of the non-existence of sin,' i. e., because we should find that no sin &c. remains;—and so there should be no subsequent pain &c. Or, burning is destruction; and so, when the destruction of the body has been performed, the agent, viz., [by hypothesis,] the body, having been destroyed, there could be no sin, [—whereas, after a man's body has been burned, we find his sins pursuing him into subsequent states of existence] :—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders this doubt, that, "the same censure applies to *thee*."†

तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

A vain attempt to retort the argument.

Aph. 5.—There would be the non-existence thereof, [i. e., of sin,] even on the destruction of it, [the body,] if it had a soul, because that [viz., the soul,] is eternal.

a. Even on the destruction of a body, if it had a soul, a murderer would have no sin, because, since that, viz., the soul, is [as

* पातकाभावात् पातकादेरभावप्रसङ्गात् तथाचोत्तरकालिकं दुःखादिकं न स्यादिति। यद्वा दाहो नाशः तथाच शरीरनाशे कृते कर्त्तरि शरीरे विनष्टे पातकं न स्यादित्यर्थः॥

† तवापि तुल्यदोष इत्याशङ्कते॥

you say,] eternal, none could be its destroyer,* [—and, the soul being the man, none could be killed].

b. He repels this.†

न कार्याश्रयकर्तृवधात् ॥ ६ ॥

The attempt repelled. *Aph.* 6.—Not so, because murder is [not of the soul, but] of the active site of operations.

a. 'Of the site of operations,' i. e., of the site of gestures, 'active,' i. e., distinguished by energizing, viz., of the body alone, but not of the soul, is there destruction.‡

b. The import is, that, since Bráhmanhood and the like belongs to the body, sin arises from the destruction of it,§ [i. e., of the body].

c. Here ends the section on the differentness of the body|| [from the soul].

d. As this is the proper place, he commences a section on the non-duality of the organ of vision.¶

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* सात्मकशरीरनाशेऽपि हन्तुः पातकाभावः स्यात् तस्यात्मनो नित्यत्वेन तन्नाशकत्वाभावात् ॥

† परिहरति ॥

‡ कार्याश्रयस्य चेष्टाश्रयस्य कर्तुः कृत्यवच्छेदकस्य शरीरस्यैव नाशो न त्वात्मनः ॥

§ ब्राह्मणत्वादेः शरीरवृत्तित्वात् तन्नाशादेव पापोत्पत्तिरिति भावः ॥

|| सप्तमं देहभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

¶ प्रसङ्गाच्चक्षुरद्वैतप्रकरणमारभते ॥

SECTION III.

ON THE NON-DUALITY OF THE ORGAN OF VISION.

सव्येन दृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ७ ॥

An opinion regarding single vision.

Aph. 7.—[Some say that there is a permanent Soul,] because what is seen by the left [eye] is recognised by the right.

a. It is the opinion of some that a permanent Soul is demonstrated by the recognition, through the right eye, of what was seen by the left eye. He cites this in order to refute it.*

b. He [thus] censures it.†

नैकस्मिन् नासास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात् ॥ ८ ॥

The preceding view corrected.

Aph. 8.—Not so, because there is [only] a conceit of duality in that [organ of vision] which, being single, is divided by the bone of the nose.

a. That is to say, as in the case of a piece of water with a bridge placed across the middle, so the notion that there is a duality [in the organ of vision], because of its belonging also to the other eye ball which is separated by the bridge of the nose, is a mistake.‡

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* वामेन चक्षुषा दृष्टस्य दक्षिणेन चक्षुषा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् स्थिरात्मसिद्धिरिति केषाञ्चिन्मतं तन्निराकरणायैतदुपन्यासः ॥

† एतद्दूषयति ॥

‡ मध्यस्थसेतुना तडागस्येव नासास्थिव्यवहितगोलकान्तरावच्छिन्नतया द्वैतप्रत्ययो भ्रम इत्यर्थः ॥

b. Some one objects.*

एकनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशात् ॥ ९ ॥

Objection to the unity of the organ of vision. *Aph.* 9.—[The two eyes, says some one, cannot be one single organ,] because, when the one is destroyed, the other does not perish.

a. If the organ of vision were single, then, on the destruction of one eye, there should be blindness:—such is the import.†

b. One partially informed rebuts this as follows:‡—

अवयवनाशेऽप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ १० ॥

An imperfect reply to the objection. *Aph.* 10.—This is no argument, for, though a part have perished, we still perceive that of which it was the part.

a. Since, even on the destruction of a part, as a branch, one recognises that of which it was the part, as the tree, there is no rule that the whole shall every where perish on the destruction of a part; and so, even on the destruction of one [eye,] there is not blindness.§

b. In order to set to rights the opinion of the partially inform-

* आक्षिपति ॥

† चक्षुरैक्ये एकचक्षुर्नाशेऽन्धत्वं स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ अथैकदेशी परिहरति ॥

§ अवयवस्य शाखादेर्नाशेऽप्यवयविनो वृक्षस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नावयवनाशे सर्वत्रावयविनाशनियमस्तथा चैकनाशेऽपि नान्धत्वमिति ॥

ed person, and the objection aforesaid, here is an aphorism of the author.*

दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ११ ॥

This matter cleared up. *Aph.* 11.—This is no reply, for the illustration is not in point.

a. The foregoing reply is not proper, because the illustration is 'not in point,' is not applicable. For, on the cutting off of the branches, *the tree* does *not* abide; for, if that were the case, we should find the tree to be indestructible:—therefore, since in that case a *mutilated* tree is constituted by the remaining parts, the opinion of the partially informed person is not correct. By the same argument is negatived also the attempt to establish a distinction [of the organ of vision into two,] on the ground that when one [eye] is destroyed the other does not perish;—for, even when one eye has been destroyed, there may remain a *mutilated* organ of vision in virtue of the parts that belong to the other eye-ball.†

b. He states another argument for a distinction between the Soul and the Senses.‡

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* एकदेशिमतस्य पूर्वोक्ताक्षेपस्य च समाधानाय सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रम् ॥

† उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तो दृष्टान्तस्य विरोधादयुक्तत्वात्। न हि शाखाच्छेदे वृक्षस्तिष्ठति तथा सति वृक्षस्यानाशप्रसङ्गादतो ऽवस्थितावयवैस्तत्र खण्डवृक्षोत्पत्तेर्नैकदेशिमतं युक्तं। एतेनैकनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशाद्भेदसाधनमपि प्रत्युक्तं चक्षुर्नाशेऽपि गोलकान्तरावच्छिन्नावयवैः खण्डचक्षुःसम्भवात् ॥

‡ आत्मन इन्द्रियभेदे युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् ॥ १२ ॥

Another proof that the senses are not the soul.

Aph. 12.—Because there is a change [in an organ of sense,] through something other than the sense.

a. When an acid substance is seen, as the fruit of the Gadelupa arborea, since, from the remembrance of its taste, there is a change in the organ of taste, in the shape of an overflowing of the water of the teeth, it is settled that there is a Soul, other than the organ,* [in which Soul that remembrance resides].

b. Some one objects.†

न स्मृतेः स्मर्त्तव्यविषयत्वात् ॥ १३ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 13.—Nay, because the remembrance is lodged in the thing remembered.

a. For it is a fixed thing that the remembrance is concerned about the thing remembered.‡

b. He clears up this.§

तदात्मगुणत्वसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

The reply.

Aph. 14.—This is no objection, because it [—viz., remembrance—] is really a quality of the Soul.

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* चिरबिल्वाद्यम्लद्रव्ये दृष्टे तद्रसस्मरणाद्दन्तोदकसम्प्लवरूपरसनेन्द्रियविकारादिन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा सिध्यति ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ स्मृतिर्हि स्मर्त्तव्यविषयिणीति नियमः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. The aforesaid objection is not proper, because, by the evidence which acquaints us with the subject [viz., the Soul, the substratum of knowledge under all its forms], it is proved that memory is a quality of the Soul—exclusively a quality of the soul; and because we are conscious that it is *I* that remember, [and not my Sense of Taste or Smell that remembers]; and because, if the relation of cause and effect [in the case of memory and the thing remembered,] were lodged in the object, then, because Chaitra knew [this or that object], we should find Maitra recollecting it:—such is the import.*

b. Pondering the doubt whether memory be not intimately united with the objects remembered, he removes it.†

अपरिसंख्यानाच्च स्मृतिविषयस्य ॥ १५ ॥

A doubt in regard to memory cleared up.

Aph. 15.—And by reason of the innumerableness of the objects of memory, [it is simpler to suppose that it inheres in one separate subject].

a. Some say that this is not an aphorism but [a portion of] the *Bháshya*.‡

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* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः। धर्मिग्राहकमानेन स्मृतेरात्मगुणत्वात्परिशेषेणात्मगुणत्वसिद्धेरहं स्मरामीत्यनुभवात्। विषयनिष्ठकार्यकारणभावे चैत्रस्य ज्ञानान्मैत्रस्य स्मरणापत्तेरिति भावः॥

† विषयाणां स्मर्त्तव्यानां स्मृतिसमवायित्वं स्यादित्याशङ्क्य समाधत्ते॥

‡ इदं न सूत्रं किन्तु भाष्यमिति केचित्॥

b. Here ends the section on the non-duality of the organ of vision.*

c. He ponders the doubt—but then, since the Mind (*manas*) is eternal, let *it* be [what is called] the Soul.†

SECTION IV.

How the mind is not the soul.

नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात् ॥ १६ ॥

Whether the Mind be the Soul.

Aph. 16.—Nay [—says some one, there is no Soul other than the Mind—], because the arguments that establish [what you choose to call] Soul are applicable to [what we all call] the Mind.

a. There is no other Soul [than Mind];—nothing else than Mind is meant in the arguments that establish [the existence of what is called] Soul:—such is the import.‡

b. He clears up this.§

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ १७ ॥

Soul and Mind not to be confounded.

Aph. 17.—Since there is a knower and an instrument of knowledge, it is merely a difference of names [your calling these by one name or another].

* समाप्तं चक्षुरद्वैतप्रकरणम् ॥

† ननु मनसो नित्यत्वादात्मत्वमस्त्वित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ नातिरिक्त आत्मा आत्मसाधकमानानां मनसार्थान्तरमिति भावः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. If the Mind were the knower, then it would be necessary to mention some other instrument for the production of attention, &c., [in the Mind,—whereas the Mind, in this system, is regarded as the instrument for producing attention to one thing at a time in the Soul]. And thus it is fixed that there is one knower and one instrument;—but to say "let *Mind* be Soul," is merely a matter of naming. Moreover, there is this unavoidable difference [between Mind and Soul], that the Mind, as it produces attention, is proved to be an Atom [—so that no more than one thing at one time can pass through it to the Soul]; and the Soul, as it conduces to perception, has magnitude, [—otherwise any perceptible impression on it were impossible];—such is the import.*

b. But then [some one may say],—let the perception of Colour, &c., require an instrument [as the eye, &c.], but not so the [non-sensuous] perception of Pleasure, &c. In like manner, though other Atoms transcend perception, the Mind may be perceptible [with its impressions];—to which he replies:—†

नियमश्च निरनुमानः ॥ १८ ॥

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* यदि मनसो ज्ञातृत्वं तदा व्यासङ्गाद्युपपादनाय करणान्तरमवश्यं वाच्यं। तथाचैको ज्ञाता ज्ञानसाधनञ्चैकं सिद्धं। मन आत्मास्त्विति संज्ञामात्रं। किञ्च व्यासङ्गोपपादकतया मनसो ऽणुत्वं सिद्धमात्मनश्च प्रत्यक्षोपपादकतया महत्त्वमिति भेद आवश्यक इति भावः ॥

† ननु रूपादिप्रत्यक्षं सकरणकमस्तु न तु सुखादिप्रत्यक्षं॥ एवं परमाण्वन्तरस्यातीन्द्रियत्वे ऽपि मनसः प्रत्यक्षं स्यादत आह ॥

This reiterated. *Aph.* 18.—**And such an arrangement is unsupported by argument.**

a. The sort of arrangement, which you have alleged, is 'unsupported by argument,' i. e., it has no evidence;—because it is cumbrous [the argumentum ab inconvenienti], and because, if the contrary be asserted, there is nothing to decide the question.*

b. Here ends the section on the differentness of Mind† [from Soul].

c. Though Soul have thus been proved to be different from Body, &c.,—still, but for its being eternal, no one would strive as desirous of the next world. Therefore we have an aphorism to set forth the eternity of the Soul.‡

SECTION V.

On the Soul's having neither beginning nor end.

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोक-
सम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ १९ ॥

Proof of the soul's eternity. *Aph.* 19.—Because joy, fear, and grief, arise to him that is born, through relation to his memory of things previously experienced.

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* उक्तो नियमविशेषो निरनुमानः निष्प्रमाणकः गौरवाद्वैपरीत्ये च विनिगमकाभावाच्चेति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं मनोभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ एवं साधिते ऽपि देहादिभिन्न आत्मनि विना तन्नित्यतां न परलोकार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिरत आत्मनित्यताप्रतिपादनाय सूत्रम् ॥

a. To 'him that is born,' i. e., to a child,—the causes of joy, &c., in this birth, not even having as yet been experienced by him,—there 'arise,' i. e., there spring up, joy, &c.,—[evidenced, e. g., by smiles,—and we conclude that the child must have existed in previous lives,] because this can only be through relation to memory dependent on successively antecedent cases of consciousness. And since thus the soul—of the time being—is proved to have existed during successively antecedent times, it can have had no beginning; and of an entity that had no beginning there is no destruction;—thus its eternity is demonstrated:—such is the import.*

b. How he ponders a doubt.†

पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः ॥ २० ॥

A conjecture about infants. *Aph.* 20.—His [i. e., the child's] changes [of countenance, says some one,] are like the changes, of expanding and closing up again, in lotuses, &c.

a. The joy, &c., of the child, are inferred from the expanding, &c., of his countenance; and this [—viz., that the inference should be altogether demonstrative,] is impossible, because this [expansion, &c.,] occurs just through the force of some peculiar

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* जातस्य बालस्य एतज्जन्माननुभूतेष्वपि हर्षादिहेतुषु सत्सु हर्षादीनां सम्प्रतिपत्तिः। उत्पत्तिस्तस्याः पूर्वपूर्वानुभवाधीनस्मृतिसम्बन्धादेव सम्भवात्। इत्थञ्चेदानीन्तनस्यात्मनः पूर्वपूर्वसिद्धौ तस्यानादित्वमनादेश्च भावस्य न नाश इति नित्यत्वसिद्धिरिति भावः॥

† अत्र शङ्कते॥

unseen [influence], just as in the case of the expansion, &c., of lotuses, and the like:—such is the import.*

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.†

नोष्णशीतवर्षाकालनिमित्तत्वात् पञ्चात्मक-
विकाराणाम् ॥ २१ ॥

Infants are not vegetables.

Aph. 21.—Nay, because the changes in things that consist [barely] of the five [elements], are caused by heat, cold, rain, and season.

a. What was alleged [in §20] is not proper; because those changes which take place 'in things that consist of the five,' i. e., in things that are made up of [nothing besides] the five elements, as lotuses and the like, are caused by warm weather, &c:—but the expansions of the face, &c., of men, &c., are caused by joy, &c.;—so that there is no similarity [between the two cases]:—such is the import.‡

b. He states another argument for the eternity of soul.§

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* बालस्य हर्षादयो मुखविकासाद्यनुमेया न च तत्सम्भवः पद्मादीनां प्रबोधादिवददृष्टविशेषाधीनक्रियावशादेव तदु-पपत्तेरिति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ उक्तं न युक्तं यतः पञ्चात्मकानां पाञ्चभौतिकानां पद्मादीनां ये विकारास्तेषां उष्णकालादिनिमित्तत्वात् । मनुष्यादीनान्तु हर्षादिनिमित्तका मुखविकासादय इति न तुल्यतेति भावः ॥

§ आत्मनित्यत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

प्रेत्याहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्तन्याभिलाषात् ॥ २२ ॥

Another argument for the eternity of Soul.

Aph. 22.—Because of the desire for milk caused, by the practice of eating it, in one that has [been born after having] died.

a. 'After having died,' i. e. of one who, having died, has just been born, the desire for milk is, in short, produced by the practice of eating it;—for the child applies itself to drinking the breast through the remembrance of there being the means of gratifying the desire,—this [remembrance] being dependent on the impression awakened by the soul's deserts, [and the impression being] generated by the knowledge, pertaining to eating in a previous life, of there being [e. g., in the breast] the means of supplying the thing desired. Therefore it [the soul] is eternal:* [because the same consideration which convinces us that the soul existed at least *once* before the present life, proves equally that it existed at least once before that antecedent life,—and so on without end].

b. He ponders a doubt.†

अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणम् ॥ २३ ॥

Another conjecture about infants.

Aph. 23.—Like the approach of the iron to the loadstone [suggests some one,] is the approach of him, [i. e., of the new-born child to the breast].

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* प्रेत्य मृत्वा जातमात्रस्य यः स्तन्याभिलाषः स तावदाहाराभ्यासजनितः जन्मान्तरीणाहारेष्टसाधनताधीनताधी-जन्यजीवनादृष्टोद्बोधितसंस्काराधीनेष्टसाधनतास्मरणेन हि बालः स्तनपाने प्रवर्त्तते इत्यनादित्वमिति ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

a. As the iron, in the vicinity of the loadstone, goes towards the loadstone, exactly so does the child also go towards the breast;—but this is no gesture resulting from an effort [of volition] dependent on the knowledge that this is the means of attaining what is wished:—such is the meaning.*

b. He clears up this.†

नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात् ॥ २४ ॥

Difference between an infant and a piece of iron.

Aph. 24.—Nay, for there is no [voluntary] effort in the other.

a. For there is no effort 'in the other,' i. e., in the iron. For voluntary effort is inferred from gestures [obviously directed towards some desirable end], but the token [from which we may infer voluntary effort] is not mere motion:—therefore there is no undue extension [of the argument, from the case of the child to the case of the iron]:— such is the import.‡

b. He states another argument.§

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ २५ ॥

Another argument for the eternity of the soul.

Aph. 25.—Because we see nothing born devoid of desire.

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* यथायस्कान्तसन्निहितस्यायसोऽयस्कान्ताभिमुखतया गमनं तथैव वत्सस्यापि स्तनोपसर्पणं नत्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानाधीनप्रवृत्तिजन्यचेष्टेयमित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अन्यत्र अयसि प्रवृत्त्यभावात्। प्रवृत्तिर्हि चेष्टानुमिता लिङ्गं न तु क्रियामात्रमतो न व्यभिचार इति भावः ॥

§ हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

a. One 'devoid of desire,' i. e., in short empty of desires, does not arise,—but on the contrary [every creature that is born is] possessed of desires; and therefore the reason [for the desire exhibited,] is remembrance dependent on the knowledge, belonging to a previous life, of the power of supplying the desire;—so, a little way back, the desire of *milk* was instanced, but now it is *desire* simply [that is spoken of—], common to the inclination for eating grain, &c., in the case of birds, &c.; so that this is not an instance of tautology.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ २६ ॥

A conjecture respecting the soul.

Aph. 26.—It arises [says some one,] just as a thing with qualities arises.

a. As a 'thing,' i. e., a jar, or the like, 'with qualities,' i. e., distinguished by colour, &c.,—as a jar, or the like, is just of itself coloured, &c., —just so the soul also, of itself, is possessed of desires; so that there is no occasion for thy arguments [to prove how it comes to be possessed of desires] :—such is the import.‡

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* वीतरागो रागशून्यस्तावन्नोत्पद्यते अपितु सरागस्तेन च जन्मान्तरीयेष्टसाधनताज्ञानाधीनस्मरणं हेतुरिति पूर्वं स्तन्याभिलाष उक्तः सम्प्रति तु पतगादीनां कणादिभक्षणाभिलाषसाधारणं रागमात्रमित्यपौनरुक्त्यम् ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ द्रव्यस्य घटादेर्यथा सगुणस्य रूपादिविशिष्टस्योत्पत्तिर्यथा घटादिः स्वत एव रूपादिमान्भवति तथैवात्मापि स्वत एव सरागो भवतीत्यप्रयोजकत्वं त्वदीयहेतूनामिति भावः ॥

b. He clears up this.*

न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम् ॥ २७ ॥

How desires arise in the soul.

Aph. 27.—Not so, because desire, &c., are caused by judgment.

a. 'Judgment,' i. e., knowledge;—in short, the knowledge that something can effect what is desired. For desire, &c., are caused by this,† [—and knowledge, in a new-born child, implies its acquisition in a previous life].

b. Here ends the section on the [soul's] want of a beginning and of an end.‡

c. The examination of Body having presented itself in its turn, some say that the Body, of men, &c., is composed of the five Elements. In regard to that, here is an aphorism conveying our tenet.§

SECTION VI.

The body considered.

पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥

The body proved to be of earth.

Aph. 28.—It [the Body] is earthy, because the special qualities [of earth] are found [in the Body].

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* समाधत्ते ॥

† सङ्कल्पो ज्ञानमिष्टसाधनताज्ञानं इति यावत्। तन्नि-मित्तका हि रागादयः ॥

‡ समाप्तमनादिनिधनप्रकरणम् ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्ते शरीरपरीक्षणे मानुषादिशरीरं पाञ्चभौतिकमित्येके तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

a. The Body, of men and others, is 'earthy,' i. e., has Earth as its substantial cause, because there are found in it the 'special qualities,' as Smell, Black and other colour, Hardness, &c.*

b. Here is a set of three aphorisms, to set forth another view.†

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः ॥ २९ ॥

निश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम् ॥ ३० ॥

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्च-
भौतिकम् ॥ ३१ ॥

Various opinions about the Body.

Aph. 29.—It is earthy, watery, and fiery, [says some one,] because the qualities of these are found [in the body].

Aph. 30.—It consists of four of the elements, [i. e., of air, in addition to the preceding three,] because [says another,] we find [in it] inspiration and expiration.

Aph. 31.—It consists of all the five elements, [says another,] because there is smell [which belongs to earth], moisture [which belongs to water], digestive warmth [which belongs to fire], breathing [which belongs to air], and the furnishing of room, [which belongs to space, or Ether].

a. These opinions, as being contemptible, are not [honoured by being] refuted by the author of the aphorisms.‡

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* मानुषादिशरीरं पार्थिवं पृथिवीसमवायिकारणकं गुणान्तरस्य गन्धनीलादिरूपकाठिन्यादेरुपलब्धेरिति ॥

† मतान्तराभिधानाय त्रिसूत्री ॥

‡ एतानि मतानि सूत्रकृता तुच्छत्वान्न दूषितानि ॥

b. He states another argument for its consisting of earth.*

श्रुतिप्रामाण्याच्च ॥ ३२ ॥

According to scripture the body is of earth.

Aph. 32.—And [the body consists of earth,] because scripture is the authority.

a. Here ends the section on the examination of Body.†

b. Now Sense is to be examined. In regard to this, in order to examine what is stated in the aphorism of the definition [B. I, §12], that the senses are formed of the Elements, he mentions a doubt.‡

SECTION VII.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE SENSES.

कृष्णसारे सत्युपलम्भाद्व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भात्संशयः ॥ ३३ ॥

Question as to what is to be called the sense.

Aph. 33.—There is a doubt [as to what is to get the name of the Sense], because, when there is the pupil of the eye, there is the perception [of the object], and because there is the perception separately [from the pupil of the eye].

a. When there is the 'pupil,' i. e., the ball of the eye, since a jar, &c., is perceived, the *eye-ball* is the sense,—says the Bauddha. Others say that they [the senses] are other than the eye-ball, because 'there is perception,' i. e., because perception is produced,

* पार्थिवत्वे युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

† समाप्तं शरीरपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ अथेन्द्रियं परीक्षणीयं तत्र लक्षणसूत्रोक्तभौतिकत्वमिन्द्रियाणां परीक्षितुं संशयमाह ॥

'separately,'—i. e., [the sense,—but certainly not the *eye-ball*,—] having reached [or come into contact with] the object. In regard to this point there is the doubt whether the senses be other than the eye-balls [&c.] or not. The Naiyáyikas, &c., hold that they *are* other than the eye-balls [&c.]. In regard to this point, also, the Sánkhyas [—see *Tattwa-Samása*, §54—] hold that they consist not of the Elements, but of Consciousness (*ahankára*): and others that they consist of the Elements.*

b. In regard to this, combating the Bauddha opinion by means of the Sánkhya opinion, he says.†—

महदणुग्रहणात् ॥ ३४ ॥

How the eye-ball is not the sense.

Aph. 34.—By reason of the apprehension of the great and the small.

a. The eye-ball is not the sense, for then it [—viz., the character of a sense—] would unduly extend to the [impossible] case of something that acts where it is not present. And thus [what some say, viz.,] "we must say that it [the sense] is something other than the eye-ball, and formed of some Element,"—that also is incongruous,—because, by the eye, what has little bulk and what has great bulk is apprehended, and what is large cannot be embraced by what is small [like the eye itself, or like the visual

* कृष्णसारे चक्षुर्गोलके सति घटाद्युपलम्भाद्गोलकस्येन्द्रियत्वमिति बौद्धः। व्यतिरिच्य विषयं प्राप्य उपलम्भात् उपलम्भजननाद्गोलकातिरिक्तानीत्यपरे। तत्र इन्द्रियाणि गोलकातिरिक्तानि नवेति संशयः। गोलकातिरिक्तानीति नैयायिकादयः। तत्राप्यभौतिकान्याहङ्कारिकाणीति सांख्याः। भौतिकानीत्यपरे॥

† तत्र सांख्यमतेन बौद्धमतमुदस्यन्नाह॥

ray which some allege as the sense of sight], nor, without being embraced [in its full extent,] can any thing be apprehended; therefore [concludes the Sánkhya,] the Senses, not consisting of the Elements, consist of Consciousness.*

b. He refutes the Sánkhya.†

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षात्तद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ३५ ॥

The Nyáya theory of Vision.

Aph. 35.—It is by the contact of the ray and the object that it is apprehended.

a. The [visual] 'ray' is light contained in the eye-ball. From the peculiar 'contact,' i. e., a kind of conjunction, which takes place between this light and the 'object,' as a jar, or the like, the apprehension of the great and of the small is produced. We see that the power of manifesting both what is great and what is small belongs to something formed of the Elements, as a lamp, or the like; but if it [the sense] were *not* formed of the Elements [it would not be obstructed by the Elements, and] we should perceive *all* things, whether placed in front or behind.‡

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* गोलकं नेन्द्रियं अप्राप्यकारित्वे ऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। इत्थञ्च गोलकातिरिक्तं भौतिकमिति वाच्यं तदप्यसङ्गतं चक्षुषा हि न्यूनपरिमाणं महत्परिमाणञ्च गृह्यते नच न्यूनेन महतो व्यापनं सम्भवति नवाव्याप्यग्रहणमतो ऽभौतिकानीन्द्रियाण्याहङ्कारिकाणीति ॥

† सांख्यं निरस्यति ॥

‡ रश्मिर्गोलकावच्छिन्नं तेजः। तेजो ऽर्थस्य घटादेः सन्निकर्षविशेषः संयोगविशेषस्तस्मात् महदणुवोर्ग्रहणमुपपद्यते। भौतिके ऽपि प्रदीपादौ महदणुप्रकाशकत्वं दृष्टं। अभौतिकत्वे तु पुरःपश्चाद्वर्त्तिनां सर्वेषामेव ग्रहः स्यात्॥

b. The Bauddha suspects that this luminous organ of vision is disproved by its not being perceived.*

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ३६ ॥

The theory questioned.

Aph. 36.—This is not the cause, [says the Bauddha,] because we perceive no such thing.

a. Contact of a ray with the object is not the cause [of vision], because we perceive no ray in addition to the eye-ball.†

b. He clears up this.‡

नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिर-
भावहेतुः ॥ ३७ ॥

Reply to this.

Aph. 37.—That we do not apprehend it perceptively, is no proof of the non-existence of what we infer.

a. That is to say, our not apprehending it perceptively does not ascertain the non-existence of what we infer from such a consideration as this, that the perception of Colour implies some instrument§ [by which the eye establishes a communication with the object].

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* तैजसे चक्षुष्यनुपलब्धिबाधं बौद्धः शङ्कते ॥

† रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षो न हेतुर्गोलकातिरिक्तस्य रश्मेरनुपलब्धेः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ रूपोपलब्धेः सकरणकत्वादिनानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिर्नाभावनिर्णायिकेत्यर्थः ॥

b. How then is it [the visual ray] not perceived? To this he replies.*

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः ॥ ३८ ॥

Conditions of visibility.

Aph. 38.—And perception depends upon the sort of character of the subject and of its qualities.

a. By the sort of character of the subject is meant magnitude, &c.; the sort of character of the quality is obviousness:—since perception is dependent on this, there is no rule that a substance, simply as such, shall be perceived. That in which there is obvious colour, and magnitude, &c., is perceived;—from the absence thereof, the organ of sight, &c., are not perceived.†

b. Whence is there really not obvious colour in the organ of sight, &c.? With reference to this doubt the *Bháshya* says.—‡

कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः ॥ ३९ ॥

No need that the senses should have been visible.

Aph 39.—And the arrangement of the senses, occasioned by [man's] works, is subservient to the purposes of man.

a. The 'arrangement,' i. e., the peculiar structure, of the senses, dependent on certain deserts [in the person who is perfectly or imperfectly furnished with them], is a means of enjoyment [and

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* कथं तर्हि नोपलम्भ इत्यत आह ॥

† द्रव्यस्य धर्मभेदो महत्त्वादिर्गुणस्य धर्मभेद उद्भूतत्वं। तदधीनत्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य द्रव्यमात्रे उपलब्धेर्न नियमः। यत्रोद्भूतरूपमहत्त्वादिकं तस्य प्रत्यक्षं तदभावाच्चक्षुरादेरप्रत्यक्षम् ॥

‡ चक्षुरादावुद्भूतरूपमेव न कुत इत्याशङ्कायां भाष्यम् ॥

not an object of observation]. Some say that this is really an aphorism,* [while others hold that it is a clause of the *Bháshya*].

b. He states an instance of [even] a large coloured object's being imperceptible.†

मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४० ॥

Not wonderful that the organ of vision should be imperceptible.

Aph. 40.—It is not perceived, just as the light of a firebrand at mid-day is not perceived.

a. As the light of a large firebrand, [though] possessing colour, by being overpowered by the light of the sun, is not perceived at midday, [much more] the organ of vision also, since it is *not* possessed of obvious colour, may not be perceived :—such is the import.‡

b. But then, that way, [some one may say,] a jar, or the like, also may have a ray, which, again, is not perceived in consequence of its being overpowered by the light of the sun. To this he replies.§—

न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः ॥ ४१ ॥

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* अदृष्टविशेषाधीन इन्द्रियाणां व्यूहो रचनाविशेष उपभोगसाधनमिति । सूत्रमेवेदमिति केचित् ॥

† महतो रूपवतोऽनुपलब्धौ दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

‡ महतो रूपवतश्चोल्काप्रकाशस्य सौरालोकेनाभिभवा-न्मध्यन्दिनेऽनुपलब्धिवदनुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वाच्चक्षुषोऽप्यनुपलम्भः सम्भवतीति भावः ॥

§ नन्वेवं घटादेरपि रश्मिः स्यात्सौरालोकेनाभिभवा-त्पुनरग्रह इत्यत आह ॥

An objection to the visual ray disposed of.

Aph. 41.—Nay, because even in the night this is not perceived. [See §44.]

a. After 'nay.' supply "[nor] is there any ray in a jar, or the like."*

b. But then what is the proof of this, that it is from its want of obvious colour that the organ of vision is not perceived, and not from its being overpowered—[like, the firebrand at §40]? To this doubt of some indifferent person he replies.—†

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद्विषयोपलब्धेरनभिव्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४२ ॥

Invisibility of the visual ray whence.

Aph. 42.—It is not perceived in consequence of its unobviousness, because an object is perceived through the aid of external light.

a. In consequence of 'unobviousness,' i. e., in consequence of the non-possession of obvious colour, the organ of vision is not perceived:—why?—because an object is perceived 'through the aid of external light,' i. e.. with the aid of the light of the sun, or the like. If it possessed obvious colour, it would need no external light, [being itself of the nature of light;] and if it were overpowered, then even therewith there would be no perception produced, because what is overpowered can effect nothing:—such is the import.‡

b. But then [some one may say], it is not the organ of sight, but the *colour* thereof, that is overpowered,—and there is no

* नेत्यस्य घटादौ रश्मिरिति शेषः ॥

† नन्वनुद्भूतरूपत्वाच्चक्षुषोऽनुपलब्धिर्नत्वभिभवादित्यत्र किं विनिगमकमिति तटस्थाशङ्कायामाह ॥

‡ अनभिव्यक्तितोऽनुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वाच्चक्षुषोऽनुपलब्धिः । कुतः । बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहात् । शौरालोकादिसापेक्षत्वाद्वि-

proof that it is this [colour] that generates perception. Moreover, this itself is not perceived, through its being overpowered, and there is nothing contradictory in the perception of other things' taking place:—to which doubt he replies.*—

अभिव्यक्तौचाभिभवात् ॥ ४३ ॥

Only the manifest can become hidden.

Aph. 43.—And [it is not through its being overpowered that the organ of sight is not perceived,] because there is overpowering [only] where there is [—in the absence of the overpowering cause—] manifestation.

a. Where, of colour, there is 'manifestation,' i. e., perception,—obviousness, in short. For, where something that possesses obvious colour is not perceived, we conjecture that it is overpowered; but this is not the case in the present instance.†

b. He states another proof of [there being such] an organ of sight.‡

नक्तञ्चररश्मिदर्शनाच्च ॥ ४४ ॥

The visual ray where discernible.

Aph. 44.—And because we see the [visual] ray of nocturnal animals.

a. Of 'nocturnal animals,' cats, and the like, since we see the

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षयोपलब्धेः। तस्योद्भूतरूपत्वे बाह्यप्रकाशापेक्षा न स्यात्। अभिभूतत्वे च तत्साहित्येनापि प्रत्यक्षजननं न स्यादभिभूतस्य कार्याक्षमत्वादिति भावः॥

* ननु चक्षुषो नाभिभवः किन्तु तद्रूपस्य तस्य च प्रत्यक्षजनकत्वे मानाभावः। किञ्चाभिभवात् तस्य न प्रत्यक्षमितरप्रत्यक्षजनने च विरोधाभाव इत्याशङ्कायामाह॥

† रूपस्य अभिव्यक्तौ प्रत्यक्षे उद्भूतत्व इति यावत्। उद्भूतरूपस्य प्रत्यक्षाभावे ह्यभिभवकल्पना न त्वेवं प्रकृते॥

‡ चक्षुषि प्रमाणान्तरमाह॥

ray in the eye-ball,—by this example we infer the ray in the case of others also; such is the import:—otherwise, in the dark, *this* could not be seen:—such is the heart* [or force of the argument].

b. He ponders the doubt whether the [supposed] organ of sight must not act where it is not present.†

अप्राप्यग्रहणं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः ॥ ४५ ॥

Whether the sight apprehends what it cannot reach.

Aph. 45.—There is apprehension [—says some one—] of what is not reached [by the supposed visual organ], because we perceive that which is divided from us by glass, talc, a film, or crystal.

a. He clears up this.‡

कुड्यान्तरितानुपलब्धेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४६ ॥

Sight is interrupted by opaque bodies.

Aph. 46.—This is no objection [to our theory of vision], because we do not perceive what is divided from us by a wall.

a. The luminous nature [of the organ of vision] is established by the example of the lamp, inasmuch as it reveals what is divided from us by glass, and the like. But then how should it not be something that acts where it is not?—To this he replies 'by a wall,' &c. You cannot disprove the alleged luminous nature [of the visual organ,] by arguing that it consists of the eye-ball, be-

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* नक्तञ्चराणां वृषदंशादीनां गोलके रश्मिदर्शनात् तद्दृष्टान्तेन परेषामपि रश्म्यनुमानमिति भावः। अन्यथा तमसि तस्य प्रत्यक्षं न स्यादिति हृदयम् ॥

† अप्राप्यकारित्वं चक्षुषः स्यादित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

cause it does not perceive what is divided off by a wall,* [—and neither does a lamp reveal this,—though the lamp be unquestionably luminous].

b. But then, as it cannot be in contact with what is divided from it by a wall, so also [neither can it be in contact] with what is divided from it by a glass;—so how can it be said [in the latter case] to be acting upon what it has reached? In regard to this doubt he says.†—

अप्रतिघातात्सन्निकर्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ ४७ ॥

Sight not interrupted by transparent bodies.

Aph. 47.—Contact takes place because there is no obstruction.

a. That is to say, contact does 'take place, because, by the glass, or the like, which is a clear substance, there is no 'obstruction,' i. e., no hindrance.‡

b. He states an example of this.§

आदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरिते ऽपि दाह्ये ऽविघातात् ॥ ४८ ॥

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* प्रदीपदृष्टान्तेन काचाद्यन्तरितप्रकाशकत्वेन तैजसत्वं सिद्ध्यतीति। नन्वप्राप्यकारित्वं किं न स्यादत्राह कुड्येति। उक्तस्य तैजसत्वस्य प्रतिषेधो गोलकात्मकत्वं न सम्भवति कुड्यान्तरितस्यानुपलब्धेरिति ॥

† ननु कुड्यान्तरित इव काचान्तरिते ऽपि सन्निकर्षो न सम्भवतीति कथं प्राप्यकारित्वमित्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

‡ काचादिना स्वच्छद्रव्येणाप्रतिघातादप्रतिबन्धात्सन्निकर्ष उपपद्यत इति भावः ॥

§ तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

The sun's rays where uninterrupted.

Aph. 48.—Because a ray of the sun is not prevented from reaching something that is to be burned, though crystal be interposed.

a. 'Something that is to be burned' stands further for anything in general. But others say that this refers to the non prevention of fire, &c., from reaching the bowl-shaped half, which is to be baked, of a jar, or the like,* [even through opaque substances].

b. Some one objects.†—

नेतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४९ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 49.—Nay [says some one,]—because the property of the one presents itself in the other.

a. It is not right to say that there is no prevention; because in the one, i. e., in the crystal, or the like, there presents itself the property, viz, prevention 'which is that of the other,' i. e., of the wall, &c. That is to say, crystal, and the like, must obstruct just as a wall does.‡

b. He clears up this.§

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धि-
वत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥ ५० ॥

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* दाह्य इति वस्तुमात्रोपलक्षणं। परे तु दाह्ये कपालादौ वह्न्यादेरविघातपरं तदित्याहुः ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ अप्रतिघातो न युक्त इतरस्य स्फटिकादेरितरस्य कुड्यादेर्यो धर्मः प्रतिघातकत्वं तत्प्रसङ्गात्। स्फटिकादिकमपि कुड्यादिवत्प्रतिबन्धकं भवेदित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

Reply to the objection.

Aph. 50.—The perception thereof is as the perception of a form, in a mirror, or in water, through the possession of the nature of clearness.

a. In a mirror, and in water, 'through the possession of the nature of clearness,' i. e., through the being possessed of a clear nature, the form of the face, or the like, is perceived,—but not in a wall, or the like;—in like manner, what has crystal, or the like, interposed, is perceived; but not what has a wall, or the like, interposed;—and there is no fault to find here, because it is from the nature of things. By this we debar the objection, that, as fire, &c., is not stopped by a jar, or the like, the sight also ought not to be stopped [by the same]; because, though a thing may not stop fire [or heat], it is [by the nature of things,] possible it may intercept it [sight,] as it does the light of a lamp, or the like:—such is the import.*

b. What proof is there in support of the hypothesis that the organ of vision is such [as has been here set forth]? To this he replies.†—

दृष्टानुमितानां हि नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ ५१ ॥

Hypotheses must accommodate themselves to facts.

Aph. 51.—For neither injunctions nor prohibitions can be imposed on ob-

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* आदर्शे उदके च प्रसादस्वाभाव्यात्स्वच्छस्वभावत्वात् मुखादिरूपोपलब्धिर्न तु भित्त्यादावेवं स्फटिकाद्यन्तरितस्योपलब्धिर्न तु कुड्याद्यन्तरितस्येति स्वाभाव्यान्न दोषः। एतेन वह्न्यादेर्घटादिनाप्रतिघातवच्चक्षुषो ऽपि प्रतिघातो न स्यादिति प्रत्युक्तं वह्न्याद्यप्रतिबन्धे ऽपि दीपालोकादेः प्रतिबन्धवत्तत्सम्भवादिति भावः॥

† चक्षुषस्तादृशत्वकल्पने किं मानमित्यत्राह॥

served facts, or on inferences [legitimately derived from rightly observed facts].

a. 'For,' i. e., because:—of things seen and inferred,—or the meaning is—of things inferred from what has been seen:—in the case of these, the injunction "It shall be thus," or the prohibition "It shall not be thus," is nothing to the purpose;—for conjecture must defer to facts:—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of the senses.†

c. The expressions [as at §1] "through both Sight and Touch," &c., are to the purpose, *if* the senses be several; so, to supply a basis for this, the plurality of the senses has to be examined:—in regard to this he states a doubt.‡

SECTION VIII.

THAT THERE ARE MORE SENSES THAN ONE.

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशयः ॥ ५२ ॥

Whether the senses be more than one.

Aph. 52.—Since there is plurality where there is a diversity of place, and since what

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* हि यस्मात्। दृष्टानामनुमितानां वा पदार्थानां दृष्टेनानुमितानामिति वार्थः। तेषामेवं भवितेति नियोग एव मा भवितेति प्रतिषेधो वा नोपपद्यते। युक्त्यनुसारिणी हि कल्पनेति भावः॥

† समाप्तमिन्द्रियपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्॥

‡ दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामित्यादिकमिन्द्रियनानात्वे युज्यते इत्युपोद्घातेनेन्द्रियनानात्वं परीक्षणीयं तत्र संशयमाह॥

is made up of parts has several places, there is a doubt, [suggests some one, whether Sense be one or many].

a. 'Where there is a diversity of place,' i. e., where there are different places, as in the case of jars, webs, &c., since we observe a plurality; and since we see the unity of a whole which consists of many parts; there is a doubt whether plurality belongs to the senses, or unity.*

b. An aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.†

त्वगव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ५३ ॥

Whether all the senses be modifications of Touch.

Aph. 53.—The Touch,—because nowhere absent.

a. Let the Touch be the sole sense; 'because nowhere absent,' i. e., because of its really existing in all the situations of the senses.‡ [Compare Sir Wm. Hamilton's allusion, Reid's Works p. 104, to the shrewd conjecture of Democritus, that all the senses are only modifications of touch.]

b. He replies.§

न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः ॥ ५४ ॥

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* स्थानान्यत्वे स्थानभेदे घटपटादीनां नानात्वदर्शनान्ना-नावयवस्थितस्यावयविन एकत्वदर्शनाच्च इन्द्रियाणां नाना-त्वमेकत्वं वेति संशयः ॥

† पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ॥

‡ सर्वेष्विन्द्रियप्रदेशेष्वव्यतिरेकात् सत्त्वात्त्वगेवैकमिन्द्रि-यमस्तु ॥

§ उत्तरयति ॥

Why they cannot be so. *Aph.* 54.—Not so, because objects are not apprehended simultaneously.

a. Since 'objects,' i. e., Odours, Colours, &c., are not apprehended 'simultaneously,' i. e., at one and the same time, the Touch is not the sole organ of sense; otherwise, since it pervades [the whole body], at the time of visual perception, or the like, there must also be olfactory, &c.: such is the import.*

b. He states the diversity of their effects as a proof of the plurality of the senses.†

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् ॥ ५५ ॥

The senses must be five. *Aph.* 55.—Since the objects of the senses are five.

a. Since the 'objects of the senses,' i. e., Colour, &c., which are apprehended by the senses, 'are five,' i. e., are of five sorts. For Colour, &c., are heterogeneous, because they are apprehended only by the senses, sight, &c., severally; and this could not be the case, on the supposition of there being but one sense:—and we should find blind men, &c., [were that the case—] apprehending Colour, &c. :—such is the import.‡

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* युगपत् एकदा अर्थानां गन्धरूपादीनां अनुपलब्धेर्न त्वगेवैकमिन्द्रियं। अन्यथा तस्य व्यापकत्वाच्चाक्षुषादिकाले घ्राणजादिकमपि स्यादिति भावः॥

† इन्द्रियाणां नानात्वे कार्यभेदमानमाह॥

‡ इन्द्रियार्थानामिन्द्रियग्राह्याणां रूपादीनां पञ्चत्वात् पञ्चविधत्वात्। रूपादीनां हि चक्षुराद्येकैकेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यत्वाद्वैलक्षण्यं तच्चैकेन्द्रियपक्षे न सम्भवति। अन्धादीनां रूपाद्युपलब्धिप्रसङ्गश्चेति भावः॥

b. He ponders a doubt.*

न तदर्थबहुत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

This view questioned.

Aph. 56.—Not so, [says some one,] because their objects are multitudinous.

a. The division of the senses [into five], on the ground that the objects of the senses are five, is not proper; because, since the 'objects' of the senses, viz., blue, yellow, &c., are multitudinous, we should find [—according to your argument—] that the senses are many more† [than five].

b. He clears up this.‡

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

The objection removed.

Aph. 57.—This is no objection, because Odours, &c., are never without the nature of Odour, &c.

a. The aforesaid objection will not do, because 'Odour, &c.,' i. e., fragrance, &c., are 'never without the nature of Odour, &c.,' i. e., they always have the nature of Odour, &c. And so, what we mean [—when we talk, e. g., of what constitutes the sense of Smell—] is the 'fact of its being an apprehender, with distinctive reference to what separates it [from the other senses, viz.], the general nature of Odour,—but not its being an apprehender with distinctive reference to subordinate natures [—such

* शङ्कते ॥

† इन्द्रियार्थानां नीलपीतादीनां बहुत्वादिन्द्रियाणां बहुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादिन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वादिन्द्रियभेदो न युक्तः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

as the smell of this, that, and the other thing]:' such is the import.*

b. He ponders the doubt that, if things fragrant, &c., be one, on the ground that they have in common, e. g., the nature of Odour, then, since Odours, and Flavours, &c., also are one, in respect of their having in common the nature of Objects, there must be only one sense.†

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम् ॥ ५८ ॥

Further objection. *Aph.* 58.—Since the character of Object is never absent [from the objects of sense], oneness [of the senses, suggests some one, should follow].

a. 'Since the character of Object is never absent,' i. e. since there is unity [in all the multitude of things perceived], in as far as they are [all alike] objects.‡

b. He replies.§—

न बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजाति-
पञ्चत्वेभ्यः ॥ ५९ ॥

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* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न गन्धादीनां सौरभादीनां गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धत्वादिसत्त्वात्। तथाच विभाजकगन्धत्वावच्छिन्नग्राहकत्वमभिप्रेतं नत्ववान्तरधर्मावच्छिन्नग्राहकत्वमिति भावः॥

† यदि गन्धत्वादिना सुरभ्यादीनामैक्यं तदा विषयत्वेन गन्धरसादीनामप्यैक्यादिन्द्रियैक्यं स्यादिति॥

‡ विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकाद्विषयत्वेनैक्यात्॥

§ उत्तरयति॥

He replies. *Aph.* 59.—Not so, because, of the characters of knowledge, the provinces, the procedures, the forms, and the genera, there is severally a five-fold nature.

a. The senses are not one. He states his reason, saying 'of understanding,' &c. Since visibility, and the rest, which are the 'characters' of knowledge, visual or otherwise, are of five descriptions,—the instruments appropriated thereto are five. In like manner, their 'provinces,' i. e., the object, Colour, &c., because this is of five sorts. 'Procedure' is a going to a distance, &c. This is with reference to the Sight. Or 'procedure' is a *way*; and so it means, because of the five-fold character of their ways, because they differ in their ways,—for the Sight apprehends after having gone [to the object], the Touch [apprehends] in association with the body, the Hearing in association with the ear, and so on. 'Form' is some peculiar collocation, e. g., of the eye-balls. 'Genus' means the nature of Earth, &c., [the Smell being held to be earthy, the Taste watery, &c.,] but, really, Genus here means habit, [and not that which—see *Bháshá-parichchheda* §vi., *c*,—would exclude Ether,] so that the nature of Hearing [—the hearing being said to be ethereal—] is included.*

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* इन्द्रियाणामैक्यं न। हेतुमाह। बुद्धीत्यादि। बुद्धेश्चाक्षुषादेर्यल्लक्षणं चाक्षुषत्वादि तत्पञ्चत्वेन तदवच्छिन्नकरणानां पञ्चत्वं। एवमधिष्ठानं रूपादिर्विषयस्तत्पञ्चत्वात्। गतिः दूरादौ गमनं। इदं चक्षुरधिकृत्य। यद्वा गतिः प्रकारस्तथाच प्रकाराणां पञ्चत्वात्। चक्षुर्हि गत्वा गृह्णाति त्वग्देहावच्छेदेन श्रोत्रं कर्णावच्छेदेनेत्यादिप्रकारभेदात्। आकृतिर्गोलकानां संस्थानविशेषः। जातिः पृथिवीत्वादि। वस्तुतो जातिः धर्मस्तेन श्रोत्रत्वसंग्रहः॥

b. He states a proof that the Smell &c., are really of the nature of Earth, &c.*

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम् ॥ ६० ॥

Why Smell is held to be Earthy, &c.

Aph. 60.—Since they apprehend the peculiar qualities of the Elements, they are of the same nature, [severally, as the Elements to which these qualities are peculiar].

a. 'Of the Elements,' i. e., of Earth, &c., which are the 'peculiar qualities,' i. e., Odour, &c.;—since they apprehend these. The import is, that they are proved to have the nature of Earth, &c., by such examples as butter's bringing out the odour of saffron† [to which it is akin in respect of its earthy constitution; and so the Smell, which brings out the odours of things, must be earthy also. Compare the lines of Empedocles, quoted by Prof. H. H. Wilson at p. 122 of his *Sánkhya-káriká*].

b. Here ends the section on the plurality of the senses.‡

c. For the examination of the Objects [of sense], whose turn next arrives, we have an aphorism conveying a tenet.§

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* घ्राणादेः पृथिवीत्वादिसत्त्वे मानमाह ॥

† भूतानां पृथिव्यादीनां ये गुणविशेषा गन्धादयस्तदुपलम्भकत्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्जकघृतादिदृष्टान्तेन पृथिवीत्वादिसाधनमिति भावः ॥

‡ समाप्तमिन्द्रियनानात्वप्रकरणम् ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तार्थपरीक्षणाय सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

SECTION IX.

EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSES.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्या अप्तेजो-
वायूनां पूर्वपूर्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः ॥ ६१ ॥

The Qualities of the Elements.

Aph. 61.—Of Odour, Savour, Colour, Tangibility, and Sound, those ending with Tangibility belong to Earth; rejecting each preceding one in succession, they belong to Water, Light, and Air; the last belongs to Ether.

a. Among those, as far as Tangibility, having left out successively each preceding one, are to be recognised the qualities of Water, Light, and Air. The 'last,' viz., Sound, is the quality of Ether. And so those among which Tangibility is the last, belong to Earth; Savour, Colour, and Tangibility, to Water; Colour and Tangibility to Light; Tangibility to Air; Sound to Ether.*

b. Some one objects.†

न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः ॥ ६२ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 62.—Not so, [says some one,] because the whole of the qualities [of each alleged Element] are not apprehended [by the single appropriate sense].

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* स्पर्शपर्यन्तेषु मध्ये पूर्वपूर्वं त्यक्त्वा अप्तेजोवायूनां गुणा ज्ञातव्याः। उत्तरः शब्द आकाशस्य गुणः। तथाच स्पर्शान्ताः पृथिव्या रसरूपस्पर्शा जलस्य रूपस्पर्शौ तेजसः स्पर्शो वायोः शब्द आकाशस्य ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

a. The above-mentioned assignment of qualities is not proper. Since all that are conceived to be qualities, e. g., of Earth, are not apprehended, e. g., by Smell, there is no such genus as earthiness, &c., for the Savour, &c., of Earth is not apprehended by Smell, [—whereas, according to §60, the earthy sense is what apprehends the earthy Element]. The import is, that such a distribution ought to be observed, that the external senses should apprehend the *whole* of the qualities that are capable of belonging to [the several Elements which are alleged to be] their several material;* [—that only being entitled, e. g., to be reckoned a quality of the earthy element, which is apprehended by the sense that is formed out of elemental earth; and so of the rest].

b. And so what is the state of the case as regards the Savour, &c., that are perceived in Earth, &c.? In regard to this he [the objector,] states his own opinion.†

एकैकस्यैवोत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावादुत्तरोत्तराणां
तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ६३ ॥

The objection pursued. *Aph.* 63.—Since the severally subsequent qualities [says the objector,] belong to those severally subsequent, just each to each, these are not perceived [by the organ of any preceding one].

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* उक्तो गुणनियमो न युक्तः। पृथिव्यादेर्गुणत्वाभिमतानां सर्वेषां घ्राणादिग्राह्यत्वाभावाच्च पार्थिवत्वादिकं घ्राणेन पृथिव्यां रसाद्यग्रहणात्। बहिरिन्द्रियाणां स्वप्रकृतिपृथिव्याद्यशेषगुणग्राहकत्वनियमो भज्येतेति भावः॥

† इत्थञ्च पृथिव्यादावुपलभ्यमानानां रसादीनां का गतिरित्यत्र स्वमतमाह॥

a. 'Those severally subsequent,' viz., Water, &c.,—'just each to each,' i. e., in their respective order;—'since the qualities severally subsequent thereto belong,' i. e., since Savour and the other qualities belong;—'these are not perceived,' i. e., these, Savour, &c., are not perceived by Smell, &c.:—such is the meaning.*

b. Then how *are* Savour, &c., apprehended in Earth, &c? In regard to this he says:†—

संसर्गाच्चानेकगुणग्रहणं विष्टं ह्यपरम्परेण ॥ ६४ ॥

Alleged commixture of the senses. *Aph.* 64.—And it is through their commixture [says some one,] that there is the apprehension of more than one, for the one is interpenetrated by the other.

a. 'The one,' i. e., Earth, &c;—'by the other,' i. e., by Water, &c.;—'for,' i. e., because;—'interpenetrated,' i. e., combined:—and so Savour, &c., is perceived through the conjunction of the sense of Taste [with that of Smell], through the Water [—the element of Taste,—] &c., that is in the same place with the Earth [—the element of Smell,—] &c.:—such is the import.‡ [Compare *Vedánta Sára*, No. 68.]

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* उत्तरोत्तराणां अबादीनां एकैकस्यैव एकैकक्रमेण तदुत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावात् रसादिगुणसद्भावात् तदनुपलब्धिरेषां रसादीनां घ्राणादिनानुपलब्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† तर्हि कथं पृथिव्यादौ रसादिग्रहणं तत्राह ॥

‡ अपरं पृथिव्यादि । परेण जलादिना । हि यस्मात् । विष्टं सम्बद्धं । तथा च पृथिव्याद्यवच्छिन्नजलादिना रसना-संयोगाद्रसादिग्रह इति भावः ॥

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.*

न पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥

The Nyáya view of the matter.

Aph. 65.—Not so, because, of the Earthy and the Watery, there is immediate knowledge.

a. The aforesaid assignment of the qualities [in §64,] is not proper;—why?—because earthy and watery substance is directly perceived, i. e., they really have Colour and Tangibility. Were they devoid of Colour and Tangibility, they would not be apprehended by Sight and Touch; and it is cumbrous to suppose that Colour, &c., is caused, in some [of the elements], by direct connection [of colour with the element], and, in others, mediately:—such is the import.†

b. If Savour, e. g., be a quality, e. g., of Earth, then [says some one,] we should find it apprehended, e. g., by the [earthy organ, viz.,] Smell. He states what determines this point.‡

पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात्तत्तत्प्रधानम् ॥ ६६ ॥

Each sense has its own appropriate object.

Aph. 66.—In each, in order, as the [respective] quality is intense, it is principally characterised by this or that.

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* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† उक्तो गुणनियमो न युक्तः । कुतः । पार्थिवस्याप्यस्य च द्रव्यस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वाद्रूपस्पर्शसिद्धेस्तस्य रूपस्पर्शशून्यत्वे चक्षुषा त्वचा च ग्रहणं न स्याद्रूपादेश्च क्वचित्साक्षात्सम्बन्धेन क्वचिच्च परम्परया हेतुत्वे गौरवमिति भावः ॥

‡ रसादेः पृथिव्यादिगुणत्वे घ्राणादिनापि तद्ग्रहणप्रसङ्ग इत्यत्र नियामकमाह ॥

a. 'Each in order,' viz., Smell and the rest [of the senses];—'principally characterised by Odour, &c.,—he states the source of this principalness, viz., 'as the quality is intense,' i. e., as the quality, Odour, &c., is intense, is distinctive of this or that. And so, among Odour and the rest, the Smell and the rest apprehend only their own distinctive quality* [severally].

b. But then, [some one may say,] since Odour may predominate in other things than Earth, *which* is the Sense, and which is not the Sense [in respect of this or any other sense-object]? In regard to this he says.†

तद्व्यवस्थानन्तु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ ६७ ॥

The Senses need not be confounded.

Aph. 67.—But this is determined by the excessiveness

a. 'By the excessiveness,' i. e., by its originating, e. g., from Earth that is not peculiarised by [any noticeable proportion of] Water, &c.;—' this is determined,' i. e., it is determined whether the Sense is the Smell, or the like.‡

b. He states a proof that the Smell, &c, do possess the quality of Odour, &c.§

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* पूर्वंपूर्वं घ्राणादि। तत्तत्प्रधानं गन्धादिप्रधानं। प्राधान्ये बीजमाह गुणोत्कर्षाद्गुणस्य गन्धादेरुत्कर्षात्तद्व्यवस्थापकत्वात्। तथाच गन्धादिषु मध्ये स्वव्यवस्थापकगुणस्यैव ग्राहकत्वं घ्राणादीनामिति ॥

† ननु पृथिव्यन्तरस्यापि गन्धप्राधान्यात्किमिन्द्रियं किमनिन्द्रियमित्यत्राह ॥

‡ भूयस्त्वात् जलाद्यविशिष्टपृथिव्याद्यारब्धत्वात्तद्व्यवस्थानं घ्राणादीन्द्रियत्वव्यवस्थितिः ॥

§ घ्राणादीनां गन्धादिगुणवत्त्वे मानमाह ॥

सगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात् ॥ ६८ ॥

How the five senses must have the five qualities.

Aph. 68.—Because only what have the qualities can be the Organs [perceptive of the qualities].

a. 'Because [only] what have the qualities,' i. e., what are peculiarised by Odour, &c., viz., the Smell, &c., 'can be the organs,' i. e., can be the causes of the perception of Odour, &c.;—because we see the same thing in such examples as butter's bringing out the odour of saffron,* [—see §60].

b. And their Odour, &c., being thus established, it is conjectured, from the fact of its not being perceived, that it is not developed, [see §38;] adverting to which, he says:†—

तेनैव तस्याग्रहणाच्च ॥ ६९ ॥

Imperceptibility of the qualities of the Senses.

Aph. 69.—And because it is not apprehended by that same.

a. Since 'by that,' i. e, by the Sense, 'it,' i. e., the Sense which has a quality, is not apprehended, the undeveloped character [of the quality] is conjectured.‡

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* सगुणानां गन्धादिविशिष्टानां घ्राणादीनामिन्द्रियभावात् गन्धादिसाक्षात्कारकारणत्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्जकघृतादौ तथैव दर्शनात् ॥

† इत्थञ्च गन्धादिसिद्धावप्रत्यक्षत्वादनुद्भूतत्वकल्पनमित्याशयेनाह ॥

‡ तेन इन्द्रियेण तस्य सगुणस्येन्द्रियस्याग्रहणादनुद्भूतत्वकल्पनमिति ॥

b. He ponders the doubt—but then it is not necessary that the qualities in the Senses be imperceptible.*

न शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः ॥ ७० ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 70.—Not so, because the quality Sound is perceived [as pertaining to the organ of Hearing].

a. The aforesaid rule is not correct, because Sound *is* perceived as the quality of the organ of Hearing.†

b. He clears up this.‡

तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ७१ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 71.—The perception of it is in consequence of the difference of the qualities of substances, one from another.

a. In consequence of the difference mutually between 'the qualities of substances,' viz., Colour, Sound, &c., there is perception of Sound [as belonging to the organ of Hearing], and not of Colour in the organ of vision, and the like:—because, for simplicity, it is settled that the substratum of Sound [viz., the Ether,] is but one, [so that the organ of Hearing, being ethereal, is one with it:] such is the import.§

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* नन्विन्द्रियगुणानामप्रत्यक्षत्वनियमो नेत्याशङ्कते ॥

† उक्तो नियमो न युक्तः शब्दस्य श्रोत्रगुणस्योपलब्धेः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ द्रव्यगुणानां रूपशब्दादीनां परस्परं वैधर्म्याच्छब्दस्योपलब्धिर्न चक्षूरूपादीनां। शब्दाश्रयस्य लाघवेनैक्यसिद्धेरिति भावः ॥

b. Here ends the section on the examination of the Objects* [of the senses].

c. So much for the First Diurnal Portion of the Third Book, viz., the Examination of the set of four, among the objects of right knowledge, beginning with Soul.†

d. Now, since its turn has arrived, there is the examination of Understanding and Mind. Simply the examination thereof, in seven sections, is the matter of this Diurnal Portion. But others say that the matter of this Diurnal Portion is really the examination of whatever, being an object of right knowledge, exists within the Body,—an examination of whatever has any relation adapted to the experience to which this is common that it pertains to the body. But this is not right, for it would unduly extend to an examination of the Senses [—which reside in the Body, but which have been examined, already, in the preceding Diurnal Portion]. And, among these, the examination of Understanding *(buddhi)* is in five sections. Among these, in the first place, there is the section on the fact that Understanding is not eternal. In order to set forth a doubt in regard to this point, we have an aphorism.‡

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* समाप्तमर्थपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

† इति तृतीयाध्यायस्याद्यमाह्निकं आत्मादिप्रमेयचतुष्कपरीक्षणं नाम ॥

‡ अथ क्रमप्राप्ततया बुद्धेर्मनसश्च परीक्षा सप्तभिः प्रकरणैस्तत्परीक्षैव चाह्निकार्थः। परे तु शरीरावच्छेद्व्याप्यभोगानुकूलसम्बन्धवत्परीक्षा शरीरान्तर्वर्त्तिप्रमेयपरीक्षैवाह्निकार्थ इति तदसत् इन्द्रियपरीक्षायामतिव्याप्तेः। तत्रच बुद्धिपरीक्षा पञ्चभिः प्रकरणैः। तत्रादौ बुद्ध्यनित्यताप्रकरणं। तत्र संशयदर्शनाय सूत्रम् ॥

SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

ON THE EXAMINATION OF UNDERSTANDING, AND MIND.

SECTION X.

ON THE NON-ETERNITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात्संशयः ॥ ७२ ॥

Whether knowledge be eternal.

Aph. 72.—Since it resembles Action, and the Ether, there is a doubt [whether it be transitory like the one, or eternal like the other].

a. 'Since it resembles Action and the Ether,' viz., in being intangible, there is a doubt whether what is meant by the word Understanding be eternal,—which amounts to the question whether the word 'Understanding' mean something eternal or not.*

b. In regard to this, the Sánkhya establishes the eternity of Understanding.†

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ७३ ॥

Sánkhya argument for the eternity of the understanding.

Aph. 73.—Since objects are recognised.

a. Supply—therefore the Understanding is eternal. The recognition "I who saw the jar, the same *I* do touch the jar" supposes, as its sphere, some one thing liable to modifications; and the Soul is not so, for this, no subject of emergent habitudes, is

* कर्मण आकाशस्य च साधर्म्यादस्पर्शत्वाद्बुद्धिपदार्थनित्यत्वसंशयः । बुद्धिपदं नित्यशक्तं न वेति संशयपर्यवसन्नः ॥

† तत्र बुद्धिनित्यत्वं सांख्यः साधयति ॥

unalterable; therefore [argues the Sánkhya,] there really is an understanding which is liable to modifications; but its modification is [not a production, but] an affection;—for Understanding, too, is only revealed or concealed, but not produced or destroyed.*

b. He refutes this.†

साध्यसमत्वादहेतुः ॥ ७४ ॥

Its refutation. *Aph.* 74.—This is no reason; because it is in the same condition with what is to be proved.

a. The fact of there being one that recognises, is no reason [for supposing, in man, an eternal understanding other than Soul,] 'because this is in the same condition with what is to be proved,' i. e., because this [alleged reason, like the question in dispute,] is not established [and admitted by both parties]; for, in consequence of such expressions as "I know," it is the Soul only that is regarded as a recogniser. Its "unalterableness" is merely its having neither beginning nor end; but it is not proved that it is anything else:—such is the import.‡

b. He rejects the Sánkhya opinion, that just from the under-

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* बुद्धिर्नित्येति शेषः। यो ऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सो ऽहं घटं स्पृशामीतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानमेकं वृत्तिमन्तं विषयीकरोति। न चात्मा तथा तस्य जन्यधर्मानधिकरणस्य कूटस्थत्वात्। तस्माद्वृत्तिमती बुद्धिरेव वृत्तिस्तु तस्याः परिणामः बुद्धेराप्याविर्भावतिरोभावावेव न तूत्पादविनाशाविति॥

† परिहरति॥

‡ साध्यसमत्वात् असिद्धत्वात् प्रतिसन्धातृत्वं न हेतुः। अहं जानामीत्यादिना आत्मन एव प्रतिसन्धातृप्रत्ययात्।

standing, which is permanent, there issue, like sparks from fire, modifications, not different from the thing modified, one to each object, consisting of knowledge.*

न युगपद्ग्रहणात् ॥ ७५ ॥

A Sánkhya opinion opposed. *Aph.* 75.—Not so, for apprehension [of various things] is not simultaneous.

a. If there were no distinction between the modification and that to which the modification belongs, then, since that which is modified is permanent, it must be granted that the modification also is permanent; and so the apprehension of all things should be simultaneously; and this is not the case; so that it is not the case that there is no distinction.†

b. Now the transitoriness of the modifications is asserted [by the Sánkhya]; in regard to which he says.‡

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानेच विनाशप्रसङ्गः ॥ ७६ ॥

अनादिनिधनत्वमेव तस्य कौटस्थ्यं अन्यादृशं त्वसिद्धमिति भावः ॥

* बुद्धेरेव स्थायिन्या यथाविषयं ज्ञानात्मिका वृत्तयो वृत्तिमदभिन्ना वह्नेरिव स्फुलिङ्गा निःसरन्तीति सांख्यमतं निरस्यति ॥

† वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरभेदे वृत्तिमदवस्थित्या वृत्तेरप्यवस्थितिर्वाच्या तथाच सर्वपदार्थग्रहणं युगपत्स्यात् नचैवं तस्मान्न भेद इति ॥

‡ अथ वृत्तीनामनवस्थायित्वमुच्यते तत्राह ॥

Further argument against the opinion.

Aph. 76.—And when there was not the recognition, we should find the destruction [of the recogniser].

a. 'When there was not the recognition,' i. e., when there was the non-existence, the destruction, of the recognition, there would be the destruction also of the modified, [if the modified and its modification were the same;] therefore the two are not one.*

b. He explains, on his own theory, how things are not apprehended simultaneously.†

क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ७७ ॥

Why apprehensions are not simultaneous.

Aph. 77.—The non-simultaneousness of apprehensions is in consequence of the successiveness of modifications.

a. Supply "of the mind." In consequence of the atomic character of the mind, as its conjunction with the senses is successive, cognitions are successive; and so the *Bháshya* introductory [to the aphorism,] says: "The Mind, unextended and one, combines with all the senses in succession:"—when the conjunction of the mind with this or that sense takes place, knowledge is possible.‡

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* अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य अभावे विनाशे वृत्तिमतो ऽपि विनाशः स्यादतो न द्वयोरैक्यम् ॥

† अयुगपद्ग्रहणं स्वमते व्युत्पादयति ॥

‡ मनस इत्यादिः । मनसो ऽणुत्वादिन्द्रियैः सह क्रमेण सम्बन्धात् ज्ञानानां क्रमिकत्वं । तथाच अविभु चैकं मनः पर्यायेण सर्वेन्द्रियैः सम्बध्यत इत्यवतारभाष्यं । तत्तदिन्द्रियमनस्संयोगे सति ज्ञानमुपपद्यते ॥

b. He explains how knowledge ceases in the absence of this.*

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानञ्च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात् ॥ ७८ ॥

How apprehensions cease. *Aph.* 78.—And there is cessation of the perception, when it [the Mind,] applies itself to another object.

a. 'Cessation of the perception,' i. e. non-existence of the knowledge produced by this or that sense; through the conjunction of the mind with 'another object,' i. e., with another Sense:—such is the meaning.†

b. And this could not be the case, on thy theory, as he states.‡—

न गत्यभावात् ॥ ७९ ॥

The mind not infinitely extended. *Aph.* 79.—Nay, because there could be no going of the mind, [from one to another].

a. On thy theory, the mind could not be conjoined with the senses successively, because, as being all-pervading, the mind could not go§ [from one point to another].

b. He ponders a doubt, with the view of setting forth that, even granting that there were really no distinction between the

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* तद्व्यतिरेके ज्ञानाभावमुपपादयति ॥

† अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं तत्तदिन्द्रियजज्ञानाभावः । विषयान्तरेण इन्द्रियान्तरेण मनसः सम्बन्धादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ त्वन्मते चेदं नोपपद्यते इत्याह ॥

§ त्वन्मते मनसः क्रमेणेन्द्रियसम्बन्धो न मनसो विभुत्वेन गत्यभावात् ॥

modified and its modification, there is the belief of a distinction.*

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमानः ॥ ८० ॥

A sceptical suggestion. *Aph.* 80.—As crystal is fancied to be different, so is this fancied to be different.

a. As, from the proximity of the Hibiscus flower and other things, a crystal, though one and the same, is fancied to have the colour of this or that, so the [mental] modification, [says some one,] though not different from the modified, through the influence of the contact with this or that object, appears as if various.†

b. He censures

न हेत्वभावात् ॥ ८१ ॥

This repelled. *Aph.* 81.—Not so, for there is no proof.

a. That is to say, what is asserted [in §80,] is not right, because there is no proof that such a mistake [in the general belief respecting mind and its operations,] takes place.§

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* वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्वस्तुतो ऽभेदे ऽपि भेदप्रत्ययप्रतिपादनाय शङ्कते ॥

† यथा जवाकुसुमादिसन्निधानादेकस्यापि स्फटिकस्य तत्तद्रूपाभिमानस्तथा वृत्तिमदभिन्नापि वृत्तिस्तद्विषयसन्निकर्षवशान्नानेव प्रतिभासत इति ॥

‡ दूषयति ॥

§ भ्रमत्वे साधकाभावान्नोक्तं युक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

b Here ends the section on the non-eternity of understanding.*

c. A Buddhist, not tolerating the illustration, [in § 80,] that, "There is a mistaken notion of diversity, as in the case of crystal," states his doubt.†

SECTION XI.

DISPROVING THE MOMENTARY DURATION OF THINGS.

स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद्व्यक्तीना-
महेतुः ॥ ८२ ॥

The sceptic argues from the momentary duration of things.

Aph. 82.—That is no argument, because, [says the Buddhist,] since individuals are momentary in duration, even in the case of the crystal there is the arising of another and another.

a. It is no argument to say "like the fancy that the crystal is different:"—why?—'because, even in the case of the crystal, there is the arising of another and another,' i. e., there is the arising of a different and a different crystal. He states his proof of this,—'since individuals,' i. e., entities, 'are momentary.‡

b. In support of this there is the *Bháshya,* "From beholding,

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* समाप्तं बुद्ध्यनित्यताप्रकरणम् ॥

† स्फटिके इव नानात्वभ्रम इत्यसहमानः सौगतः शङ्कते ॥

‡ स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवदित्यहेतुः । कुतः । स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः विलक्षणविलक्षणस्फटिकोत्पत्तेः। तत्र मानमाह व्यक्तीनां भावानां क्षणिकत्वात् ॥

in bodies, the course of increase and decrease;"—from seeing, in bodies, from moment to moment, increase and decrease, the diversity [of the body, at one moment, from itself at the next moment, is inferred]:—for two magnitudes cannot belong to one and the same mass;—such is the import. Some say that this [passage of the *Bháshya*] is really an aphorism.*

c. An aphorism conveying the tenet.†

नियमहेत्वभावाद्यथा दर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा ॥८३॥

Proof of this needed.

Aph. 83.—Since there is no proof of any such absolute rule, we will acknowledge it [only] where we see reason.

a. Since there is no proof of its being an absolute rule that things are distinguished by an apparatus for their destruction, [—so that they must needs perish momentarily], yet, supposing it to be so, he says—'where we see reason:'—if there *be* a proof that anything is distinguished by an apparatus for its destruction, then the momentary duration of that shall indeed be acknowledged,—as, e. g., the last sound‡ [in any series, which is held to be self-destructive].

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* तत्साधनाय भाष्यं उपचयापचयप्रबन्धदर्शनाच्छरीरेषु। प्रतिक्षणं शरीरेषूपचयापचयदर्शनान्नानात्वं। नह्येकस्मिन्नवयविनि परिमाणद्वयसमावेश इति भावः। इदं सूत्रमेवेति केचित्॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्॥

‡ पदार्थानां विनाशसामग्रीवैशिष्ट्यनियमे मानाभावात्। अभ्युपेत्याह यथा दर्शनमिति। यदि कस्यचिद्विनाशसामग्री-

b. He states another argument.*

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ८४ ॥

Production and destruction result from what.

Aph. 84.—Not so, because the causes of production and destruction are apprehended.

a. There does not belong, to crystal, &c., a momentary duration; because the causes of production and destruction [in general] have been ascertained by perception, viz., addition and abstraction of parts, &c.; and in the case of the crystal no cause of destruction is discerned, by which there should be destruction of the previous [crystal] and production of a subsequent one:—such is the import.†

b. Some one objects.‡—

क्षीरविनाशकारणानुपलब्धिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिवच्च
तदुपपत्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥

An inadmissible suggestion.

Aph. 85.—And this may be accounted for, [suggests some one,]

वैशिष्ट्ये मानं स्यात्तदा क्षणिकत्वं तस्याभ्यनुज्ञायत एव यथान्त्यशब्द इति ॥

* युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

† न स्फटिकादेः क्षणिकत्वं यत उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणान्युपलब्ध्या निर्णीतान्यवयवोपचयापचयादीनि। नच स्फटिके विनाशकारणमुपलभ्यते येन पूर्वविनाशोऽपरोत्पत्तिश्च स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ आक्षिपति ॥

just as the production of curd, where no cause of the destruction of the milk is discerned.

a. 'As the production of curd,' i. e., as the cause of the production of curd is not discerned; 'this may be accounted for,' i. e., the non-apprehension of a cause of the destruction of the previous crystal, and the non-apprehension of a cause of the production of a subsequent crystal, may consistently be:—such is the import.*

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.†

लिङ्गतो ग्रहणान्नानुपलब्धिः ॥ ८६ ॥

Its rejection.

Aph. 86.—This is *not* unapprehended, because it is apprehended inferentially.

a. And since the destruction of the milk [that went to the making] of the curd is demonstrated by perception, a cause of this [destruction] is conjectured; but not in this way are destruction and production of the crystal apprehended, so as that any cause thereof need be conjectured.‡

b. In regard to the Buddhistic doctrine he cites an objection of the Sánkhya.§

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* दध्युत्पत्तिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिकारणानुपलब्धिवत् तदुपपत्तिः पूर्वस्फटिकविनाशकारणानुपलब्धेरुत्तरस्फटिकोत्पत्तिकारणानुपलब्धेश्चोपपत्तिः स्यादिति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ दध्नः क्षीरविनाशस्य च प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्तत्कारणं कल्प्यते नत्वेवं स्फटिकविनाशोत्पादावुपलभ्येते येन तत्कारणकल्पनम् ॥

§ सौगतमते सांख्यदूषणमुपन्यस्यति ॥

न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् ॥ ८७ ॥

The Sánkhya doctrine of transformation.

Aph. 87.—Not so [says the Sánkhya], because there is a transformation, a manifestation of other qualities, in the case of the milk.

a. There is not a destruction of the milk and a production of curd, but there is a 'transformation' of the milk;—the meaning of the word 'transformation' is 'manifestation of other qualities.' The meaning is, that there is a disappearance of the previous flavour of the still existent milk through the manifestation of another quality, in the shape of an acid flavour.*

b. The author of the aphorisms rejects this.†

व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेरनुमानम् ॥ ८८ ॥

The Nyáya view on this point.

Aph. 88.—The seeing arise, from a different arrangement, a different substance, is an argument for the surcease of the previous one.

a. From 'a different arrangement,' i. e., from a different composition; the destruction of the previous combination of parts, and the production of another substance, is recognised; such is the import.‡

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* न क्षीरस्य नाशो दध्नश्चोत्पत्तिः किन्तु क्षीरस्य परिणामः । परिणामशब्दार्थो गुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावः । विद्यमानस्य क्षीरस्य पूर्वरसतिरोभावो ऽम्लरसात्मकगुणान्तरस्याविर्भावादित्यर्थः ॥

† एतन्निराकरोति सूत्रकारः ॥

‡ व्यूहान्तराद्रचनान्तरात् पूर्वावयवसंयोगनाशो द्रव्यान्तरोत्पादश्चानुभविक इति भावः ॥

b. In order to mention another fault [in the argument at §85], there is an aphorism of the author.*

क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८९ ॥

An erroneous view objected to.

Aph. 89.—Since in some cases the cause of destruction is not perceived.

a. [For this reason,] and because in some cases [see §84] it *is* perceived, this [viz., the illustration made use of at §85] is ambiguous :—it is not proper, on the strength of the example of milk and curd, to say that destruction and production have no causes, —because this is invalidated by our perceiving the presence of a cause thereof in the case of a jar, or the like. In reality, since the cause of the destruction of milk is the contact of a sour substance, and since curd originates from the sour-tasted particles [thence resulting], the destruction of milk and the generation of curd are *not* without a cause.†

b. Here ends the section regarding momentary destruction‡ [and reproduction of things].

c. Although the fact that understanding is a quality of Soul was pretty well established by the examination of Soul [at the commencement of the present Book], yet, in order to set this

* दोषान्तराभिधानाय सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रम् ॥

† क्वचिच्चोपलब्धेरनैकान्तः । क्षीरदधिदृष्टान्तेन विनाशोत्पादावकारणकाविति न युक्तं घटादौ सकारणकत्वोपलब्धेर्व्यभिचारात् । वस्तुतः क्षीरविनाशे ऽम्लद्रव्यसंयोगस्य हेतुत्वादम्लरसवत्परमाणुभिश्च दध्न आरम्भात्सकारणकौ क्षीरविनाशदध्युत्पादाविति ॥

‡ समाप्तं क्षणभङ्गप्रकरणम् ॥

forth explicitly, we have a section on Understanding's being a quality of Soul. And here a primâ facie view presenting itself, viz., since it [understanding] depends on the conjunction of a sense with its object, suppose that it is just located in the sense, &c., as Sound, which depends on the conjunction of the musical instrument and the Ether, is lodged in the Ether;—we have an aphorism conveying the tenet.*

SECTION XII.

How knowledge is a quality of Soul.

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशे ऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात् ॥ ९० ॥

Knowledge not a quality of Sense.

Aph. 90.—If [knowledge] belongs neither to the Sense nor to the Object, because, even on the destruction thereof, knowledge abides.

a. Understanding is not a quality of the Sense nor of the Object, because, even when that perishes, knowledge, i. e., memory, abides, i. e., exists:—for memory is impossible in the absence of the one who was [previously] cognizant [of the thing remembered], for this would be beyond the rule [that he only who has experienced can remember];—such is the import.†

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* बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वं यद्यप्यात्मपरीक्षातं एव सिद्धप्रायं तथापि विशिष्य व्युत्पादनाय बुद्ध्यात्मगुणत्वप्रकरणं। तत्रचेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाधीनत्वादिन्द्रियादिनिष्ठत्वमेवास्तु भेर्याकाशसंयोगाधीनशब्दस्याकाशनिष्ठत्ववदिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† बुद्धिर्नेन्द्रियस्य न वार्थस्य गुणस्तन्नाशे ऽपि ज्ञानस्य स्मरणस्यावस्थानात् उत्पत्तेः। नह्यनुभवितुरभावे स्मरणमुपपद्यते ऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति भावः ॥

b. He denies that it [knowledge] is a quality of the Mind.*

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः ॥ ९१ ॥

Nor of the Mind.

Aph. 91.—Nor to the Mind [the existence of which is inferred] from the non-simultaneous apprehension of what things are knowable.

a. The character of agent [—and knowledge is the quality of the agent—] does not belong to the Mind, which is proved to exist [—see §77—] by this argument that what things are knowable are not apprehended simultaneously; for it [the Mind] is proved to be only an instrument [in the hands of Soul], by the argument that there must be a subject, [of whatever qualities, properties, &c., may be proved to exist]. In reality, by the fact that what things are knowable are not apprehended simultaneously, we are made aware that the Mind is an Atom, and thus pleasure, &c., if lodged in it [instead of in the Soul], would be imperceptible. So too when there is a set of bodies [tenanted by one Yogí] there would be no knowledge, &c., in this or that body,† [—since the mental atom could be present in no more than one at one time].

b. He ponders a doubt.‡

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* मनोगुणत्वं निरस्यति ॥

† युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेर्हेतोः सिद्धस्य मनसो न कर्तृत्वं धर्मिग्राहकमानेन करणत्वेनैव सिद्धेः। वस्तुतो युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेरित्यनेन मनसो ऽणुत्वं सूचितं तथाच तद्गतसुखाद्यप्रत्यक्षता स्यात्। एवं कायव्यूहे तत्तद्देहावच्छेदेन ज्ञानादिकं न स्यादिति ॥

‡ शङ्कते ॥

तदात्मगुणत्वे ऽपि तुल्यम् ॥ ९२ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 92.—It were the same [suggests some one], even were it [knowledge] a quality of Soul.

a. Even were it, viz., knowledge, a quality of the Soul, there ought equally to be simultaneousness of cognitions, because the Soul [—being all-pervading—] is in conjunction with all the organs of Sense.*

b. He replies.†—

सन्निकर्षाभावान्नदनुपपत्तिः ॥ ९३ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 93.—This cannot be, because of the absence of the conjunction [of the Mind].

a Because of the absence of the conjunction of the Mind with several senses simultaneously, there is not the simultaneous apprehension of several objects, [—the soul, even where present, operating only through its instrument the Mind] ;—such is the import.‡

b. Some one objects.§—

नोत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात् ॥ ९४ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 94.—Not so [—says some one—], because you do not state the cause of its existence.

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* तस्या बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे ऽपि ज्ञानयौगपद्यं तुल्यं आत्मनः सर्वेन्द्रियसंयोगात् ॥

† उत्तरयति ॥

‡ युगपज्ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सह मनसः सन्निकर्षाभावान्न युगपज्ज्ञानाविषयोपलब्धिरिति भावः ॥

§ आक्षिपति ॥

a. Since you do not state, i. e., since you do not mention, any cause of the existence of knowledge, we deny that knowledge is a quality of Soul:—if its cause be [—as you seem to insinuate—] the conjunction of Soul and Mind, then [since these are always in conjunction] it appears that knowledge must be eternal, [contrary to what has been made out]:—such is the import.*

b. Some one alleges the following objection also to the notion that knowledge is a quality of Soul.†

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ ९५ ॥

The objection further. *Aph* 95.—And if it abide there, we should find it to be eternal, because of there being no cause discernible for its destruction.

a. If knowledge were located in the soul, since no cause of destruction, i. e., of the destruction, &c., of that in which it resides, is discernible, we should find that it, viz., knowledge, is eternal,‡ [contrary to what has been made out].

b. He replies.§

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* बुद्ध्युत्पत्तौ कारणस्यानपदेशात् अकथनात् नात्मगुणो बुद्धिः । आत्ममनस्संयोगस्य कारणत्वे सार्वदिकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति भावः ॥

† बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे दोषमप्याह ॥

‡ बुद्धेरात्मन्यवस्थाने विनाशकारणस्याश्रयनाशादेरनुपलब्धेस्तस्या बुद्धेर्नित्यताप्रसङ्गः ॥

§ उत्तरयति ॥

अनित्यत्वग्रहणाद्बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत् ॥ ९६ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 96.—Since we perceive that it is *not* eternal, [we may conjecture that] one cognition is put an end to by another cognition, just like Sound.

a. Since we perceive that knowledge is not eternal, i. e., since we are conscious of its production and its destruction, a cause thereof being to be conjectured, it is conjectured that its producer is the conjunction of the Soul and the Mind, &c., and that its destroyer is subsequently emergent knowledge, or mnemonic impression, &c:—but of the last knowledge [to which none succeeds, so as to account for its supersession,] the destruction results from the cessation of desert, [—whereupon the soul attains a blissful freedom from ideas,—] or from time. As regards the destruction of one cognition by another cognition, he mentions a parallel instance, saying 'just like Sound.' As a sound is put a stop to by another sound, and the last sound ceases on the cessation of its cause, so is it also in the case of the thing in question:—such is the import.*

b. Here he ponders the objection of a partially informed person, viz., but then, if knowledge be a quality of the Soul, since the mnemonic impression and the conjunction of Soul and Mind actually are [at all times], acts of memory must be simultaneous.†

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* बुद्धेरनित्यत्वस्य ग्रहणात् उत्पादनाशयोरनुभविकत्वात्तत्कारणे कल्पनीये आत्ममनोयोगादेरुत्पादकत्वमनन्तरोत्पन्नबुद्धेः संस्कारादेर्वा नाशकत्वं कल्प्यते । चरमबुद्धेस्तु अदृष्टनाशात्कालाद्वा नाशः । बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तरनाश्यत्वे ऽनुरूपं दृष्टान्तमाह शब्दवदिति । शब्दस्य यथा शब्दान्तरनाश्यत्वं चरमशब्दस्य निमित्तनाशनाश्यत्वं तथा प्रकृते ऽपीति भावः ॥

† ननु बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे संस्कारात्ममनोयोगयोः सत्त्वात्स्मृतीनां यौगपद्यं स्यादित्येकदेशिनः परिहारमाशङ्कते ॥

ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षान्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ९७ ॥

An imperfect suggestion.

Aph. 97.—Since memory is produced [—suggests some one—] by the conjunction of the Mind with some portion of the Soul in which knowledge inheres, there is no simultaneous production [of many acts of recollection].

a. 'Knowledge,'—here the cause of a mnemonic impression,—in what portion it 'inheres,'—since the conjunction of the Mind with that portion is what produces memory,—and since this is successive,—there is no simultaneousness of recollections :—such is the meaning.*

b. Others say that the word [here translated] 'knowledge' (*jnâna*), according to the etymology which explains it as "that by means of which something is known," means here the mnemonic impression.†

c. He condemns this opinion‡ [conveyed in §97].

नान्तः शरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः ॥ ९८ ॥

He condemns this.

Aph. 98.—Not so, because it is within the body that the Mind has its function.

a. What is alleged [in §97] is not proper, because the Mind 'has its function within the body,' i. e., it is that of which the

* ज्ञानं संस्कारकारणं समवेतं यदवच्छेदेन तदवच्छेदेन मनस्सन्निकर्षस्य स्मृत्युत्पादकत्वात्तस्यच क्रमिकत्वान्न स्मृतियौगपद्यमित्यर्थः ॥

† ज्ञायते अनेनेति व्युत्पत्त्या ज्ञानपदं संस्कारपरमित्यन्ये ॥

‡ तन्मतं दूषयति ॥

function, viz., the operation which consists in producing knowledge, is within the body.*

b. That is to say, this [notion, implied in §97, that memory may result from the conjunction of Mind with Soul even beyond the body,] is entirely a mistake, because the conjunction of Soul and Mind in any place apart from the body is no cause of knowledge, that only being such cause which is within the limits of the body:—such is the import.†

c. A partially informed person ponders a doubt.‡

साध्यत्वादहेतुः ॥ ९९ ॥

A demur.

Aph. 99.—This, [says some one] is no reason, because it requires to be proved.

a. The conjunction, within the limits of the body, of Soul and Mind, is not [to be admitted as] the cause [of knowledge], because this 'requires to be proved,' i. e., it is not an established fact,—there is no proof:—such is the import.§

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet ||

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* उक्तं न युक्तं मनसः अन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वात् अन्तःशरीरे वृत्तिर्ज्ञानजनकीभूतो व्यापारो यस्य तत्त्वात् ॥

† शरीरातिरिक्तावच्छेदेनात्ममनोयोगस्य ज्ञानाहेतुत्वाच्छरीरावच्छिन्नस्य हेतुत्वे तद्दोषतादवस्थ्यमिति भावः ॥

‡ एकदेशी शङ्कते ॥

§ शरीरावच्छिन्नात्ममनोयोगो न हेतुः साध्यत्वात् असिद्धत्वात् मानाभावादिति भावः ॥

|| सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

स्मरतः शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ १०० ॥

The reply.

Aph. 100.—This is no objection, because the proof is that we find the supporting of the body during reminiscence.

a. The objection mentioned [at §99] is not proper, because there is a 'proof,' i. e., an argument [for the fact] that the Mind, in Memory, does not quit the body], in the shape of 'the supporting of the body during reminiscence;' otherwise, when the Mind was without, the body would not be supported, in the absence of effort, through there being [then] no conjunction of the Mind with the Soul *within* the limits of the body :—such is the import.*

b. Again some one ponders a doubt.†

न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः ॥ १०१ ॥

Another demur.

Aph. 101.—Not that [proves that the Mind does not leave the body, suggests some one], because the Mind moves swiftly.

a. The sustaining of the body is not [a proof that the Mind has not quitted it], because 'the Mind moves swiftly,' i. e., it returns quite quickly into the body.‡

b. He blames this.§

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* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः स्मरतः शरीरधारणरूपाया उपपत्तेर्युक्तेरन्यथा मनसो वहिर्भावे शरीरावच्छिन्नात्ममनोयोगाभावेन प्रयत्नाभावे शरीरधारणं न स्यादिति भावः ॥

† पुनः शङ्कते ॥

‡ शरीराधारणं न मनसः आशुगतित्वाच्छीघ्रमेव शरीरे परावृत्तेः ॥

§ दूषयति ॥

न स्मरणकालानियमात् ॥ १०२ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 102.—Not so, because there is no rule as regards the duration of reminiscence.

a. The quick returning of the mind is not to the purpose, because in reminiscence there is no rule as regards the time; sometimes a thing is recollected quickly, sometimes moreover, through attention, with delay.*

b. And you must not say that the attention belongs altogether to the Mind while abiding within the body, but that the out-going takes place immediately antecedently to the recollecting;—because the body would not be supported for so long as the space of time for the several actions adapted to its out-going and re-entering, &c. :—such is the import.†

c. Another partially informed person blames the opinion of the partially informed person‡ [in §97].

आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः ॥ १०३ ॥

An imperfect view. *Aph.* 103.—There is no such peculiar conjunction [—says some one—as that alleged in §97], whether

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* मनसः शीघ्रमागमनं न युक्तं स्मरणे कालनियमाभावात् कदाचिच्छीघ्रं स्मर्यते कदाचित्प्रणिधानाद्विलम्बेनापीति ॥

† नच प्रणिधानं शरीरान्तःस्थितमनस एव वहिर्निगमस्तु स्मरणाव्यवहितपूर्वमेवेति वाच्यं । वहिर्निगमान्तःप्रवेशानुकूलक्रियाविभागादिकालकलापं यावच्छरीरधारणं न स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ एकदेशिमतमन्य एकदेशी दूषयति ॥

through the Soul's sending [the Mind in search of what it wishes to recollect], or arbitrarily, or through its [the Mind's] being cognizant.

a. It is impossible there should be any peculiar conjunction of the Mind with any particular external locality,—for this could not take place through the Soul's sending it for the sake of recollecting, for, as this presupposes a knowledge of what is to be remembered [—compare Plato—], it would be a case of recollecting even before [sending the Mind in search]; nor again [could this alleged conjunction of the Mind take place] 'arbitrarily,' i. e., without a reason why; for it is denied that anything happens without a reason why; nor again through the Mind's being 'cognizant,' i. e., through its being that which knows,—because it is not held that the Mind [—but the Soul—] is the knower.*

b. Some one says that [the words which we have rendered] "through sending, or arbitrarily, or through its being cognizant," mean "through effort, and desire, and knowledge;" but this is not the case, because [—since effort presupposes desire, and desire knowledge—] it would turn out that all the meaning is conveyed by the term 'effort' alone,† [and that the other words are superfluous and tautological].

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* वह्निः प्रदेशविशेषे मनःसंयोगविशेषो न सम्भवति। स हि न स्मृत्यर्थमात्मप्रेरणेन तस्य स्मरणीयज्ञानपूर्वकतया प्रागेव स्मृत्यापत्तेः। नापि यदृच्छया अकस्मात् आकस्मिकत्वस्य निषेधात्। नापि मनसो ज्ञतया ज्ञातृतया मनसो ज्ञातृत्वानभ्युपगमात्॥

† प्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिः प्रयत्नेच्छाज्ञानैरित्यर्थ इति कश्चित्तन्न प्रयत्नेनैव चरितार्थत्वापत्तेः॥

c. He disallows this* [that is alleged in §103].

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण समानम् ॥ १०४ ॥

The foregoing view disallowed.

Aph. 104.—It is the same as the particular conjunction, in the case of him that is rapt in mind, when he hurts his foot.

a. In the case of one looking [intently] at dancing, or the like, when he hurts his foot with a thorn, or the like, as there takes place a conjunction of the Mind with that locality; just so is this also:—such is the import. Otherwise the alleged objections [in §103] would apply also to the conjunction of the Mind here [—within the limits of the body as well as without]. If you say that, that [conjunction of the Mind, or direction of the attention to the injured limb] is through the force of Action dependent on some particular desert, then it is just the same with the case in question also;—such is the import.†

b. He himself accounts for the non-simultaneousness of recollections.‡

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावाद्युगपदस्मरणम् ॥ १०५ ॥

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* एतन्निराकरोति ॥

† नृत्यादिकं पश्यतः कण्टकादिना पादव्यथनेन तदवच्छेदेन मनस्संयोगो यथा जायते तथैव तदपीति भावः। इतरथा तत्र मनस्संयोगेऽप्युक्तदोषाः स्युः। अदृष्टविशेषाधीनकर्मवशादसाविति चेत्तुल्यं प्रकृतेऽपीति भावः॥

‡ स्मरणायौगपद्यं स्वयमुपपादयति ॥

Why acts of memory are not simultaneous.

Aph. 105.—**Recollections are not simultaneous, because [efforts of] attention, and the knowledge of signs, &c., are not simultaneous.**

a. 'Attention' (*pranidhána*) means the direction of the mind to one point,—in short the desire to recollect. The 'knowledge of a sign' means an awakener [of memory]. The expression, "&c.", immediately after these awakeners, is to be joined on after the "knowledge." Since this is successive, recollection is successive. And if awakeners *are* simultaneous, [—e. g., when the recollection is of a complex fact—], it is to be understood that we quite agree that then the recollection embraces as many objects [as are simultaneously suggested],—as in the case of the knowledge of words, &c.,* [where several words simultaneously concur in calling up the complex import of a sentence].

b. But then [some one may say], since Desire, &c., are qualities of the Mind, since [again] they are products of knowledge, and since it is through their having the same substratum [as knowledge] that they [viz., Desire and knowledge] stand in the relation of product and cause, how is knowledge a quality of the *Soul* [and not of the Mind]? In regard to this doubt, there is an aphorism conveying a tenet.†

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* प्रणिधानं चित्तैकाग्र्यं सुस्मूर्षेति यावत्। लिङ्गज्ञानं उद्बोधकं। उद्बोधकानामानन्त्यादादिपदं ज्ञानात्परतो योजनीयं। तस्य क्रमात् स्मरणक्रमः। यदि च युगपदुद्बोधकानि तदा तावद्विषयकस्मरणमिष्यत एव यथा पदज्ञानादाविति मन्तव्यम्॥

† नन्विच्छादीनां मनोधर्मत्वात्तेषां ज्ञानजन्यत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्येनच तत्र कार्यकारणभावात्कथं ज्ञानस्यात्मगुणत्वमित्याशङ्कायां सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्॥

ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः ॥ १०६ ॥

Desire, &c., are qualities of the Soul.

Aph. 106.—They belong to the knower, because commencing and leaving off are caused by Desire and Aversion.

a. Desire, &c., belong to 'the knower,' i. e., the possessor of knowledge, viz., Soul. He states the reason, viz., 'because commencing and leaving off are caused by Desire and Aversion,' i. e., because doing and forbearing are products of Desire and Aversion, and knowledge, as having the same receptacle with them [—for else were this impossible—], is the cause of these, [viz., of Desire and Aversion]:—such is the import.*

b. Or the meaning is,—because they are caused by Desire and Aversion, which belong to the knower, i. e., to that to which knowledge belongs. And so the fact that knowledge, desire, and effort, have the same receptacle, is not un-established,† [—though this was charged against our theory at §105, *b*].

c. But then, grant that they have the same receptacle,—ponders the *Chárváka*,—yet their receptacle is only the form of the body,—an aggregate of earthy or other atoms.‡

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* ज्ञस्य ज्ञानवत आत्मन इच्छादयः । हेतुमाह । आरम्भनिवृत्त्योरिच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादिति । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरिच्छाद्वेषजन्यत्वात्तथच सामानधिकरण्येन ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वमिति भावः ॥

† यद्वा ज्ञस्य ज्ञानवतो याविच्छाद्वेषौ तन्निमित्तत्वादित्यर्थः । तथाच ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नानां सामानाधिकरण्यं नासिद्धम् ॥

‡ नन्वस्तु तेषां सामानाधिकरण्यं परन्तु तेषामधिकरणं कायाकारः पार्थिवादिपरमाणुपुञ्ज एवेति चार्वाकः शङ्कते ॥

तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्व-
प्रतिषेधः ॥ १०७ ॥

Opinion of the materialist.

Aph. 107.—It is not to be denied [—says the materialist—] that these exist in what consist of earth, or the like, because Desire and Aversion are indicated by those same [commencings and leavings off].

a. It is not to be denied that knowledge, &c., exist in 'what consist of earth, or the like,' i. e., in bodies [—earthy, watery, aerial, or fiery—];—why?—'because desire and aversion are indicated by those,' i. e., are indicated by commencing and leaving off—[see §106],—and these two [species of voluntary effort] are indicated by particular gestures,—and gesture is proved by immediate evidence to belong to the body:—such is the import.*

b. Seeking to clear up this, he states an objection† [to the view taken in §107].

परश्वादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ १०८ ॥

An objection to the materialistic view.

Aph. 108.—[This cannot be allowed,] because we see commencements and leavings off in axes and the like.

a. We should find it established [—were we to accept the reasoning in §107—] that there is knowledge, &c., in axes, and the like,—because [in the case of these] we see particular actions

* पार्थिवाद्येषु देहेषु ज्ञानादेर्न प्रतिषेधः। कुतः। इच्छाद्वेषयोस्तल्लिङ्गत्वादारम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गकत्वात्तयोः चेष्टाविशेषलिङ्गकत्वाच्चेष्टायाश्च शरीरे प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादिति भावः॥

† समाधित्सुः प्रतिबन्दिमाह॥

which might lead us to infer [voluntary effort directed towards] commencement and leaving off:—therefore, that particular movements are the result of voluntary effort must be through some other relation than that of inherence,—because of the straying away [of movement unaccompanied by any voluntary effort, inhering in or originating in the axe]:—such is the import.*

b. He explains the matter according to his own view.†

नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ ॥ १०९ ॥

Distinction between Spirit and Matter.

Aph. 109.—But the rule and the reverse of the rule are what distinguish these two.

a. 'What distinguish the two,' i. e., what distinguish, or difference from one another, the two, viz., Soul and Not-soul,—are 'the rule and the reverse of the rule,' i. e., the rule that the production takes place through intimate [and not some mediate] relation, and the reverse of this. It is through intimate relation that knowledge and desire, &c., are properties of Soul; and it is through [the mediate relation of] its being their *circumscriber* that within the Body these have the relation of product and producer; and in an axe, or the like, motion is through its [the axe's] being the *object* [not the originator] of effort. But in reality it is merely *gesture* that is the generator of motion in an axe, or the like; there is no proof that its cause is *effort*,‡ [—for the arm that wielded it may have been involuntarily convulsed].

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* आरम्भनिवृत्त्यनुमापकक्रियाविशेषदर्शनात् परश्वादिषु ज्ञानादिसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः। तस्मात्क्रियाविशेषाणां प्रयत्नादिजन्यत्वं सम्बन्धान्तरेण नतु समवायेन व्यभिचारादिति भावः॥

† स्वमते व्युत्पादयति॥

‡ तद्विशेषकौ तयोश्चेतनाचेतनयोर्विशेषकौ इतरव्यावर्त्त-

b. He states another reason why Desire, &c., are not qualities of the Mind.*

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यात् स्वकृताभ्यागमाच्च न मनसः ॥ ११० ॥

Distinction between Mind and Soul dwelt upon.

Aph. 110. They do not belong to the Mind, because they are caused as aforesaid, because it is subject to another, and because it is from one's own deeds that one has fruition.

a. Supply "Desire, and the rest." 'Because they are caused as aforesaid,' i. e., because knowledge and desire, &c., stand in the relation of cause and effect through their having the same substratum, [which has been shown, in Section III, to be the Soul]. 'Because it is subject to another;'—since the Mind is an assistant of Soul, Desire and the rest are not qualities of this [subordinate]. 'From one's own deeds,' i. e., from the actions done by oneself. 'Fruition,' i. e., experience. And this [experience], if Effort, &c., belonged to the Mind, could not take place,—because experience [in the shape of reward or punishment] does not come from the deeds done by *another*, nor can experience, moreover, belong to the *Mind* [—which we have supposed, for the sake of argument, to be the agent—], because it is just the experiencer,—the partaker of bondage or liberation,—that is meant

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कौ नियमानियमौ समवायेन जन्यतानियमतदभावौ। समवायेन ज्ञानेच्छादीनां चेतनधर्मत्वादवच्छेदकतयाच शरीरे तेषां जन्यजनकभावः परस्वादौ यत्नविषयतया क्रिया। वस्तुतस्तु चेष्टैव परस्वादिक्रियाजनिका यत्नादेस्तद्धेतुत्वे मानाभावः॥

* इच्छादीनां मनोगुणत्वाभावे युक्त्यन्तरमाह॥

by the word Soul,—there being no proof that there is any other Soul than this [which we mean when we speak of the experiencer of bondage and liberation]. Moreover these [—viz., Mind and Soul—] are not one and the same;—the Soul has magnitude, because it is adapted to the perception of pleasure, &c.; and the Mind is atomic, as is proved by the argument which proved its own existence* [as the subject to which this atomic character belonged;—see B. I. §16].

b. He winds up in regard to their being qualities of Soul †

परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च ॥ १११ ॥

Recapitulation.

Aph. 111.—And since the aforesaid arguments are established exclusively.

a. Supply—Desire and the rest are qualities of Soul. He states the reason, since 'exclusively,' i. e., to the exclusion of the arguments for its being the Body, or the like,—'the aforesaid arguments,' viz., such as "Because through both Sight and

* इच्छादय इति शेषः। यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् ज्ञानेच्छादीनां सामानाधिकरण्येन कार्यकारणभावात्। पारतन्त्र्यात् मनसश्चेतनसहकारित्वादिच्छादयो न तद्गुणाः। स्वकृतात्स्वयंकृतात्कर्मणः। अभ्यागमो भोगः। स मनसो यत्नादिसत्त्वे न स्यान्नह्यन्यकृतात्कर्मणो भोगः। न वा भोगो ऽपि मनसः भोक्तुर्बन्धमोक्षादिभागिन एवात्मत्वात्तद्भिन्न आत्मनि मानाभावात्। आत्मनः सुखादिसाक्षात्कारानुरोधान्महत्त्वं मनसश्च धर्मिग्राहकमानादणुत्वमतो ऽपि नैक्यम् ॥

† आत्मगुणत्वमुपसंहरति ॥

Touch, we apprehend a single object," [§1,] and the like,—'are established,' i. e., 'are congruous.*

b. That *memory* is a quality of Soul, though established by the meaning of the term [when properly looked into], he sets forth separately, with a view to the clearness of the pupil's understanding.†

स्मरणं त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् ॥ ११२ ॥

Memory belongs to Soul.

Aph. 112.—But memory belongs to the Soul, because it is of the essence of that which knows.

a. The "but" means "moreover." 'Because it is of the essence of that which knows,' i. e., it is of the essence of that which is the possessor of knowledge. For, the essence of the Soul is its being the possessor of what is constituted by the genus of knowledge, and as Memory is constituted [what it is] by the genus of knowledge, [i. e., by being a kind of knowledge], it is settled by the sense of the terms that it [Memory] is a property thereof,‡ [i. e., of Soul].

b. In order to clear away [the mistaken notion of] the simultaneousness of recollections, the argument assigned [at §105]

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* इच्छादिकमात्मगुण इत्यादिः। हेतुमाह परिशेषात् शरीरादिहेतुनिरासात् यथोक्तहेतूनां दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादित्यादीनां उपपत्तेः उपपन्नत्वात् ॥

† स्मृतेरात्मगुणत्वमर्थसिद्धमपि शिष्यबुद्धिवैशद्याय पृथग्व्युत्पादयति ॥

‡ तुरप्यर्थे। ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् ज्ञानवत्स्वाभाव्यात्। ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नवत्त्वं ह्यात्मनः स्वभावः स्मृतेश्च ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नत्वात्तद्धर्मत्वमर्थात्सिद्धम ॥

was the successiveness of its awakeners, Attention and the rest. With reference to this he exhibits Attention and the rest.*

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः ॥ ११३ ॥

Awakeners of Memory.

Aph. 113.—[Memory is awakened] by the following causes, viz., Attention, Concatenation, Study, Signs, Marks, Likeness, Possession, Refuge and Refugee, Relation, immediate Subsequency, Absence, Similarly employed, Opposition, Frequency, Receiving, Covering, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Fear, Wealthiness, Motion, Affection, Merit and Demerit.

a The word "Memory" is borrowed [from §105]. The word "cause" which [in this aphorism] is heard following the aggregative compound, is indifferently in construction with each term, severally †

b. 'Attention' *(pranidhána)* is the hindering the mind's moveing away to some other object ‡

c. 'Concatenation,' *(nibandha)* means the association of context in the same composition:—for example, by the word "Proof"

* स्मृतेर्यौगपद्यसमाधानाय प्रणिधानादीनामुद्बोधकानां क्रमो हेतुरुक्तस्तत्र प्रणिधानादीनि दर्शयति ॥

† स्मरणमित्यनुवर्त्तते । निमित्तशब्दस्य द्वन्द्वात्परं श्रुतस्य प्रत्येकमभेदेनान्वयः ॥

‡ प्रणिधानं मनसो विषयान्तरसञ्चारवारणम् ॥

[the first word in Book I, §1], one remembers "Thing proved," [which is the next word in the aphorism,] and so on *

d. 'Study' *(abhyása)* means a multiplicity of impressions† [confirming the first impression by force of repetition].

e. A 'Sign' *(linga)*, that which is constantly accompanied, reminds us of what constantly accompanies it.‡

f. A 'Mark' *(lakshaṇa)*, as the monkey-standard, or the like, [reminds us] of Arjuna, or the like.§

g. 'Likeness,'—of person, or the like.||

h. 'Possession' *(parigraha)* means making one's own:—it means here the relation of property and owner:—by either of these we are reminded of the other.¶

i. The 'Refuge and Refugee' *(ásraya* and *ásrita)*, as a king and his attendants, reciprocally call one another to mind.**

j. 'Relation' *(sambandha)*, as the relation of preceptor and disciple, and the like. This is mentioned separately [—though there are various instances of relation in the present list—], on

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* निबन्ध एकग्रन्थोपनिबन्धनं यथा प्रमाणेन प्रमेयादिस्मरणम् ॥

† अभ्यासः संस्कारबाहुल्यम् ॥

‡ लिङ्गं व्याप्यं व्यापकस्य स्मारकम् ॥

§ लक्षणं यथा कपिध्वजादि अर्जुनादेः ॥

|| सादृश्यं देहादेः ॥

¶ परिग्रहः स्वीकारस्तस्य स्वस्वामिभावो ऽर्थः तदेकतरेणान्यतरस्मरणम् ॥

** आश्रयाश्रितौ राजादितत्परिजनौ परस्परस्मारकौ ॥

the same principle as "Kine and bulls,"* [where the bulls, though comprised under the cow-kind, are mentioned, *honoris causâ*, separately].

k. 'Immediate Subsequency' *(ânantarya)*, as of sprinkling [the rice to be employed in some sacrificial operation], and pounding [the rice, immediately afterwards, in a wooden mortar, to free it from the husk], and the like.†

l. 'Absence,' as of a wife, &c.,‡ [which makes one think of her].

m. Those 'similarly employed,' as [fellow] disciples, &c., reciprocally call to mind one another.§

n. From 'Opposition,' the snake and ichneumon, and the like, call to mind one another.‖

o. 'Distinction,'—an influence [of some ceremony], as the investiture with the sacrificial string, calls to mind, e. g., the preceptor [who officiates on such occasions].¶

p. 'Receiving,' of wealth, &c., reminds us of the giver.**

q. A 'Covering,' is what hides;—thus a sheath, or the like, [reminds us] of a sword, or the like.††

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* सम्बन्धो गुरुशिष्यभावादिः। गोवृषन्यायात् पृथगुक्तः॥

† आनन्तर्यं प्रोक्षणावघातादेः॥

‡ वियोगो यथा दारादेः॥

§ एककार्या अन्तेवासिप्रभृतयः परस्परस्मारकाः॥

‖ विरोधादहिनकुलादेरन्यतरेणापरस्मरणम्॥

¶ अतिशयः संस्कार उपनयनादिराचार्यादिस्मारकः॥

** प्राप्तिर्धनादेर्दातारं स्मारयति॥

†† व्यवधानमावरणं यथा खड्गादेः कोषादि॥

r. By one or other of the two, Pleasure and Pain, the other is called to mind; or by these two the occasioner thereof* [is called to mind].

s. 'Desire and Aversion' remind us of that in respect of which they are entertained.†

t. 'Fear' reminds us of death, and the like, or of some reason for fear.‡

u. 'Want,' [reminds us] of a bestower,§ [who can supply our wants].

v. 'Motion,' of a branch or the like, [reminds us] of the wind, or the like [which occasions the action].||

w. From 'Affection,' or fondness, there is recollection of a son, &c.¶

x. Through 'Merit and Demerit,' finally, there is recollection of causes of joy and sorrow experienced in another birth, and of the joy, &c, previously experienced.**

y. And among the things mentioned [in the aphorism], some

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* सुखदुःखयोरन्यतरेणापरस्य ताभ्यां तत्प्रयोजकस्य वा स्मरणम् ॥

† इच्छाद्वेषौ यद्विषयकतया गृहीतौ तस्य स्मारकौ ॥

‡ भयं मरणादेर्भयहेतोर्वा स्मारकम् ॥

§ अर्थित्वं दातुः ॥

|| शाखादेः क्रिया वाय्वादेः ॥

¶ रागात्प्रीतेः पुत्रादेः स्मरणम् ॥

** धर्माधर्माभ्यां जन्मान्तरानुभूतसुखदुःखसाधनयोः प्रागनुभूतसुखादेश्च स्मरणमिति ॥

are really of themselves awakeners [of memory], and some are awakeners if imagined,—[just as a fire burns, without reference to our thoughts, while, on the other hand, the notion that there is a tiger, even when there is none, raises alarm]; and this detail [—which is unusual in an aphorism—] is for the edification of the disciple.*

z. Here ends the section on understanding's being a quality of Soul †

aa. It was stated [under §96] that [one act of] understanding is put an end to by [another act of] understanding; and this may be the case provided that it be proved that it [viz., understanding or knowledge,] is the counter-entity to a destruction which takes place at the third instant [of the existence of the thing destroyed,—one instant being allotted to its production, and at least a second instant to its continuance—]; therefore what has to be made out is that understanding [thus] perishes as soon as produced. In regard to this we have an aphorism conveying a tenet ‡

SECTION XIII.

How Knowledge perishes as produced.

कर्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात् ॥ ११४ ॥

The transitoriness of knowledge.

Aph. 114.—Because we apprehend it to be transitory like Action.

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* उक्तेषु च किञ्चित्स्वरूपसत्किञ्चिच्च ज्ञातमुद्बोधकं शिष्यव्युत्पादनाय चायं प्रपञ्चः ॥

† समाप्तं बुद्ध्यात्मगुणत्वप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विनाश उक्तः। स च तृतीयक्षणवर्त्तिध्वंस-

a. That is to say, because we apprehend [through consciousness] the transitoriness of knowledge like that of Action.*

b. Some one doubts† :—

अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वाद्विद्युत्संपाते रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 115.—From its transitoriness [—if we were to grant it—says some one], there should be indistinct apprehension [in the case of every cognition], just as there is indistinct apprehension of colour [or of coloured from] during a flash of lightning.

a. If knowledge were instantly perishable, it could not apprehend any object peculiarized by an indefinite number of cognizable distinctive properties,—just as in the case of the apprehending of anything during a flash of lightning;—and this is not the case [—because such things *are* apprehended];—therefore it is not so [—that knowledge is transitory as a flash of lightning—]; such is the meaning.‡

b. He replies§ :—

प्रतियोगित्वासिद्धौ स्यादतो बुद्धेरुत्पन्नापवर्गित्वं व्युत्पादनीयं। तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

* कर्मवद्बुद्धेरनवस्थायित्वग्रहणादिति ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ बुद्धिर्यद्याशुविनाशिनी स्याद्योग्याशेषविशेषधर्मविशिष्टधर्मिग्राहिणी न स्याद्विद्युत्सम्पातकालीनवस्तुग्रहणवत् । नचैवं। तस्मान्न तथेत्यर्थः ॥

§ उत्तरयति ॥

हेतूपादानात्प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ११६ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 116.—By taking this argument, you acknowledge that which you had undertaken to disprove.

a. 'An acknowledgment of 'what thou hadst undertaken to disprove,' viz., that knowledge is momentarily perishable, has been made by thee,—by taking, as what was to prove the point, an argument in the shape of the example of the [knowledge during a] flash of lightning [—see B. V. §26] ;—and thus thou dost, in respect of that part, contradict thyself,—such is the import.*

b. Assuming, then, that, according to that example [of the flash of lightning] other cognitions are un-permanent, he says, in regard to this† :—

न प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्यभिव्यक्तिग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणमनवस्था-
यित्वेऽपि ॥ ११७ ॥

An objection anticipated. *Aph.* 117.—Nay [—say not that clear knowledge is therefore impossible, for]—even though it [knowledge] be un-permanent, through it there is [clear] apprehension, as there is distinct apprehension through the constant succession of the [momentarily perishing] rays of a lamp.

a. As there is distinct apprehension through the continuously

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* प्रतिषेद्धव्यस्य बुद्धेराशुविनाशित्वस्याभ्यनुज्ञा त्वया कृता विद्युत्सम्पातदृष्टान्तरूपस्य हेतोः साधकस्योपादानात् । तथाचांशतो बाध इति भावः ॥

† अस्तु तर्हि तद्दृष्टान्तेनान्यासां बुद्धीनामनवस्थायित्वमित्यत्राह ॥

streaming rays of a lamp, though these be not permanent, so may it be in the other instance also. The knowledge which is produced in the case of a flash of lightning [—§115, *a.*—], is distinct in respect of its own object [—or so far as it goes];—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the perishing of knowledge as soon as produced.†

c. Now there is a section on understanding's not being a quality of the *body.* And you are not to say that, because this has been proved already [in section 3d. of the present Book], it ought not to be entered upon here; because, through such cognitions as "I, who am fair [in complexion of body], do know," &c., a doubt is thrown on our arguments in regard to this; therefore, with a view to setting forth this matter explicitly, he states the source of the doubt.‡

SECTION XIV.

How Knowledge is no quality of the body.

द्रव्ये स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः ॥ ११८ ॥

Whether knowledge be a quality of the body.

Aph. 118,—From our perceiving, in a substance, the qualities of itself

* यथा प्रदीपार्चिषां सन्तन्यमानानामनवस्थायित्वेऽप्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणं तथान्यत्रापि स्यात्। विद्युत्सम्पातस्थले या बुद्धिरुत्पन्ना सा स्वविषये व्यक्तैवेति भावः॥

† समाप्तं बुद्धेरुत्पन्नापवर्गित्वप्रकरणम्॥

‡ अथ बुद्धेः शरीरगुणत्वाभावप्रकरणं। नच प्रागेव तत्सिद्धेरनारम्भणीयमेतत् गौरोऽहं जानामीत्याद्यनुभवेन

and of others, there arises a doubt [whether this or that quality belong to it or not].

a. From our perceiving, 'in a substance,' e. g., in sandal-wood, —a 'quality of itself,' e. g., colour,—and a 'quality of another,' e. g., cold—[which is held to be proper to water but adscititious in the case of other substances],—so likewise, from our perceiving, in the Body, colour, &c. [which are proper to it], and warmth [which is held to be peculiar to fire], the doubt arises whether knowledge, or the like, be a quality of the Body or not.*

b. The aphorism of the tenet in regard to this point.†

यावच्छरीरभावित्वाद्रूपादीनाम् ॥ ११९ ॥

Knowledge how not a quality of the Body.

Aph. 119.—Because Colour, &c. [—the proper qualities of the Body], exist as long as the Body.

a. At the commencement, the clause, "Intellect is not a quality of the Body," is supplied by the author of the *Bháshya*,—meaning that it is not a distinctive quality of the Body.‡

b. The form of the confutation is as follows:—"Were knowledge, or the like, a distinctive quality of the Body, it would re-

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तत्साधकानामाभासीकरणादतो विशिष्य तद्व्युत्पादनाय संशयबीजमाह ॥

* द्रव्ये चन्दनादौ स्वगुणस्य रूपादेः परगुणस्य शैत्यादेश्च ग्रहादेवं शरीरे रूपादेरौष्ण्यस्य च ग्रहाद्बुद्ध्यादिः शरीरगुणो नवेति संशयः ॥

† तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ न शरीरगुणश्चेतनेति आदौ भाष्यकृतः पूरणं । न शरीरविशेषगुण इत्यर्थः ॥

main as long as the Body,—as Colour, or the like does." And the argument elaborated out of this is,—"knowledge, or the like, is not a distinctive quality of the Body, because it does not remain as long as the Body,—as Sound, or the like, [does not remain];"—or, contrariwise, as colour, or the like,* [*does* remain].

c. And "not to remain as long as the substance," is [—in the case of any quality—] to be the counter-entity to a non-existence, [or, in other words, to be that of which there is an emergent non-existence] contemporaneous with what is held to be the substratum† [of the quality in question].

d. He considers the doubt whether this argument would prove too much, according to the opinion that it is the aggregate [and not the atoms] that undergoes maturation.‡

न पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः ॥ १२० ॥

The argument objected to.

Aph. 120.—Nay—[says the objector], because other qualities, produced by maturation, arise.

a. That is to say,—the alleged reason is not proper, because it proves too much, since there are, in the case of the Body,

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* अयं तर्काकारः। बुद्ध्यादिकं शरीरविशेषगुणः स्याद्या-वच्छरीरभावि स्यात् रूपादिवत्। तत्परिष्कार्यश्चानुमानं। बुद्ध्यादिकं न शरीरविशेषगुणः। अयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वात्। शब्दवत्। व्यतिरेके। रूपवद्वा॥

† अयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वञ्च आश्रयत्वाभिमतकालीननाश-प्रतियोगित्वम्॥

‡ पिठरपाकमते व्यभिचारमाशङ्कते॥

Colour, &c., dependent on maturation,* [—so that Colour, not existing co-extensively with the Body, should be no distinctive property of the Body, according to the reasoning in §119].

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.†

प्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धेः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ १२१ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 121.—This is no objection, because what result from maturation exist in some opposite.

a. Though colour produced by maturation be possible in a jar, or the like, because those [colours, &c.,] that are produced by maturation take place 'in some opposite,' i. e., in another body corresponding to the former body [—the baked jar being another body than the unbaked jar—],—yet it is not possible in respect of the [human] Body, because the parts of the Body, the skin, &c., are necessarily destroyed by any instance of contact with fire‡ [—such as brings out the red colour in a jar].

b. But others say, that, he is stating another reason why it [knowledge] is not a quality of Body,—when he says 'in relation to some opposite,' &c. Of what [colours, &c.,] result from maturation, the 'opposite' is some different previous colour, or the like, —because there is no difference of colour whilst the one colour

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* शरीरे पाकाधीनरूपादिना व्यभिचारान्नोक्तं साधनं युक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ पाकजानां प्रतिद्वन्द्विनि पूर्वशरीरप्रतिरूपके शरीरान्तरे सिद्धेः घटादौ पाकजरूपसम्भवे ऽपि शरीरे न तत्सम्भवः शरीरावयवानाञ्चर्मादीनामग्निसंयोगविशेषेण नाशावश्यकत्वात् ॥

continues; but in the present case, since, even whilst the cognition is but one, at the second instant [—in consequence of the momentariness of knowledge—§114—] it is another cognition that arises, knowledge, or the like [—thus differing from colour, &c.,—] is no distinctive quality of the Body:—such is the meaning.*

b. He mentions another reason.†

शरीरव्यापित्वात् ॥ १२२ ॥

Another reason. *Aph.* 122.—Because they pervade the body.

a. Supply—the distinctive qualities of the Body. But knowledge, pleasure, &c., do not pervade the body, because it is within the limits of the heart, &c., that these affect us ‡

b. Some one doubts.§—

न केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः ॥ १२३ ॥

A doubt. *Aph.* 123.—Not so, because these are not found in the hair and nails, &c.

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* अन्ये तु शरीरगुणत्वाभावे हेत्वन्तरमाह प्रतिद्वन्द्वीति। पाकजानां पूर्वरूपादिकं प्रतिद्वन्द्वि विरोधि एकस्मिन् रूपे विद्यमाने रूपान्तराभावात् प्रकृते त्वेकस्मिन् ज्ञाने सत्यपि द्वितीयक्षणे ज्ञानान्तरोत्पत्तेर्ज्ञानादिकं न शरीरविशेषगुण इत्यर्थः ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ शरीरविशेषगुणानामिति शेषः। ज्ञानसुखादिकन्तु न शरीरव्यापकं हृदयावच्छेदेन तदानुभविकत्वादिति भावः ॥

§ देशयति ॥

a. The colour, &c., of the Body [—says the objector—] do not pervade their receptacle,—because the bodily fair colour, touch, &c., are not found in the hair, the nails, &c.:—such is the meaning.*

b. He censures this.†

त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य केशनखादिष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ १२४ ॥

The reply. *Aph*. 124.—These [qualities of the Body] are not met with in the hair, and the nails, &c., because what belongs [distinctively] to the Body is only as far as the cuticle.

a. This is plain.‡

b. He mentions another reason.§

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ १२५ ॥

Another reason. *Aph*. 125.—Because it is of another character than the qualities of the Body.

a. Knowledge is not a quality of the Body, 'because it is of another character than the qualities of the Body,' i. e., because, whilst it is uncognizable by the external senses, it is yet *cognizable*.||

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* शरीररूपादेराश्रयव्यापकत्वं न शारीरस्य गौररूपस्पर्शादेः केशनखादावनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ स्पष्टम् ॥

§ हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

|| बुद्धिर्न शरीरगुणः शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात्। बहिरिन्द्रियावेद्यत्वे सति वेद्यत्वात् ॥

b. Some one objects.*

न रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात् ॥ १२६ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 126.—Not so,—because colours, &c., are heterogeneous in respect of one another.

a. What you have alleged [—says the objector—] is not proper, 'because colours, &c., are heterogeneous in respect of one another,'—and so, at that rate, Touch, &c., should not be qualities of the Body, because they are not visible;—and so what you have alleged is useless :—such is the import.†

b. He clears up this.‡—

ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद्रूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ १२७ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 127.—There is no objection to colour, &c., [as being qualities of the Body], because these are sensible.

a. There is no objection that colour, &c., should be qualities of the Body :—why?—'because these are sensible';—i. e., because, though this or that quality differ from another in so far as it is not apprehensible by this or that sense-organ, they do not possess that distinction from bodily quality simply, which Knowledge does possess, viz., of being cognizable though not cognizable by any external sense :—such is the import.§

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* आक्षिपति ॥

† नोक्तं युक्तं रूपादीनां परस्परवैधर्म्यात्। तथाच तद्रीत्या स्पर्शादीनां शरीरगुणत्वं न स्यादचाक्षुषत्वात्तथाचोक्तमप्रयोजकमिति भावः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ रूपादीनां न शरीरगुणत्वप्रतिषेधः। कुतः। ऐन्द्रि-

b. Here ends the section on understanding's being other than a quality of the Body.*

c Now for the examination of Mind *(manas)*, the turn of which has arrived. In regard to this, there being the doubt whether the Mind be one to each Body, or whether there be a pentad of minds, inasmuch as it is a fellow-worker with the Sight, &c.,—the primâ faciê view being this that a pentad of Minds is what is proper, and that thus, from the conjunction of all the [five] minds in each instance, separate continuance and simultaneousness [of conceptions] would be explicable,—we have [in regard to this point] an aphorism conveying the tenet.†

SECTION XV.

Enquiry concerning the Mind.

ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः ॥ १२८ ॥

The unity of the Mind.

Aph. 128.—The Mind *(manas)* is one,—because cognitions are not simultaneous.

यकत्वात् । तत्तदिन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वलक्षणतत्तद्गुणवैधर्म्येऽपि शरीरगुणत्वावच्छिन्नवैधर्म्यस्य बहिरिन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वे सति ग्राह्यत्वस्याभावात्। बुद्धेश्च तत्सत्त्वादिति भावः ॥

* समाप्तं बुद्धेः शरीरगुणभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

† अथ क्रमप्राप्ता मनःपरीक्षा । तत्र प्रतिशरीरमेकं मनश्चक्षुरादिसहकारितया मनःपञ्चकं वेति संशये पञ्चकमेवोचितं तेनच प्रत्येकं सकलमनः सम्बन्धाद्धारावाहिकयौगपद्ये उपपद्येते इति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

a. If there were a plurality of Minds to each Body, then even in the case of separate attention there would be simultaneousness [of cognitions]; therefore the Mind is not plural;—such is the import.*

b. He ponders the doubt whether there should not be a plurality [in Mind] from the simultaneousness of cognitions in the eating of a cake [with many flavours in it], or the like.†

न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः ॥ १२९ ॥

The plurality of the Mind wrongly asserted

Aph. 129.—Not so—[says some one], because we perceive simultaneously several acts [of cognition].

a. The mind is not one, because we perceive 'several acts,' i. e., more than one cognition [simultaneously]; such is the meaning.‡

b. He clears up this.§

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात् ॥ १३० ॥

This misconception cleared up.

Aph. 130.—The apprehension thereof is in consequence of the rapid succession, as in seeing a circle in the case of a firebrand.

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* प्रतिशरीरं मनोनानात्वे व्यासङ्गस्थले ऽपि यौगपद्यं स्यादतो न मनोनानात्वमिति भावः ॥

† दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणादौ ज्ञानयौगपद्यान्नानात्वं स्यादित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ न एकं मनः अनेकक्रियाणां अनेकज्ञानानामुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Even in the case of what is successive, 'the apprehension thereof,' i. e. the apprehension of simultaneousness, is 'in consequence of the rapid succession,' i. e., in consequence of the delusion that consists in its rapid succession; just as when a firebrand is whirling in a circle with an excess of rapidity, we do not perceive the succession of actions as involving any difference* [in the continuous and unbroken circular image].

b. But then [—some one may object—], since it brings about a simultaneousness [among things different], the Mind must be [not atomic, but rather, on the contrary,] all-pervading. In regard to this he says.†

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणुः ॥ १३१ ॥

The Mind an atom

Aph. 131.—It [the Mind] is an atom, because what has been aforesaid is proof.

a. Supply—the Mind. 'What has been aforesaid,' i. e., the non-simultaneousness of cognitions;—because it is 'proof,' i. e., because it establishes the atomic nature of the Mind:—such is the meaning.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination of the Mind.§

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* क्रमिकेऽपि तदुपलब्धिर्यौगपद्योपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात् शीघ्रसञ्चारात्मकदोषात । यथा अलातचक्रे वेगातिशयेन भ्राम्यमाणे क्रियासन्तानस्य भेदेनानुपलब्धिरिति ॥

† ननु यौगपद्योपपादकतया मनसो वैभुत्वं स्यादत्राह ॥

‡ मन इति शेषः । यथोक्तस्य ज्ञानायौगपद्यस्य हेतुत्वा-मनोऽणुत्वसाधकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाप्तं मनः परीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

c. Now, as it presents itself, there is a section on the fact that the Body is caused by this or that person's deserts. In regard to this, there being a difference of opinion as to whether or not the Body be caused by the desert inhering in each person, the negative alternative is of three kinds—(1) because there is no such thing as desert, or (2) because this is not the cause of the Body, or (3) because desert does not inhere in Soul. Of these he rejects the first view* [—as follows].

SECTION XVI.

How the Body is the result of one's deserts.

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ १३२ ॥

The body whence.

Aph. 132.—It is produced through the connection of the fruit of former deeds.

a. 'Of former deeds,' such as sacrifice, gifts, injuries, &c.;—'the fruit'—in the shape of merit or demerit;—'through the connection,' i. e., through the co-operation;—'it,' i. e., the body, is produced †

* अथ प्रसङ्गाच्छरीरस्य तत्तत्पुरुषादृष्टनिष्पाद्यताप्रकरणं। तत्र शरीरं तत्तत्पुरुषसमवेतादृष्टनिमित्तकं नवेति विप्रतिपत्तौ निषेधकोटिस्त्रेधा अदृष्टाभावात् तस्य शरीरहेतुत्वाभावात् अदृष्टस्य पुरुषसमवायाद्वा । तत्राद्यं पक्षं निरस्यति ॥

† पूर्वकृतस्य यागदानहिंसादेः फलस्य धर्माधर्मरूपस्य अनुबन्धात्सहकारिभावात्तस्य शरीरस्योत्पत्तिः ॥

b. Some one objects.*

भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्त्युपादानवत्तदुपादानम् ॥ १३३ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 133.—It [—says some one—] is formed of the elements, just as a statue is formed.

a. The expression 'of the elements' is for precision, [—for it might have been *inferred* that the Body was formed of the *elements* if it was formed as a statue is—]. And so, as a 'statue,' of clay, or the like, is 'formed,' or has its origin, from 'the elements,' i. e, from atoms, which have no reference to desert,—just so 'it,' viz., the Body, is 'formed,' i. e., has its origin,—viz., from atoms which have no reference to desert:—such is the meaning.†

b. He clears up this.‡

न साध्यसमत्वात् ॥ १३४ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 134.—Not so,—because this [example of yours] is in the same predicament with what you have to prove.

a. What you have alleged is not proper, because the example is 'in the same predicament with what is to be proved,' i. e., in the same predicament with the subject [of your proposition, viz., the Body]; for, since we hold that clay, &c., also are produced from atoms which *have* a reference to desert [—the atoms of the

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* आक्षिपति ॥

† भूतेभ्य इति सावधारणं । तथा चादृष्टनिरपेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः परमाणुभ्यो मूर्त्तेर्मृदादेरुपादानमारम्भो यथा तथैव तस्य शरीरस्य उपादानमारम्भः परमाणुभ्यो ऽदृष्टनिरपेक्षेभ्य इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

material world so comporting themselves as to work out the designs of retributive justice—], it is not established [—nor are you at liberty to take for granted—] that there [—i. e, in the case of the clay of the image], the origination is not therefrom [—i. e., not from desert] :—such is the import.*

b. In a couple of aphorisms he states that it is not the same case [with the Body] as with clay, &c ,† [formed into images].

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः ॥ १२५ ॥

Further reasons

Aph. 135.—Not so,—because father and mother are the cause of its production.

तथाहारस्य ॥ १३६ ॥

Aph. 136.—So too eating [food offered to the manes].

a. The Body is not the same as clay, &c., because the Body results from the desert of the parents;—for the means of [obtaining] a son, &c., is the merit, resulting from worship, &c., of the gods, which [merit] leads to the experiencing the delight produced by the beholding, &c., of a son.‡

b. Likewise [the Body differs, as regards its production, from an earthen image,] because what conduces to the birth of a son,

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* नोक्तं युक्तं दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यसमत्वात् पक्षसमत्वात् । मृदादेरप्यदृष्टसापेक्षपरमाणुभ्य एवोत्पत्तेरुपगमात्तदजन्यत्वस्य तत्रासिद्धेरिति भावः ॥

† न मृदादिसाम्यमित्याह सूत्राभ्याम् ॥

‡ शरीरे न मृदादिसाम्यं मातापित्रोः कर्मणः शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वात् पुत्रदर्शनजन्यसुखानुभावकादृष्टस्य देवाराधनादिजन्यस्य पुत्रादिनिमित्तत्वात् ॥

&c., is, through desert, the 'eating' or partaking of the cakes offered to ancestors, &c.: such is the meaning* [according to some.]

c. He states what debars the opinion opposed to the fact that the eating [of the sacrificial cakes] co-operates with desert† [in bringing about the birth of a son].

प्राप्तौ चानियमात् ॥ १३७ ॥

A further reason.

Aph. 137.—And because there is no certainty though there be present [the other requisites].

a. Though there be present both husband and wife, yet since, on their taking steps, there is no certainty of impregnation, therefore it is indispensable that this [eating of the sacrificial cakes] should co-operate with desert:—such is the import.‡

b. But then [some one may say], let the Body be [held to be] produced by certain Elements which are quite irrespective of desert, through some particular self-determining nature [—such as neither requires nor admits of any analysis or explanation—]; and if you do not admit such a self-determining nature, then, since a Body is conjoined with every Soul, we should find a state of community,—[there being nothing to determine which Soul should tenant which Body]. Therefore he replies.§—

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* एवं आहारस्य पितामहपिण्डभोजनादेरदृष्टद्वारा पुत्रजनकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† आहारस्यादृष्टसहकारित्वे विपक्षे बाधकमाह ॥

‡ प्राप्तौ दम्पत्योः सम्प्रयोगे तु गर्भधारणस्य यतो न नियमस्ततोऽदृष्टस्य सहकारित्वमावश्यकमिति भावः ॥

§ नन्वदृष्टनिरपेक्षैरेव भूतैः कैश्चित् स्वभावविशेषाच्छरीरं

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत्संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म ॥ १३८ ॥

Bodies assigned on what principle.

Aph. 138.—Desert, as it is the cause of the production of the Body, so is it the cause of the taking place of conjunction [between a Soul and this or that Body].

a. Now he rejects the second view [§131, *c*], held by the *Sánkhyas*, viz.,—that the Body is not produced by desert, for it is accounted for just by its being the nature of the Primal Agency to originate; but that what is dependent on desert is the departure of the previous Body which obstructs [the coming into existence of a subsequent one], just as the nature of water to follow a slope is dependent on the departure of what confines it.*

एतेनानियमः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ १३९ ॥

The assignment not fortuitous.

Aph. 139.—By this [theory of ours] the absence of rule is denied [—which would have to be admitted on the *Sánkhya* view].

a. 'By this,' i. e., by this decision that desert is the cause [§138]. But 'absence of rule,' means the Soul's connection sometimes with a human body, and sometimes another sort [of connection],—and one body having all its members, and another one being irregular as regards its members,—and so on. But

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जन्यतां । स्वभावानभ्युपगमेच शरीरस्य सर्वात्मसंयुक्तत्वात् साधारण्यापत्तिरत आह ॥

* अथ शरीरं नादृष्टजन्यं प्रकृतेरारम्भस्वभावत्वादेव तदुपपत्तेः प्रतिबन्धकपूर्वशरीरापगमस्त्वदृष्टाधीनः जलस्य निम्नानुसरणस्वभावस्येव बन्धापगमाधीनत्वमिति द्वितीयपक्षं सांख्यसम्मतं निरस्यति ॥

there would be absence of rule [in such a state of things] if it were not agreed that desert is the cause,—but not on our theory,* [which teaches that all these varieties of condition are retributive].

b. Moreover if it [—the Body—] were originated merely by Nature, without reference to desert, the [same kind of] Body would be common to all Souls :—such is the import.†

c. But the followers of Arhat [—viz., the *Jainas*—] hold that desert is a quality [—not of Soul,—see §131, *c*—but] of the Mind (*manas*) and of atoms. That is to say,—the earthy atoms in concert, by force of desert attached to them, originate the Body; and the Mind, impelled by its own desert, enters the Body; and that desert, just through its own nature, brings about the joy or suffering of the Soul *(pudgala)*. To this he replies.‡—

पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे ॥ १४० ॥

Objection to the Jaina view.

Aph. 140.—This [assignment of a Body] would present itself again, even when there had been emancipation.

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* एतेन अदृष्टहेतुकत्वव्यवस्थापनेन। अनियमस्तु आत्मनः कदाचिन्मानुषशरीरसम्बन्धः कदाचिदन्यादृशः किञ्चिच्च शरीरं सकलावयवं किञ्चिच्च विकलावयवमित्यादि। अदृष्टहेतुत्वानभ्युपगमे त्वयमनियमो न त्वस्मन्मते ॥

† किञ्चादृष्टनिरपेक्षप्रकृतिमात्रारब्धत्वे सर्वात्मसाधारण्यं शरीरस्य स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ आर्हतास्तु मनःपरमाणुगुणमदृष्टं मन्यन्ते। तथाहि। पार्थिवाः परमाणवः संहिताः स्वादृष्टवशाच्छरीरमारभन्ते।

a If the atoms originated a Body, for this or that Soul to have experience, quite without account taken of the desert of this or that Soul, then even when some Soul had been emancipated, they would originate a Body, with a view to its having experience*—[which it was entitled to be utterly rid of].

b. He blames also the opinion that desert is a quality of the Mind† [and not of the Soul].

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगाद्यनुच्छेदः ॥ १४१ ॥

Further objection. *Aph.* 141.—And there would [in that case] be no putting an end to the conjunction [of Soul with Body], &c., because of its being caused by the desert of the Mind.

a. There would be no putting an end to 'the conjunction' [§138] which originates the Body and gives rise to knowledge, &c.;—why? Because the 'desert,' merit or demerit, which [by the hypothesis] belongs to the *Mind*, is the cause thereof:—such a *continuance of conjunction* could not be put a stop to, because this [desert of the Mind] must be eternal,—[there being no assignable reason why it should cease]:—and even if it were not eternal, it would be out of the question that what should put an end to it should be experience belonging to a different receptacle: [—in other words, desert chargeable against the

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मनश्च स्वादृष्टप्रयुक्तं शरीरमाविशति तच्चादृष्टं स्वभावादेव पुद्गलस्य सुखदुःखे साधयतीति तत्रोत्तरमाह ॥

* तत्तदात्मादृष्टोपग्रहं विनैव तत्तदात्मोपभोगाय परमाणवश्चेच्छरीरमारभन्ते मुक्ते ऽपि तदात्मनि तद्भोगाय शरीरमारभेरन् ॥

† अदृष्टस्य मनोगुणत्वमपि दूषयति ॥

Mind could not be wiped out by experience undergone by the *Soul*;] such is the import.*

b. What is the harm if there be no end to the conjunction [of Soul and Body]? To this he replies.†

नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्च प्रापणानुपपत्तेः ॥ १४२ ॥

Force of the objection. *Aph.* 142.—And we should find it [viz, mundane life] eternal, because there could be no reaching [the end of it].

a. Were it so [as alleged at §139, *c.*], since there would be no possibility of 'reaching,' i. e., no possibility of death,—we should find the Body, &c., to be 'eternal,' i. e., indestructible.‡

b. Some one objects.§

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववत् स्यात् ॥ १४३ ॥

An inadmissable conjecture. *Aph.* 143.—This [says some one] may be just like the eternity of the blackness of an atom.

a As the blackness of an atom, though eternal [in so far as it is without beginning], surceases,—so also the Body, &c., surceases.||

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* संयोगस्य शरीरारम्भकस्य ज्ञानादिजनकस्य च उच्छेदो न स्यात्। कुतः। मनसो यत्कर्म अदृष्टं तन्निमित्तत्वात् तस्य नित्यत्वात्तादृशसंयोगधारा नोच्छिद्येत। तस्यानित्यत्वेऽपि व्यधिकरणभोगस्य तन्नाशकत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति भावः॥

† संयोगानुच्छेदे का क्षतिरत आह॥

‡ तथा सति प्रापणस्य मरणस्यानुपपत्तेः शरीरादेर्नित्यत्वस्याविनाशित्वस्य प्रसङ्गः॥

§ आक्षिपति॥

|| यथा परमाणोः श्यामता नित्यापि निवर्त्तते तथा शरीरादिकमपि निवर्त्तते॥

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.*

नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १४४ ॥

This point settled. *Aph.* 144.—Not so,—because it would turn out that we were accepting what is undemonstrable.

a. 'What is undemonstrable,' i. e., what is not susceptible of proof;—it would turn out that we were 'accepting,' i. e., were admitting, this. For, whilst the cause [of mundane existence], viz., [by hypothesis,] the desert lodged in the atoms [§141, *a*], exists, there could be no putting an end to the body:—moreover thus [—i. e., according to your argument—] we should have to admit the eternity of the blackness of atoms, which cannot be submitted to evidence;—and so the example is not a real one,† [and goes for nothing].

b. Here ends the section on the Body's resulting from desert.‡

c. And so ends the Second Diurnal Portion of the Third Book.§

d. Thus is completed, in the commentary on the Nyáya Aphorisms composed by the venerable Viswanátha Bhaṭṭáchárya, the comment on the Third Book.||

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* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† अकृतस्य प्रमाणाविषयस्य अभ्यागमः स्वीकारस्तत्प्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः। नहि परमाणुनिष्ठस्यादृष्टस्य कारणस्य सत्त्वे शरीरोच्छेदः स्यादेवमणुश्यामतानित्यत्वस्यापि प्रमाणागोचरस्य स्वीकारस्स्यात्तथाच दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः॥

‡ समाप्तं शरीरस्यादृष्टनिष्पाद्यताप्रकरणम् ॥

§ समाप्तञ्च तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥

|| इति श्रीविश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ तृतीयाध्यायवृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥

END OF BOOK III.

THE

NYÁYA APHORISMS OF GAUTAMA.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

a. I take refuge with that pre-eminent Light, filled with splendour that surpasses hundreds of thousands of suns, who haunts the minds of the devout,—that undescribable black Light [—meaning Krishṇa—], the giver of our desires, lovely as a hundred thousand Cupids.*

b. In the Third [Book] was examined just the set of six of the Objects [B. I. §9] beginning with Soul, which [set] is in the shape of causes, [—Soul being the substantial cause of knowledge, and so on]. Now the [remaining] set of six, beginning with Effort *(pravritti)*, which [set] consists of effects, is to be examined, since the occasion offers, and because of their relation as effects [to the foregoing].†

* सूरकोटिविजयिप्रभाभरं योगिमानसचरं परं महः। श्यामलं किमपि धाम कामदं कामकोटिकमनीयमाश्रये॥

† तृतीये तावदात्मादिप्रमेयषट्कं कारणरूपं परीक्षितमथ कार्यरूपं प्रवृत्त्यादिप्रमेयषट्कमवसरतो हेतुमद्भावेन च परीक्षणीयम्॥

c. Although the set of six is to be examined in the First Diurnal Portion, but knowledge of the truth [—which is not one of the set—] in the Second Diurnal Portion, yet the matter of this Book is just the examination of the set of six, because that [viz., true knowledge] is the cause of Liberation [which is one of the six,] and because this falls within the examination of Liberation, inasmuch as it requires to be examined as supplementary* [to the determination thereof].

d. And, among these things, the matter of the First Diurnal Portion is the examination of the set of six as regards their possessing the characters enunciated [in the First Book]. In this First Diurnal Portion there are fourteen Sections; and, of those, the matter of the first section is the examination of Effort and of the Faults, as to whether they possess the natures ascribed to them. And there is no subdivision of the section [which you may imagine ought to be made] because of the difference of the topics [embraced in it]; for, by the two mutually respective portions, viz., the expression "As" [in the first aphorism,] and "So" [in the second and last,] he informs us that it embraces but one topic, in the shape, viz., of whether the things possess the natures ascribed to them.†

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* यद्यपि प्रथमाह्निके षट्कं परीक्षणीयं द्वितीयाह्निके तु तत्त्वज्ञानं तथापि तस्यापवर्गहेतुत्वादुपोद्घातेनच परीक्षणीयत्वादपवर्गपरीक्षान्तःपातितया षट्कपरीक्षैवाध्यायार्थः ॥

† तत्रचोद्दिष्टधर्मवत्तया षट्कपरीक्षा प्रथमाह्निकार्थः। तत्र प्रथमाह्निके चतुर्दश प्रकरणानि तत्रचोक्तरूपवत्तया प्रवृत्तिदोषयोः परीक्षा प्रथमप्रकरणार्थः। नचार्थभेदात् प्रकरणभेदः यथा तथेति परस्परसाकांक्षाभ्यामवयवाभ्यामुक्तरूपवत्त्वलक्षणैकार्थवत्त्वकथनात् ॥

e. The examination of 'Effort' being looked for, we have an aphorism as follows.*

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

GENERAL EXAMINATION OF EFFORT AND OF THE FAULTS.

प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता ॥ १ ॥

Effort. *Aph.* 1.—As Effort is as has been said,—[so are the Faults].

a. Some here fill up the ellipsis with the expression "just so," [—making the aphorism to mean "Effort is just so as has been asserted" at B. I, §17]. This is not right. If it were so, then the 'expectancy' of the word "as," [—which always looks out for "so"—] being satisfied in this very place, there would be, by our having to supply another "as," for the word "So," too, which stands in the next aphorism, a splitting of the section [—or, in other words, a distinction of topics,—see Introduction, *d*]. Therefore the construction [of the "As"] with the word "So," which stands in the next aphorism, is the right one.†

b. The meaning, in combination with the next aphorism, is, that, as 'Effort' possesses the character ascribed to it, so the 'Faults' also possess the character ascribed to them. The defi-

* प्रवृत्तिपरीक्षायामाकांक्षितायां सूत्रम् ॥

† अत्र तथैवेति शेषं पूरयन्ति । तदयुक्तं । तथा सत्यत्र यथाशब्दस्याकांक्षाशान्तावग्रिमसूत्रस्थतथाशब्दे ऽपि यथाशब्दान्तरस्य पूरणीयतया प्रकरणभेदापत्तेस्तस्मादग्रिमसूत्रस्थतथाशब्देनान्वयो युक्तः ॥

nition is established, because the definition stated [at B. I, 17], viz., "Effort is what originates the voice, the intellect, and the body," is true:—such is the import.*

c. The examination of the 'Faults' having offered itself, he says.†

तथा दोषाः ॥ २ ॥

Faults. *Aph.* 2.—So are the Faults.

a. So also are the Faults [rightly defined, as is Effort, §1]:—they really possess the character assigned [at B. I. §18], viz., "Whose character is to stimulate:"—so that there is nothing here unestablished;—such is the import.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination in general of Effort and of the Faults.§

c. Now, with the view of examining the Faults in respect of what is peculiar to them, viz., their being of three sets, there is a section on their being of three sets. In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying the tenet as follows:||

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* प्रवृत्तिर्यथा उक्तलक्षणवती तथा दोषा अप्युक्तलक्षणवन्त इत्यग्रिमसूत्रसंवलितो ऽर्थः। प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इत्युक्तलक्षणसत्त्वात् सिद्धं लक्षणमिति भावः॥

† दोषपरीक्षायां प्राप्तायामाह॥

‡ तथा दोषा अपि। प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा इत्युक्तलक्षणवन्त एवेति नासिद्धिरिति भावः॥

§ समाप्तं प्रवृत्तिदोषसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्॥

|| अथ त्रैराश्येन विशेषेण दोषपरीक्षणाय तत्त्रैराश्यप्रकरणं। तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्॥

SECTION II.

Examination of the Faults.

तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

The Faults what.

Aph. 3.—There are three sets thereof, because of the subdivision of Desire, Aversion, and Misconception.

a. 'Thereof,' i. e., of Faults, there are three 'sets,' or parties; but it is not the case that Desire and Aversion and Delusion are severally single,—because of their 'subdivision,' i. e., because of their possessing subordinate divisions; and so, since fear, and grief, and disdain, &c., are really included among these, [—the division is exhaustive—] there is no deficiency of division,—nor, since they possess heterogeneous characters, in the shape of the nature of Desire, and of Aversion, and of Misconception, is there any superfluity of division,* [—the members of the division do not include one another].

b. But the character of Desire, e. g., is proved, by consciousness, to exist in Love—and so of the others—[Aversion in Anger, and so on]. Among these [three sets of feelings], the set of Desires is Love, Spite, Censoriousness, Acquisitiveness, Covetousness, Deceitfulness, and Hypocrisy.†

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* तेषां दोषाणां त्रयो राशयः त्रयः पक्षा न तु रागद्वेषमोहानामेकैकत्वं तेषामर्थान्तरभावात् अवान्तरभेदवत्त्वात्। तथा च भयशोकमानादीनामेष्वेवान्तर्भावान्न विभागन्यूनत्वं इच्छात्वद्वेषत्वमिथ्याज्ञानत्वरूपविरुद्धधर्मवत्त्वाच्च विभागाधिक्यम् ॥

† इच्छात्वादिकन्तु रागादावनुभवसिद्धं। तत्र रागपक्षः कामो मत्सरः स्पृहा तृष्णा लोभो माया दम्भ इति ॥

c. 'Love' *(káma)* is a desire of enjoyment.*

d. 'Spite' *(matsara)* is the desire of obstructing another's wishes, without aiming at benefit to oneself:—e. g., that nobody is to drink water out of the king's well, [though he cannot drink it all himself], &c.†

e. In like manner 'Censoriousness' *(spṛihá)* is also a Desire [—the desire, viz.,] of obscuring the merits of another.‡

f. 'Acquisitiveness' *(tṛishṇá)* is the desire of acquisition not in opposition to justice. 'Miserliness' *(kárpaṇya)* also,—the desire that this of mine should not be lost,—in the shape of the desire of preserving one's wealth even by omitting to make a proper expenditure,—is just a species of Acquisitiveness.§

g. 'Covetousness' *(lobha)* is the desire of another's wealth in opposition to justice.||

h. 'Deceitfulness' *(máyá)* is the desire of cheating another.¶

i. 'Hypocrisy' *(dambha)* is the desire of celebrating one's own superiority, in virtuousness, or the like, falsely.**

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* कामो रिरंसा ॥

† मत्सरः स्वप्रयोजनप्रतिसन्धानं विना पराभिमतनिवारणेच्छा । यथा राजकीयादुदपानान्नोदकं पेयं इत्यादि ॥

‡ एवं परगुणनिवारणेच्छापि स्पृहा ॥

§ धर्माविरोधेन प्राप्तीच्छा तृष्णा । इदं मे न क्षीयतामितीच्छा उचितव्ययाकरणेनापि धनरक्षणेच्छारूपं कार्पण्यमपि तृष्णाभेद एव ॥

|| धर्मविरोधेन परद्रव्येच्छा लोभः ॥

¶ परवञ्चनेच्छा माया ॥

** कपटेन धार्मिकत्वादिना स्वोत्कर्षख्यापनेच्छा दम्भः ॥

j. The set of Aversions is Anger, Envy, Malignity, Hatred, Implacability, and Disdain.*

k. 'Anger' *(krodha)* is a particular kind of Fault which is the cause of redness of the eyes, &c.†

l. 'Envy' *(írshyá)*, is, in respect of something common to both, since it belongs to another, an Aversion to the possession thereof,—as the endless [envy] of co-heirs.‡

m. 'Malignity' *(asúyá)* is Aversion to the merits &c. of another.§

n. 'Hatred' *(droha)* is Aversion [stimulating] to destruction. But deadly injury *(hinsá)* is a result of hatred; but others hold it to be [what is meant by] hatred.‖

o. 'Implacability' *(amarsha)* is, towards him who has committed an offence, the Aversion of him who cannot bear it.¶

p. 'Disdain' *(abhimána)* is, towards an injurer, the Aversion in the soul of him who *does* nothing.**

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* द्वेषपक्षः क्रोध ईर्ष्या ऽसूया द्रोहो ऽमर्षो ऽभिमान इति ॥

† क्रोधो नेत्रलौहित्यादिहेतुर्दोषविशेषः ॥

‡ ईर्ष्या साधारणे वस्तुनि परस्वत्वात् तद्ग्रहीतरि द्वेषः । यथा दुरन्ता दायादानाम् ॥

§ असूया परगुणादौ द्वेषः ॥

‖ द्रोहो नाशाय द्वेषः । हिंसा तु द्रोहजन्या । परे तु तां द्रोहं मन्यन्ते ॥

¶ अमर्षः कृतापराधे असमर्थस्य द्वेषः ॥

** अभिमानो ऽपकारिण्यकिञ्चित्करस्यात्मनि द्वेषः ॥

q. The set of Misconceptions is Error, Doubt, Confutation, Pride, Infatuation, Fear, and Sorrow.*

r. 'Error' *(viparyaya)* is another synonyme for false knowledge,—the being sure of something that is not true.†

s. 'Doubt' *(sanśaya)* is the conceiving that a contradictory existence and non-existence belong to one and the same subject. This same is also expressed by the term 'Dubiety' *(vichikitsa)*.‡

t. 'Confutation' *(tarka)* consists in the coming upon a Major [confessedly inadmissible], on our admitting [for the sake of argument,] a Minor§ [which is untrue, but which the opponent insists upon. For example,—our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill, if there be no fire, while we *see* the smoke, is the Confutation of there being no fire in the hill].

u. 'Pride' *(mána)* is a fancy of superiority, through the imputation to oneself of some merit that does not belong to one. 'Contempt' *(smaya)* also,—in the shape of the fancy that there is no merit in some meritorious person,—is included under 'Pride'.||

v. 'Infatuation' *(pramáda)* is the fancy that something can-

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* मोहपक्षः विपर्ययसंशयतर्कमानप्रमादभयशोकाः ॥

† विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानापरपर्यायो ऽयथार्थनिश्चयः ॥

‡ एकधर्मिकविरुद्धभावाभावज्ञानं संशयः । स एव विचिकित्सेत्युच्यते ॥

§ व्याप्यारोपाद्व्यापकप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः ॥

|| आत्मन्यविद्यमानगुणारोपेणोत्कर्षधीर्मानः । गुणवति निर्गुणत्वधीरूपस्मयोऽपि मानेऽन्तर्भवति ॥

not be done, even when it has already been ascertained that it can be done; and so too conversely.*

w. 'Fear' *(bhaya)* is, on the befalling of some cause of distress, the not knowing any possibility of getting rid of it.†

x. 'Sorrow' *(śoka)* is, when something loved is absent, the not knowing any possibility of attaining it.‡

y. He ponders a doubt.§

नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 4.—Not so,—because they are the opposites of one single thing.

a. There is no difference [—says some one—] between Desire and the rest [§3], 'because they are the opposites of one single thing'. That is so [i. e., has no difference,] which is the opposite, or contrary, of one single thing,—that is to say, because destructible by that one thing:—for knowledge of the truth is the one contrary of these|| [alleged different Faults].

b. He clears up this.¶

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* प्रमादः पूर्वकर्त्तव्यतया निश्चितेऽप्यकर्त्तव्यताधीः । एवं वैपरीत्येऽपि ॥

† भयमनिष्टहेतूपनिपाते तत्परित्यागानर्हताज्ञानम् ॥

‡ शोक इष्टवियोगे तल्लाभानर्हताज्ञानम् ॥

§ शङ्कते ॥

|| रागादीनां भेदो न एकप्रत्यनीकभावात् । एकस्मिन् प्रत्यनीकभावो विरोधित्वं यस्य तत्तथा तेनैकनाश्यत्वादित्यर्थः । एकं हि तत्त्वज्ञानमेषां विरोधि ॥

¶ समाधत्ते ॥

व्यभिचारादहेतुः ॥ ५ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 5.—This is no argument, because it wanders away [and so would prove too much].

a. The fact of having one and the same opposite [or destroyer] is no reason for denying a distinction,—'because it wanders away' [to cases where the thing to be proved is not present];—because *colours* differ, although destructible by the conjunction of one and the same fire.*

b. Moreover, these [different 'Faults'] are *not* removable by one [and the same remedy], because it is true knowledge that is the remover of 'Misconception,' and it is through the removal *thereof* that 'Desire', &c., are removed;—so, to this purpose, he says.†—

तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

The worst of the 'Faults'. *Aph.* 6.—Of these, 'Misconception' is the worser; because, in the case of him who is not under misconception, neither of the others comes into existence.

a. Although the expression "the worst" *(pápatama* or *pápishṭha)* would have been proper, according to the rule directing "-est" or "most" *(ishṭhan* or *tamap)* in the case of the comparison of many [—i. e., of more than two],—still he compares them by taking them two by two,—for "-er" *(iyasun)* is enjoined when the comparison is of two;—so, of 'Desire' and 'Misconception', or [again] of 'Aversion' and 'Misconception', 'Miscon-

* एकविरोधित्वं भेदनिषेधे न हेतुर्व्यभिचारात् एकाग्निसंयोगनाश्यत्वेऽपि रूपादीनां भेदात् ॥

† किञ्च नैतेषामेकनिवर्त्यत्वं तत्त्वज्ञानस्य मोहनिवर्त्तकत्वात्तन्निवृत्त्या रागादिनिवृत्तेरित्याशयेनाह ॥

ception' is '*the worser*', i. e., the root of evil,—in short, the more earnestly to be shunned. He states the reason;—because, in the case 'of him who is not under misconception', i. e., who is void of misconception,—there is neither 'Desire' nor 'Aversion':—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

प्राप्तस्तर्हि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो-
दोषेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 7.—Then we have here [—says some one—] a difference [of 'Misconception'] from the [other] 'Faults', through their relation of cause and effect.

a. Since 'Misconception' is the *cause* of the 'Faults', it must be something other than a 'Fault', because, where there is no distinction, there cannot be the relation of cause and effect.‡

b. 'From the faults',—here the sign of the plural is employed on the strength of the included subdivisions,§ [—see §3,—'Desire' and 'Aversion' making, otherwise, only a case of duality].

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* यद्यपि बहूनां निर्द्धारणे इष्ठनस्तमपो वा विधानात् पापतमः पापिष्ठ इति वा युक्तं तथापि द्वौ द्वावधिकृत्य निर्धारणं द्वयोर्निर्धारणे ईयसुनो विधानात्तेन रागमोहयोर्द्वेषमोहयोर्वा मोहः पापीयाननर्थमूलं बलवद्द्वेष्य इति यावत्। हेतुमाह नामूढस्य मोहशून्यस्य रागद्वेषयोरभावादित्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ दोषनिमित्तत्वान्मोहस्य दोषभिन्नत्वं स्यादभेदेन कार्यकारणभावाभावात् ॥

§ दोषेभ्य इत्यान्तर्गणिकभेदाद्बहुवचनं ॥

c. He repels* [the objection in §7].

न दोषलक्षणावरोधान्मोहस्य ॥ ८ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 8.—Not so,—because 'Misconception' does involve the character of 'Fault'.

a. 'Misconception' *is* a 'Fault', because it really has the character of a 'Fault';—and the relation of cause and effect is not excluded, because it differs individually,†—[though not generically, from the two others].

b. Having shown that there was no occasion [for the argument advanced under §7], he states further that it would prove too much.‡

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९ ॥

Further reply. *Aph.* 9.—And since homogeneous things may consistently be [mutually] cause and effect, this is no objection.

a. Since two things, though they have the same genus, as two substances or two qualities, 'may consistently be cause and effect', i. e., are admitted to be cause and consequent, it is not proper to deny [—on that ground—] the homogeneousness§ [of 'Misconception' with the other 'Faults'].

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* निराकरोति ॥

† मोहस्य दोषलक्षणसत्त्वाद्दोषत्वं व्यक्तिभेदाच्च हेतुहेतुमद्भावो न विरुध्यत इति भावः ॥

‡ अप्रयोजकत्वमुक्त्वाऽनैकान्तिकत्वमप्याह ॥

§ एकजातीययोरपि द्रव्ययोर्गुणयोश्च निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेर्हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्वीकारात्तुल्यजातीयत्वप्रतिषेधो न युक्त इति ॥

b. Here ends the section on the investigation of the 'Faults.'*

c. As its turn has arrived, since 'Transmigration' has to be investigated,—there being a doubt whether transmigration pertain to the Body, or the Understanding, or the Soul, we have an aphorism conveying the tenet.†

SECTION III.

TRANSMIGRATION EXAMINED.

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

Transmigration why belonging to the Soul.

Aph. 10.—Since the Soul is eternal, [it is to it that] Transmigration is proved [to belong].

a. The Soul, for reasons aforesaid, being eternal, it is to it that Transmigration is proved to belong;‡ [and it could not belong to the Body, which is different in successive births].

b. But then [some one may say—], Transmigration must be described by means of its *production* [—i. e. by telling us how and whence it originates];—and this [—viz., production, of anything whatsoever,—] cannot take place either from what is homogeneous [with the alleged product], or from what is heterogeneous, because [if there were *any such thing* as production,] it would extend unduly to *primal* earth, &c.,—for there is no proof that this is eternal;—therefore Transmigration [—having never been produced—] is not a real thing:—so [—to obviate this

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* समाप्तं दोषपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

† क्रमप्राप्ततया प्रेत्यभावे परीक्षणीये प्रेत्यभावः शरीरस्य बुद्धेरात्मनो वेति संशये सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ आत्मनः पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या नित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावस्तस्य सिध्यति ॥

objection —], either as it is a prerequisite [to the establishment of Transmigration], or because it presents itself, he shows the way in which production *does* take place.*

व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

Production how.

Aph. 11.—Of the distinct from the distinct,—because there is the evidence of sense [that such is the case].

a. Supply—"there is the production" of the distinct. 'From the distinct,' i. e., from what has some [given] distinct genus,—e. g., from earth,—there is the production of 'of the distinct,' i. e., of things having that distinct genus,—e. g., derivative earth† [in the shape of jars, &c].

b. Not having understood this, some one doubts.‡

न घटाद्घटानिष्पत्तेः ॥ १२ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 12.—Nay [—says some one—], for a jar is not produced from a jar.

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* ननु प्रेत्यभाव उत्पत्तिनिरूप्यः सा च न सजातीयाद्विजातीयाद्वा सम्भवति आद्यपृथिव्यादौ व्यभिचारात्तन्नित्यत्वे मानाभावादतः प्रेत्यभावोऽसिद्ध इत्युपोद्घातात् प्रसङ्गाद्वोत्पत्तिप्रकारं दर्शयति ॥

† व्यक्तानामुत्पत्तिरिति शेषः व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तजातीयात् पृथिव्यादितः व्यक्तानां व्यक्तजातीयानां जन्यपृथिव्यादीनामुत्पत्तिः ॥

‡ अबुद्धा शङ्कते ॥

a. The import [of the objection] is, that if there be not such relation of cause and effect in the case of special objects [—so that a jar shall result from a jar—], then it cannot be so in the general case* [of the alleged production of earthy things from earth].

b. He clears up this point,—resting on the fact that the exception in the particular case [where a jar is undeniably not the product of a jar,] is no negative, since such is not at all the case generically.†

व्यक्ताद्घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ १३ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 13.—This is no objection, for the jar is produced from what [—though not a *jar*—] is distinct [in its generic character].

a. This [that is alleged in §12,] is no objection to the production of like from like,—because, e. g., the jar is produced, e. g., from the [constitutive] bowl-shaped halves, which have the nature of earth [that exists in the resulting product]:—and the alleged assertion has nothing to support it;—such is the import.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination of Transmigration.§

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* विशेषकार्यकारणभावाभावे सामान्यतोऽपि न तथेति-भावः ॥

† विशेषतो व्यभिचारो न विरोधी सामान्यतस्तु नास्त्येवे-त्याशयवान् समाधत्ते ॥

‡ सजातीयात्सजातीयोत्पत्तेर्न प्रतिषेधः पृथिवीजाती-यात् कपालादितो घटादिनिष्पत्तेः उक्तापादनं चाप्रयोज-कमितिभावः ॥

§ समाप्तं प्रेत्यभावपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

c. Now there here follow eight sections, because they present themselves, or because they are illustrations serving to substantiate the proposition [asserted in §11,]—"Of the distinct," &c. Among these there is first a section on the void's being the material [of all things]. In regard to this, here is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.*

SECTION IV.

That Non-entity is not the Material of things.

अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् ॥ १४ ॥

Whether entity come from non-entity.

Aph. 14.—It is from non-entity that entity arises [—suggests some one—], for manifestation is not—unless there have been destruction.

a. Because there is no manifestation of effects, in the shape of entities, e. g., as a plant, without destruction, e. g., of the seed; —and so the *destruction* [or emergent non-existence] of the seed, or the like, is the matter from which comes the plant or the like.†

b. The reply to this.‡

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* अथात्राष्टौ प्रकरणानि प्रसङ्गाद्युक्तानामित्येतत्सिद्ध्यर्थमुपोद्घाताद्वा तत्रादौ शून्यतोपादानप्रकरणं तत्र पूर्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

† कार्याणां भावानामुत्पत्तिर्यतोऽङ्कुरादेर्बीजादिकमनुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावाभावात् तथाच बीजादिविनाशोऽङ्कुराद्युपादानमिति ॥

‡ अत्रोत्तरं ॥

न व्याघातादप्रयोगः ॥ १५ ॥

This denied. *Aph.* 15.—Not so,—this is not a correct expression, because it is suicidal.

a. It is not proper to say that a thing becomes manifest through destruction, because the expression is inconsistent; for if that which [as you say,] destroys [and takes the place of what is destroyed,] was not previously existent, then it cannot be a destroyer,—and if it *did* previously exist, then it could not subsequently *come into* existence.*

b. The supporter of the primâ facie view censures this.†

नातीतानागतयोः कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् ॥ १६ ॥

A defence attempted. *Aph.* 16.—Nay [—remonstrates the objector—I make use of no suicidal expression—], because terms relating to action are [allowably] applied both to what has departed and to what has not yet come [into existence].

a. My expression [—the objector contends—] is not improper, because, in the case of what has departed and in the case of what has not come, terms in construction with a verb [see *Laghu Kaumudí*, No. 945,] are employed,—that is, terms are employed which designate agent and patient, &c.;—as, for example, "A son [now non-existent,] *will be* born,"—"He congratulates himself on the son that *is to be* born,"—"There *was* [once upon a

* उपमृद्य प्रादुर्भवतीति न युक्तः प्रयोगव्याघातात् उपमर्दकस्य पूर्व्वमसत्त्वे उपमर्दकत्वायोगात् पूर्व्वं सत्त्वे च परतः प्रादुर्भावायोगात् ॥

† पूर्व्वपक्षी दूषयति ॥

time,] a jar [now no longer extant],"—"He mourns his broken jar* [now a jar no more]."

b. But then [—we remark—], grant that your employment of language is figurative [and admissible], still, pray, do you hold that it is the destroyed seed, &c., that is the material, or the *destruction* of the seed, &c? If the latter, is this, moreover, [in your opinion,] the *material* cause or is it the *concomitant*? If the first of these [three]—here is the reply.†

न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः ॥ १७ ॥

The defence repelled in two of its aspects.

Aph. 17.—Nay,—because nothing is produced from things annihilated.

a. Because it is impossible that things annihilated, seeds, or the like, should serve as material [for the formation of anything else]. For the same reason the second [alternative,—viz., that the *destruction* is the *material,*] is not true:—in this case the word "annihilated" [in the aphorism,] stands for "annihilation", —and nothing arises therefrom, because it is substantiality [and not the being a privation,] that constitutes the nature of the material cause of a positive product.‡

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* नायुक्तः प्रयोगः अतीतेऽनागते च कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् कर्तृकर्मादिबोधकशब्दप्रयोगात् यथा जनिष्यते पुत्रः जनिष्यमाणं पुत्रमभिनन्दति अभूत् कुम्भो भिन्नं कुम्भमनुशोचति ॥

† नन्वास्तामौपचारिकः प्रयोगस्तथापि किं बीजादेर्विनष्टस्योपादानत्वं मन्यसे बीजादिविनाशस्य वा अन्त्येऽपि तस्योपादानत्वं निमित्तत्वं वा तत्राद्ये उत्तरं ॥

‡ विनष्टानां बीजादीनामुपादानत्वायोगादतएव न द्वितीयस्तत्र विनष्टं विनाशस्ततो नोत्पत्तिर्द्रव्यत्वस्य भावकार्यसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकत्वात् ॥

b. But in regard to the third [alternative,—viz., that the destruction of the seed is the *concomitant* cause of the plant,] he says.*—

क्रमनिर्देशादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १८ ॥

The defence, in its third aspect, repelled.

Aph. 18.—Since there is [merely] the pointing out of a sequence, this is no objection.

a. Since [it may be contended that] non-existence cannot be denied to be a cause, seeing that it is an admitted doctrine [—admitted without formal mention—] that the absence of obstacles is a *cause,* he therefore says 'Since,' &c. From perceiving that when the seed is destroyed the plant springs up, the destruction of the seed—the obstructer—is [indeed, assumed to be] a cause [of the plant, which could not come into being unless the seed gave place to it];—for, when the seed is destroyed, the plant originates from the parts thereof, combined with the parts of the irrigated earth [in which the seed was planted]. But if non-existence by itself could be a cause, then a plant might arise even from a seed when [its non existence has resulted from its being] reduced to powder,—for there is no difference between the non-entity [in the one case and in the other; i. e., whether the seed be destroyed by one process or another process] :—such is the import.†

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* तृतीयेत्वाह ॥

† अभावस्य कारणत्वं न प्रतिषिध्यते प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य हेतुत्वोपगमादित्याह क्रमेति। बीजे विनष्टेऽङ्कुरो जायत इति प्रत्ययाद्बीजस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्याभावः कारणं बीजे विनष्टे हि तदवयवैर्जलाभिषिक्तभूम्यवयवसहितैरङ्कुर आरभ्यते।

b. Here ends the section denying that emptiness can be a material cause.*

c. He states another opinion.†

SECTION V.

Whether God be the material cause.

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्म्माफल्यदर्शनात् ॥ १९ ॥

Whether God be the sole cause. *Aph.* 19.—God [—suggests some one—] is the [sole] cause, because we see that the acts of men are [occasionally] unattended by their fruits.

a. He clears up this.‡

न पुरुषकर्म्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ॥ २० ॥

This denied. *Aph.* 20—Not so; because, in the *absence* of men's acts, the fruit is not produced.

a. But then, were it thus, would not the agency of man unduly involve [the attainment of] fruit [*without* God's co-operation]? If this be said, he declares in regard to this:§—

अभावमात्रस्य कारणत्वे चूर्णीकृतादपि बीजादङ्कुरोत्पत्तिः स्यादभावस्य निर्विशेषत्वादिति भावः ॥

* समाप्तं शून्यतोपादाननिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

† मतान्तरमाह ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ नन्वेवं पुरुषव्यापारस्य फले व्यभिचारो न स्यादिति चेदत्राह ॥

तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः ॥ २१ ॥

An objection met. *Aph.* 21.—It [viz., man's agency,] is not the [sole] cause, because that [absence of fruit, spoken of in the preceding aphorism] is caused by that [absence of man's agency spoken of at the same place,—but not conversely].

a. Because [all that we assert is that] the absence of fruit is the result of the absence of man's works,* [—but it does not follow that the works by themselves can produce fruit].

b. Here ends the section as to whether God be the material cause.†

c. And if effects were fortuitous, then neither could atoms, or anything else, be the material cause [of things], nor could God be the concomitant Cause;—therefore he begins a section in disproof of fortuitousness. In regard to this matter there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.‡

SECTION VI.

Disproving that effects are fortuitous.

अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् ॥ २२ ॥

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* फलाभावस्य पुरुषकर्म्माभावकारितत्वात् ॥

† समाप्तमीश्वरोपादानताप्रकरणं ॥

‡ यदि च कार्य्याणामाकस्मिकत्वं तदा न परमाण्वादीनामुपादानत्वं नवेश्वरस्य निमित्तत्वमत आकस्मिकत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणमारभते तत्र पूर्व्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

Whether things can occur uncaused.

Aph. 22.—There is an origination of entities [—contends some one—] from no cause, for we see the sharpness of a thorn, &c.

a. 'From no cause';—the affix [viz., *tasil*, in the expression thus rendered,] has the force of a nominative,—the meaning being the causeless coming into existence of entities. The expression 'entities' [—which might seem superfluous—] is for the sake of clearness. The origination of a jar, or the like, [—contends this reasoner—] is not determined by causes, because it is a case of [simple] origination [or coming into existence], like the coming into existence of the sharpness of a thorn, &c.*

b. By the "&c., he includes the variegated hues of the peacock, &c.;—the import being that these have no cause whatever.†

c. A partially [orthodox] mistaken person blames this.‡

अनिमित्तनिमित्ततो नानिमित्ततः ॥ २३ ॥

A defective reply.

Aph. 23.—It is not from no cause, because it is from a cause [in the shape of what you call] "*no-cause.*"

a. That is to say,—how can it be from no cause, when the cause is precisely that "no-cause" [mentioned by yourself in the preceding aphorism], seeing that you exhibit, in the ex-

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* अनिमित्तत इति प्रथमान्तात्तसिल् अनिमित्ता भावोत्पत्तिरित्यर्थः । भावेति स्पष्टार्थं । घटाद्युत्पत्तिर्न कारणनिबन्धा उत्पत्तित्वात् कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्याद्युत्पत्तिवत् ॥

† आदिपदान्मयूरचित्रादिपरिग्रहः तदकारणकमेवेत्याशयः ॥

‡ एकदेशी भ्रान्तो दूषयति ॥

pression "*from* no cause," a 5th case-affix which *marks a reason**?

b. He [the author] blames† [this argument of a well-meaning follower, who did not discern that the affix,—see §22, *a*,—was employed with the force of the 1st case, and not of the 5th].

निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २४ ॥

The defective reply set aside.

Aph. 24.—This is no objection, because a cause and no cause are two [entirely] different things.

a. The alleged objection is not proper, because no cause and a cause are 'different things,' i. e., are heterogeneous,—because what is no cause cannot be a cause. And that [error, to which the reply in question is no answer,] has been sufficiently refuted just by the refutation of the opinion that works are no cause of [man's being born into the world in] the body,—therefore it is not refuted [over again] here‡.

b. Here ends the section respecting fortuitousness.§

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* अनिमित्तत इति हेतुपञ्चमीनिर्देशादनिमित्तस्यैव निमित्तत्वात् कथमनिमित्तत इति ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ अनिमित्तस्य निमित्तस्य च अर्थान्तरभावात् भेदात् उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः अनिमित्तस्य निमित्तत्वासम्भवात् । शरीरस्याकर्म्मनिमित्तत्वदूषणेनैव च तद्दूषितप्रायमित्याशयेन नात्र दूषितमिति ॥

§ समाप्तमाकस्मिकत्वप्रकरणं ॥

c. Were everything uneternal, then not even Soul would be eternal; therefore there is a section repelling the notion that everything is uneternal. Here the doubt arising, whether whatever is cognizable be eternal, or not, we have an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.*

SECTION VII.

HOW NOT ALL THINGS ARE UNETERNAL.

सर्व्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्म्मकत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

Whether everything be uneternal.

Aph. 25.—Everything is uneternal [—contends some one—], because it is what has a habit of coming into existence and perishing.

a. What is not from eternity is destructible [—says this reasoner—], because whatever has an origin has the character of decay.†

b. He censures this.‡

नानित्यतानित्यत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

This denied.

Aph. 26.—It is not uneternal, because it [—in some instances—] is eternal.

a. The fact of having an origin does not establish a thing's destructibility,—because *destruction* is 'eternal,' i. e., is inde-

* सर्व्वस्यैवानित्यत्वे नात्मादेरपि नित्यत्वं स्यादतः सर्व्वानित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं । तत्र प्रमेयत्वं नित्यत्वव्याप्यं नवेति संशये पूर्व्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

† अनित्यं विनाशि उत्पत्तिमतो विनाशधर्म्मकत्वात् ॥

‡ दूषयति ॥

structible;—so that, in that instance, there is a wandering away* [of the alleged mark unattended by what it is alleged as a mark of].

b. Some one objects.†

तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् ॥ २७ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 27.—That [—objects some one—] is uneternal, just as fire perishes on the perishing of the combustible.

a. That also, viz., destruction, is not eternal;—as fire, immediately on the perishing of 'the combustible,' i. e., of the fuel, or the like, perishes also itself, and does not *emerge* from the combustible; so also the destruction of a jar, or the like, perishes, and does not emerge from the jar, or the like.‡

b. He clears up this.§

नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २८ ॥

This repelled. *Aph.* 28.—The eternal is undeniable, because it is laid down as it is apprehended.

a. The full meaning is, that, there is no denying 'the eternal,'

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* उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं न विनाशित्वसाधकं ध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वादविनाशित्वात् तत्र व्यभिचारात् ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ तस्या अनित्यताया अप्यनित्यत्वं यथाग्निर्दाह्यस्येन्धनादेर्विनाशानन्तरं स्वयमपि नश्यति न तु दाह्योन्मज्जनं तथा घटादेरपि नाशो नश्यति न घटाद्युन्मज्जनं ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

i. e., the eternity of that which is distinguished by eternalness. 'As it is apprehended,' i. e., without going beyond [cases where there is] perception [of an eternal character]. And so [the fact that eternity belongs at least to some things, is settled] by its being determined that eternity belongs to [the ethereal] Space, and the like, on the strength of the argument which leads us to admit a subject of [admitted] qualities, corroborated by the simplicity* [which belongs to no other theory of the matter in question].

b. Here ends the section disproving the allegation that all things are uneternal.†

c. If [on the other hand,] all things were eternal, then Transmigration, &c., could not take place at all;—therefore there is a section for the refutation of this [eternity of *all* things]. On this point there is an aphorism of objection.‡

SECTION VIII.

How not all things are eternal.

सर्वं नित्यं पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

Whether everything be eternal.

Aph. 29.—Everything [—says some one—] is eternal, because the five elements are eternal.

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* नित्यस्य नित्यत्वविशिष्टस्य नित्यत्वस्य न प्रत्याख्यानमिति फलितं। यथोपलब्धि उपलब्ध्यनतिक्रमेण। तथाच धर्म्मिग्राहकमानेन लाघवसहकृतेनाकाशादेर्नित्यत्वव्यवस्थापनादिति ॥

† समाप्तं सर्व्वानित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

‡ सर्व्वनित्यत्वे न प्रेत्यभावादिसिद्धिरतस्तन्निराकरणप्रकरणं। तत्राक्षेपसूत्रं ॥

a. He clears up this.*

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

This denied. *Aph.* 30.—Not so,—because we apprehend causes of production and of destruction.

a. It is not proper to say that everything is eternal; because we apprehend, [in the case] of jars, and the like, causes of production and of destruction, viz., the conjunction of the bowl-shaped halves [in the production of a jar], and the blow of a mallet [in the destruction of it], and the like;—and thus production and destruction are inevitable† [as regards the necessity of conceding their existence].

b. Again a Sánkhya says.‡—

तल्लक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३१ ॥

A Sánkhya objection. *Aph.* 31.—This is no refutation [—says the Sánkhya, of the objection];—because the character thereof is [merely] obscured.

a. The alleged refutation [of the objection advanced in §29,] will not do; because [—argues the Sánkhya—] that which is the character of something eternal, an atom, or the like, viz., [the character of] elementariness, or the like, is, in a jar, or the like, [merely] 'obscured,' i. e., it really exists;—and therefore the

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* समाधत्ते ॥

† सर्व्वनित्यत्वं न युक्तं घटादीनां उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणानां कपालसंयोगमुद्गरपातादीनां उपलब्धेस्तथा चोत्पादविनाशावावश्यकाविति ॥

‡ पुनः साङ्ख्य आह ॥

notion of production, &c., is a mistaken one:—such is the import.*

b. He blames this.†

नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३२ ॥

This repelled. *Aph.* 32.—Not so,—because we perceive production,—which causes [us to know] that [uneternalness].

a. The denial that anything is uneternal is not proper, because we perceive production, which 'causes' that, i. e., which causes us to know it for certain. And so, since the notion of production and destruction is a just one, the theory [that everything is eternal,] is set aside; for otherwise there could be no such thing as the cognition of occasionalness;—and this could not be accounted for by [the Sánkhya hypothesis of] manifestation [—see Sánkhya Aph. B. 1. §151—], because, since this [manifestation] itself is not an eternal thing, it upsets the theory that *all* is eternal. And this will be discussed more clearly in the sequel.‡

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* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न नित्यस्य परमाण्वादेर्यणुकाणां भूतत्वादि घटादौ तदवरोधात् तत्सत्त्वात्तथाचोत्पादादिप्रत्ययो भ्रान्त इति भावः ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ अनित्यत्वनिषेधो न युक्त उत्पत्तेस्तत्कारणात्तत्प्रमापकादुपलब्धेः । तथाचोत्पादविनाशप्रतीतेः प्रामाणिकत्वात्सर्वनित्यत्वनिषेध इतरथा कादाचित्कत्वप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः न चाविर्भावात्तदुपपत्तिस्तस्यैवानित्यत्वे सर्व्वनित्यत्वव्याघातात् । विवेचयिष्यते चेदं स्पष्टतरमुपरिष्टात् ॥

b. Pondering the doubt whether the notion of production and destruction may be a mistaken one, he says.*—

न व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३३ ॥

A doubt disposed of.

Aph. 33.—Not so,—because [in that case] there could be no such thing as settling anything.

a. That is to say,—if we were to entertain a doubt whether even that be an error which has been settled by all mankind to be a matter of fact, then we should have to give up using the terms truth and error.†

b. Here ends the section confuting the opinion that all things are eternal.‡

c. Now, as the subject presents itself, there is a section on the question whether all things be separate things. In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.§

SECTION IX.

How all things are not each several things.

सर्व्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् ॥ ३४ ॥

Whether everything be several things.

Aph. 34.—Everything is several [—says some one—], because the marks of an entity are several.

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* उत्पादविनाशप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तत्वं स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† सार्व्वलौकिकप्रमात्वेन सिद्धस्यापि भ्रमत्वशङ्कायां प्रमाभ्रमव्यवहारविलोपः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाप्तं सर्व्वनित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

§ अथ प्रसङ्गात्सर्व्वपृथक्त्वप्रकरणं। तत्र पूर्व्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

a. Every thing is 'several,' i. e., plural. A 'mark' is that whereby anything is recognised,—something notorious in it. This [mark] is 'several,' i. e., it consists of several things. And so the application [of the argument is as follows]:—

(1.) A jar, or the like, is in the shape of an aggregate;—

(2.) Because it is nameable:—

(3.) [Everything that is nameable is in the shape of an aggregate,] as an army, a forest, &c.

[And, continues this reasoner,] there is no wandering away [of nameableness unaccompained by the character of an aggregate], because [—to anticipate the instances that may seem to contradict this—] there is no proof of [there being any such thing as] an imperceptible Ether, &c., and because the Soul is nothing other than the Body, and Quality and Action are nothing distinct from their substratum, and there is no proof of [there being any such thing as] either Ultimate Difference or Co-inhesion, and Non-existence is nothing at all.*

b. He clears up this.†

नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ३५ ॥

This denied.

Aph. 35.—Not so,—because by more marks than one a single entity is constituted.

a. Because, 'by more marks than one,' i. e., by more natures

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* सर्व्ववस्तु पृथक् नाना लक्ष्यतेऽनेनेति लक्षणं समाख्या तस्याः पृथक्त्वं पृथगर्थकत्वं तथाच प्रयोगो घटादिः समूहरूपो वाच्यत्वात् सेनावनादिवत् अतीन्द्रिये गगनादौ मानाभावादात्मनः शरीरानतिरेकाद्गुणकर्म्मणोराश्रयाभेदाद्विशेषसमवाययोर्म्मानाभावादभावस्य तुच्छत्वाच्च व्यभिचारः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

than one, e. g., by Colour, Savour, and so on,—and by this that and the other [constituent] portion,—there is 'constituted,' i. e., there is produced, just a single distinct entity;—such is the meaning.*

b. He states the reason,† [on which the foregoing argument is based].

लक्षणाव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३६ ॥

The denial reinforced.

Aph. 36.—There is no setting aside [this our argument], just because it is settled that there are marks.

a. 'There is no setting aside,' i. e., there is no establishing that every thing is several,—just because 'it is settled,' i. e., it is an established point, that there are 'marks,'—viz., [marks] of entities, such as jars, webs, &c.,‡ [which entities possess a unity, else how could the mark of any one *be* a mark of that one] ?

b. Here ends the section refuting the notion that everything is several things.§

c. Were all a void, there could be no such relation as that of cause and effect; therefore he commences a section in order to refute this [notion]. Here the doubt presenting itself—whether the fact of being an object of knowledge be, or be not, invari-

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* अनेकलक्षणैरनेकस्वरूपै रूपरसादिभिस्तत्तदवयवैश्च विशिष्टस्यैकस्यैव भावस्य निष्पत्तेरुत्पत्तेरित्यर्थः ॥

† हेतुमाह ॥

‡ लक्षणस्य अर्थाद्भावानां घटपटादीनां व्यवस्थानाद्व्यवस्थितत्वादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥

§ समाप्तं सर्व्वपृथक्त्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

ably attended by the fact of being a non-entity—, there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.*

SECTION X.

How all is not non-existent.

सर्व्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः ॥ ३७ ॥

Whether all be non-entity.

Aph. 37.—Everything is a non-entity [—says some one—], because it is a settled point that in entities there are mutual non-existences.

a. Everything is matter of dispute—non-entity—trash. He alleges a direct proof of this, saying, 'because in entities,' &c.,—i.e., because, in what are fancied to be entities, e. g., in jars, &c. it is settled that there is the nature of non-entity;—for, that all things have the nature of non-existence, is settled by such cognitions as "A jar is not a web," [—so that there is non-existence of a jar in the web, and of a web in the jar,] &c.†

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.‡

न स्वभावासिद्धेर्भावानां ॥ ३८ ॥

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* सर्व्वशून्यत्वेन कार्य्यकारणभावासम्भव इति तन्निराकरणप्रकरणमारभते। तत्र ज्ञानविषयत्वमभावत्वव्याप्यं नवेति संशये पूर्व्वपक्षसूत्रं॥

† सर्व्वं विवादपदमभावस्तुच्छं तत्र प्रत्यक्षं मानमाह भावेष्विति। भावत्वाभिमतेषु घटादिषु अभावत्वसिद्धेर्घटः पटो नेत्यादिप्रतीत्या सर्व्वेषामभावत्वसिद्धेः॥

‡ सिद्धान्तसूत्रं॥

This denied. *Aph.* 38.—Not so,—because, of entities, the nature is real.

a. 'Of entities,' i. e., of Earth, &c., the 'nature,' viz., Odour, &c., and Existence, &c., is real:—for it is impossible that of a *nothing* the Odour, Colour, or the like, should appear really existent.*

b. Again some one doubts:†—

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

A doubt. *Aph.* 39.—There is no reality [—says some one—] in the nature [of things], because they are relative.

a. Because they have relation one to another,—for we observe that "In relation to that—this is bluer,"—"It is short in comparison with that," &c. And what is relative is not real, just like the redness of crystal which has relation to the Hibiscus flower‡ [reflected in it, or seen through it].

b. He clears up this.§

आहतत्वादयुक्तं ॥ ४० ॥

This cleared up. *Aph.* 40.—This is improper, because asserted falsely.

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* भावानां पृथिव्यादीनां स्वभावस्य गन्धादेः सत्त्वादेश्च सिद्धः नहि तुच्छस्य गन्धरूपादिकं सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिर्व्वा सम्भवति ॥

† पुनः शङ्कते ॥

‡ इतरसापेक्षत्वात् एतदपेक्षयाऽयं नीलतर एतदपेक्षया ह्रस्व इति प्रतीतेः यच्च सापेक्षन्तदवस्तु यथा जवासापेक्षं स्फटिकारुण्यं ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Since it is 'asserted falsely,' i. e., since it is not the case, that non-entity is predicable wherever there is relativeness. Nor can a jar, or the like, be a relative thing. Further, is *relativeness* relative, or not? If the first, then, since [on your hypothesis,] it is a non-entity, it proves nothing. If the latter, then, since it itself is something real, how can *all* be *unreal*? Such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section refuting the opinion that all is nothing.†

c. Next there is a section in refutation of the doctrine that all is numerically one.‡

d. An aphorism conveying a tenet§ [follows].

SECTION XI.

How all is not numerically one, and, further, regarding Fruit.

सङ्ख्यैकान्तासिद्धिः कारणानुपपत्त्युपप-त्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४१ ॥

Argument against all being numerically one.

Aph. 41.—Through there being a reason, or by there not being one,, it is not true that all is numerically one.

* सापेक्षत्वस्य तुच्छत्वव्याप्तेर्व्याहतत्वादसिद्धत्वात् न वा घटादेः सापेक्षत्वं सम्भवति किञ्च सापेक्षत्वं सापेक्षं न वा आद्ये तस्य तुच्छत्वान्न साधकत्वं अन्त्ये तस्यैव सत्यत्वात् कुतः सर्व्वशून्यत्वमिति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं सर्व्वशून्यतानिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

‡ अथ संख्यैकान्तवादनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

§ सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

a. All things are not really numerically one, because there is no 'reason,' i. e., no proof of this; or, if there be, then all is not numerically one, because it is looked for that the proof be something other than the thing proved.*

b. Some one objects:†—

न कारणावयवभावात् ॥ ४२ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 42.—Not so [—says some one—], because the reason is a part.

a. That all is numerically one is not untrue, because the 'reason,' i. e., the proof, is a 'part,' i. e., is a portion, of the aforesaid [numerically single total]; and there is no difference between part and whoie,‡ [such as might justify our regarding a part and the whole as *two*].

b. He blames this.§

निरवयवत्वादहेतुः ॥ ४३ ॥

This repelled. *Aph.* 43.—This is no reason, because there is no part [available for the purpose].

a. The alleged reason is not proper, because, since everything whatever is the subject of the proposition, there is nothing left

* सङ्ख्यैकान्ता न सिध्यन्ति कारणस्य प्रमाणस्यानुपपत्तेः उपपत्तौ वा न सङ्ख्यैकान्तः साधनस्य साध्यातिरिक्तस्यापेक्षितत्वात् ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ न सङ्ख्यैकान्तस्यासिद्धिः कारणस्य प्रमाणस्यावयवभावात् उक्तस्यैकदेशत्वादवयवावयविनोश्च भेदाभावः ॥

§ दूषयति ॥

over,—and a portion of the *subject* cannot supply the *argument*:—such is the import.*

b. Now, since the opportunity offers, 'Fruit' being to be examined, he states a doubt.†

सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः ॥ ४४ ॥

A doubt regarding 'Fruit.'

Aph. 44.—Since 'Fruit,' is produced instantly, and at another time, there arises a doubt.

a. Since we see that such an action as *cooking* has its fruit immediately, while *ploughing,* or the like, has its fruit at a subsequent time, there arises a doubt whether the fruit of maintaining the sacred fire, of oblations, of injuries, and so on, be immediate, or belong to another time.‡

b. In regard to this point, the primâ facie view being this, that, since worldly credit or discredit may themselves be the fruit, we are not to imagine merit, &c., [as accruing to the agent]; the aphorism conveying the tenet§ [follows]:—

न सद्यः फलं कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात् ॥ ४५ ॥

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* उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः सर्व्वस्यैव पक्षत्वेनावशिष्टस्याभावात्पक्षैकदेशस्य हेतुत्वासम्भवादिति भावः ॥

† अथावसरतः फले परीक्षणीये संशयमाह ॥

‡ पाकादिक्रियायाः सद्यःफलकत्वस्य कृष्यादेः कालान्तरफलकत्वस्य दर्शनादग्निहोत्रहवनादेर्हिंसादेर्वा फलं साद्यस्कं कालान्तरीणं वेति संशयः ॥

§ तत्रैहिककीर्त्त्यकीर्त्त्यादीनामेव फलत्वसम्भवे नादृष्टादिकल्पनमिति पूर्व्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

The doubt solved.

Aph. 45.—The 'Fruit' is, not immediate, because it has to be experienced at a future date.

a. That is to say, because it is declared as having to be experienced at a future date. For heaven is mentioned in scripture as 'Fruit,' and *that* is joy unmixed with pain, and worldly joys are not so. In like manner the experiencing of this or that hell is mentioned in scripture as the 'Fruit,' of doing injury, &c.; and that cannot be here [on earth] :—such is the import.*

b. Some one doubts.†

कालान्तरेणानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात् ॥ ४६ ॥

A doubt.

Aph. 46.—It cannot be produced at a subsequent time [—says some one—], because the cause has ceased to be.

a. The fruit of this or that act cannot be at a future time, because the 'cause,' viz., the act, has ceased to be.‡

b. He clears up this.§

प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवत्तत्स्यात् ॥ ४७ ॥

This cleared up.

Aph. 47.—Before the production, that may be like a tree and its fruit.

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* कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वेन प्रतिपादनादित्यर्थः स्वर्गो हि फलं श्रूयते स च दुःखासम्भिन्नसुखं न चैहिकं सुखं तथा एवं हिंसादेस्तत्तन्नरकोपभोगः फलं श्रूयते नचेह तत्सम्भव इति भावः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ कालान्तरेण तत्तत्कर्म्मणः फलं न सम्भवति हेतोस्तत्कर्म्मणो विनाशात् ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Before the production of [one's fruition of] heaven, &c., that may be the medium. He states an example: 'like a tree and its fruit.' As, even when the watering of the root, and so on, has ceased, fruit may be produced by virtue of the medium, viz, the consequent growth, &c., of the parts, so, in the matter before us, though the sacrificial acts, &c., have ceased to be, there is no inconsistency in the resulting of [the fruition of] heaven, &c., because a medium really exists in the shape of the *merit* thereby generated.*

b. But then [—says some one—] the very relation of cause and effect will not bear examination;—so he ponders this doubt.†

नासन्न सन्न सदसत् सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात् ॥ ४८ ॥

Whether the relation of cause and effect be possible.

Aph. 48.—[The Fruit, says some one, before its production, is] neither non-entity, nor entity, nor yet [at once,] entity and non-entity, because entity and non-entity are incongruous.

a. 'Before production' is borrowed [from the preceding aphorism]. 'The Fruit' has to be supplied. And so, antecedently to its production, the fruit is not a non entity, because, if what is a non-entity could come into existence, then hares' horns, and the like, might also come into existence, and we might find oil even in sand, and the like;—neither is it [—the fruit—] an entity, because it is a contradiction that what *is* should *come into*

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* स्वर्गादिनिष्पत्तेः प्राक्तद्द्वारं स्यात् दृष्टान्तमाह वृक्षफलवत् यथा मूलसेकादिनाशेऽपि तदधीनावयवोपचयादिद्वारबलेन फलोत्पत्तिस्तथा प्रकृतेऽपि यागादिनाशेऽपि तज्जन्यादृष्टरूपद्वारसत्त्वान्न स्वर्गाद्युत्पत्तिविरोधः ॥

† ननु कार्य्यकारणभाव एव न विचारसह इत्याशङ्कते ॥

existence;—for the same reason it is not [at once] an entity and non-entity, because an entity and a non-entity have inter-repugnant characters, in the shape of being and *not* being.*

b. He clears up this.†

प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्तिधर्मकमसदित्यद्धा उत्पादव्यय-दर्शनात् ॥ ४९ ॥

This point cleared up.

Aph. 49.—Previously to its production, that which has the character of coming into existence, is, verily, not an entity, because we witness both production and destruction.

a. 'That which has the character of coming into existence', i. e., that which is viewed under the aspect of what has the character of coming into existence, e. g., a web, or the like, is, antecedently to its production, not an entity:—'verily,' i. e., this is the truth,—because production and destruction are established facts;—for we understand that "Now the jar has been produced," and "Now the jar has been destroyed;"—but what really *exists* cannot be *produced*, because then we should have a case of what has been produced being produced over again.‡

* प्राङ्गुत्पत्तेरित्यनुवर्त्तते फलमित्यध्याहर्त्तव्यं तथा चोत्पत्तेः प्राक् फलं नासत् असत उत्पत्तौ शशशृङ्गादेरप्युत्पत्तिः स्यात् स्याच्च सिकतादावपि तैलं न वा सत् सत उत्पत्तिविरोधात् अतएव न सदसत् सदसतोः सत्त्वासत्त्वलक्षणवैधर्म्यात् ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ उत्पत्तिधर्म्मकं उत्पत्तिधर्म्मकत्वेनोपलभ्यमानं पटादिकमुत्पत्तेः प्रागसदिति अद्धा तत्त्वं उत्पादनाशयोः प्रमितत्वात्

b. To the remark, that, if what is no entity could come into existence, there would be no law, [but utter confusion would prevail,] he says.*

बुद्धिसिद्धन्तु तदसत् ॥ ५० ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 50.—But that, [though] no entity, is determined by the understanding.

a. 'That,' i. e., the product;—[though] 'no entity,' i. e., being that whereof antecedent non-existence was predicable;—'is determined by the understanding,' i. e., is made to itself an object, by the understanding. To explain,—the weaver sets himself to work, having considered, that, "In these threads [—i. e., constituted by these threads—] there *will be* a web,"—but not with the understanding, that, "there *is* a web;" for, if *that* were the case, then, the product being supposed extant, there would be no setting one's self to work, because desire [precluded by possession,] would be absent.†

b. Well, be it so, that 'Fruit' results from a *cause*, yet, since the example [in §47], viz., 'like a tree and its fruit,' is not a parallel one, it is not proved that there is such a thing as *merit*:—so some one, on the strength of this, doubts as follows.‡—

इदानीं घट उत्पन्न इदानीं घटो विनष्ट इति प्रत्ययात् सतस्तु नेात्पत्तिसम्भव उत्पन्नपुनरुत्पादप्रसङ्गात् ॥

* असत उत्पत्तौ नियमो न स्यादित्यत्राह ॥

† तत्कार्य्यं असत् प्रागभावप्रतियोगिबुद्धिसिद्धं बुद्ध्या-विषयीकृतं तथाहि इह तन्तुषु पटो भविष्यतीति ज्ञात्वा कुविन्दः प्रवर्त्तते नतु पटोऽस्तीति ज्ञात्वा तथा सति सिद्धत्वेन ज्ञात इच्छाऽभावात् प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः ॥

‡ नन्वस्तु हेतुफलभावस्तथापि वृक्षफलवदिति दृष्टान्तवैषम्यान्नादृष्टसिद्धिरित्याशयेन शङ्कते ॥

आश्रयव्यतिरेकात् वृक्षफलवदित्यहेतुः ॥ ५१ ॥

Another objection.

Aph. 51.—[The example, in §47,] "like a tree and its fruit" is no argument, [says some one,] because a receptacle is awanting.

a. It is no argument to say, that, before production [of the fruit of acts], the case is like that of a tree and its fruit;—why? —'because a receptacle is awanting,' i. e., because that body by which the act was done has perished:—but, in the case of the tree, its improvement, by watering, &c., is suitable, because the tree really exists [and furnishes a continuant receptacle for the results of the acts]:—such is the fancy* [of this objector].

b. He clears up this.†

प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादहेतुः ॥ ५२ ॥

The point cleared up.

Aph. 52.—This [that is urged in §51,] is no argument, because the Soul is the receptacle of the happiness.

a. The argument, 'because a receptacle is awanting,' is not proper,—because 'the happiness,' i. e., the joy that is to take place, on being lodged in a celestial body, resides in the *Soul*;—that is to say, because it has the same receptacle as [the merit of] the sacrifices, &c.,‡ [of which it is the fruit].

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* प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवदित्यहेतुः कुतः आश्रयव्यतिरेकात् येन कायेन कर्म्म कृतं तस्य नाशात् वृक्षस्थले तु तस्य वृक्षस्य सत्त्वात् सलिलसेकादिकं परिकर्म्मोपयुज्यत इत्यभिमानः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ आश्रयव्यतिरेकादितिहेतुर्न युक्तः प्रीतेः सुखस्य स्वर्गि-

b. He ponders the doubt whether, even though it be possible that, in *some* cases, they [—the merit and the fruit—] have the same receptacle, it may not be so in every case.*

न पुत्रस्त्रीपशुपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्द्दे-
शात् ॥ ५३ ॥

The objection modified. *Aph.* 53.—Not so [—says some one,—the fruit cannot be lodged always in the *Soul*], because such fruits are mentioned as a son, a wife, cattle, attendants, gold, food, &c.

a. Since sons, &c., are mentioned as fruits, it is impossible that they should have the same receptacle [as the merit of which they are the fruits] :—such is the import.†

b. Although, since sons, &c., are fruits belonging to the present life, there is no [room for] doubt at all, seeing that, in this case, there is no such *absence of a receptacle* [as the doubt, in §51, is founded upon, and we might therefore have spared ourselves the trouble of replying] ;—still, having regard to the consideration that where the fruit may be in the shape of wealth, &c., belonging to a *subsequent* birth, even *then* our theory does not fail,—he says‡ [as follows].

शरीरावच्छेदेन जायमानस्यात्मवृत्तित्वाद्यागादिसामानाधि-
करण्यादित्यर्थः ॥

* क्वचित्सामानाधिकरण्यसम्भवेऽपि सर्व्वत्र न तथेति शङ्कते ॥

† पुत्रादीनां फलनिर्द्देशात् सामानाधिकरण्यं न सम्भवतीति भावः ॥

‡ यद्यपि पुत्रादीनामैहिकफलत्वात्तत्राश्रयव्यतिरेका-

तत्सम्बन्धात्फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः ॥ ५४ ॥

The objection removed.

Aph. 54.—In the case of these there is a figurative employment of speech, as if they were 'Fruit,' because 'Fruit' is produced by the conjunction thereof.

a. 'By the conjunction thereof,' i. e., by the possession of a son, &c. ;—'because fruit is produced,' i. e., because [—see §45, *a*—] joy is produced ;—'in the case of these,' i. e., in the case of a son, or the like ;—'there is a figurative employment of speech, as if they were fruit,' i. e, they are figuratively called fruit,—just as in such an expression as "Food, verily, is the life of the living,"—[whereas, literally, it is only by the *conjunction* of food that life is continued to the living].*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of 'Fruit.'†

c. Now 'Pain,' which [—see the enunciation in B. I. §9—] presents itself next in order, is to be examined; and, in regard to this, it has been stated [at B. I. §21,] that Pain is that whose mark is distress :—and it was stated that what is meant by it is the being whatever has the nature [or genus] which is the nature of *pain* :—and this, in such [so called] pains as the Body [—see B. I. §21, *a*—] is *not* invariably accompanied [by the al-

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भावात् शङ्केव न तथापि यत्र जन्मान्तरीयधनादिकमपि फलं स्यात्तत्रापि नानुपपत्तिरित्याशयेनाह ॥

* तत्सम्बन्धात्पुत्रादिसम्बन्धात्फलनिष्पत्तेः प्रीत्युत्पत्तेः तेषु पुत्रादिषु फलवदुपचारः फलत्वेन व्यपदेशः यथाऽन्नं वै प्राणिनां प्राणा इति ॥

† समाप्तं फलपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

leged mark of *distress*] ;—so, pondering this doubt, he says* [as follows].

SECTION XII.

THE EXAMINATION OF PAIN.

विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखं जन्मोत्पत्तिः ॥ ५५ ॥

The definition of Pain justified.

Aph. 55.—The occurrence of birth is a grief, because it is joined with various distresses.

a. The Body, &c., is [called] a 'birth,' because of its association with the fact of being born. 'The occurrence thereof' means conjunction therewith. 'Because it is joined with various distresses,' the expression *pain* is applied to it [—viz., to the Body, —] figuratively,—but it is not an actual pain ;—and so it is directed to be *regarded* as 'Pain,' with a view to its being avoided in consideration of its being *connected* with various pains.†

b. But then, by considering it [the Body,] as a pain, pray, is

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* अथ क्रमप्राप्तं दुःखं परीक्षणीयं तत्र च बाधनालक्षणं दुःखमित्युक्तं तदर्थस्तु दुःखत्वजातिमत्त्वमित्युक्तं तच्च शरीरादौ दुःखेऽव्याप्तमित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† जननयोगाज्जन्म शरीरादिकं तदुत्पत्तिस्तत्सम्बन्धः विविधबाधनायोगात् दुःखमिति व्यपदिश्यते न तु वास्तवमेव तत् दुखं तथाच विविधदुःखानुषक्ततया हेयत्वार्थं दुःखमिति भावनीयमुपदिश्यते ॥

pleasure denied [to have any existence]? —this is impossible;—therefore he says* [as follows].

सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ५६ ॥

Pleasure admitted to exist.

Aph. 56.—[Pleasure is not denied to exist,] because pleasure also is produced in the midst [of the pains which constitute the actual stuff of human life].

a. [This we grant,] because, since pleasure also does arise amidst pains, it is impossible to deny its existence.†

b. But then, since there is no difference between the connection of pleasure [with the Soul,] and that of pain, why do you not prefer that we should regard them [both] as *pleasure* [—instead of regarding both of them as *pain*]? To this he replies:‡—

बाधनानिवृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्य्येषणदोषादप्रति-
षेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

Pleasure a trifle in comparison with pain.

Aph. 57.—Since there is the cessation of pain [—which is the one great end], and since he who adopts your view has the fault of seeking after [en-

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* ननु दुःखभावनेन किं सुखं प्रत्याख्यायते न चेतच्छक्य-मत आह ॥

† दुःखानां मध्ये सुखस्याप्युत्पत्तेस्तत्प्रत्याख्यानस्याशक्य-त्वात् ॥

‡ ननु सुखदुःखसम्बन्धाविशेषात् सुखभावनमेव किं नेष्यत इत्यत्राह ॥

joyable objects], this is no objection [to the injunction that all that is mundane should be regarded as pain].

a. This is no objection to regarding [everything mundane] as pain,—because 'he who adopts your view,' i. e., he who considers that it [the body,] is an instrument of enjoyment, 'has the fault of seeking after,' i. e., has the fault of seeking after, or of exerting himself about, the objects of enjoyment. For, he who exerts himself for the the sake of joy, is tormented, in the acquiring and the keeping, &c., with various distresses;—therefore, since this may serve as a cause of the abandoning of desire, it is directed that it [viz., the Body, and mundane existence altogether,] shall be regarded as a *pain.**

b. But then, [some one may say,] since it [mundane life,] can cease, quite spontaneously, in the case of him who *feels* it to be pain, the instruction to *consider* it as such is useless;—so to this he replies:†—

दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च ॥ ५८ ॥

The direction to regard the Body as an evil not needless.

Aph. 58.—And [the injunction is advisable,] because, whilst there is a doubt whether it be pain, something may be fancied a pleasure, [though it be really an evil].

a. In respect of what thing there is a various [and undecided]

* दुःखभावनस्य न प्रतिषेधः वेदयतः सुखसाधनत्वं जानतः पर्य्येषणदोषात् पर्य्येषणे सुखार्थप्रवर्त्तने दोषात् सुखार्थं प्रवर्त्तमानो हि अर्जनपालनादौ विविधाभिर्बाधनाभिरुपतप्यतेऽतो दुःखभावनं वैराग्यहेतुतयोपदिश्यते ॥

† ननु दुःखमनुभवतः स्वत एव निवृत्तिसम्भवात् दुःखभावनोपदेशो व्यर्थ इत्यत आह ॥

pinion whether it be a pain, this injunction is, in order that here may be no engaging in such a thing, e. g., in forbidden njury, or eating, or embraces, &c., :—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of 'Pain'.†

c. Now, since it has presented itself in turn, 'Emancipation' [B. I. §9,] is to be examined; and in regard to this he states a primâ facie view that there is no such thing, because there is no [sufficient] opportunity for exerting oneself with a view thereto.‡

SECTION XIII.

Emancipation examined.

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः ॥ ५९ ॥

The possibility of Emancipation questioned.

Aph. 59.—There is no Emancipation [says some one], because of the [continual] association of one's debts and troubles and exertions.

a. There can be no Emancipation, because, by reason of the clinging to us of our 'debts,' &c., there is no opportunity for working out our salvation:—and so it is stated in scripture "when born, verily, a Bráhman is born triply indebted;—from the Rishis, by his course of student-life; from the gods, by sacrifice; from the progenitors, by progeny;"—that is to say, one is *freed* 'from the

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* दुःखस्य विविधः कल्पो यत्र तादृशे प्रतिषिद्धहिंसाभो-
जन मैथुनादौ प्रवृत्तिर्माभूदित्ययमुपदेश इति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं दुःखपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

‡ अथ क्रमप्राप्ततयाऽपवर्गः परीक्षणीयः तत्र च तदर्थक-
प्रवृत्तिकालाभावात्तदभाव इति पूर्व्वपक्षयति ॥

Ṛishis,' i. e., from his debts to the Ṛishis, by his course of student-life; he is freed 'from the gods,' i. e., from his debts to the gods, by sacrifice; he is freed 'from the progenitors,' i. e., from his debts to the progenitors, 'by progeny,' i. e., by [his begetting] offspring:—and life passes away in the mere clearing off of these debts:*—[and so of the 'troubles' and 'exertions'].

b. He clears up this.†

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ॥ ६० ॥

This doubt cleared up.

Aph. 60.—Since the literal expressions would be inadmissible, the recital is with figurative expressions, [and this has an additional advantage] because [it acquaints us that] blame and praise are rendered suitable.

a. For the recital "when born," &c. [§59, *a,*] does not consist of literal expressions, for a person is not competent to acts as soon as born. In the same way, the word 'debt', too, is not meant literally, for, in this instance, no one gives something that is to be received back again;—but it is enounced in such terms

* ऋणाद्यनुबन्धादपवर्गानुष्ठानकालाभावादपवर्गाभावः स्यात् तथाच श्रूयते जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिः ऋणवान् जायते ब्रह्मचर्य्येण ऋषिभ्यः यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः प्रजया पितृभ्य इति ऋषिभ्यः ऋष्यृणेभ्यो ब्रह्मचर्य्येण मुच्यते देवेभ्यः देवर्णेभ्यः यज्ञेन मुच्यते प्रजया अपत्येन पितृभ्यः पितृणेभ्यो मुच्यते ऋणापाकरणेनैव च जीवनापगमः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

in order to acquaint us that the thing is as obligatory as the discharging of a debt.*

b. He mentions the reason for the employment of figurative language, saying, 'because blame and praise are rendered suitable.' Just as by the discharging of a debt and by the not discharging it, so by the performance of sacrifice, &c., and by its non-performance, blame and praise are rendered suitable.†

c. And it is not the case that there is no season for engaging in the work [of one's Emancipation], because it is said "By old age is he emancipated," &c.‡

d. But then, though it be possible to get rid of things desirable by abandoning the desire of them, how can constant duties [—see the *Vedánta-sára*§ —] be got rid of?—for it is stated in scripture "He should offer burnt sacrifice *as long as he lives.*" To this he replies§.—

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* जायमानइत्याद्यनुवादोऽहि न प्रधानशब्दः नहि जायमानः कर्म्मण्यधिक्रियते। एवमृणशब्दोऽपि न मुख्यः नह्यत्र प्रत्यादेयं कश्चन ददाति परन्तु ऋणापाकरणवदावश्यकत्वख्यापनाय तथोक्तं ॥

† लाक्षणिकशब्दप्रयोगे वीजमाह निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ऋणानपाकरणतदपाकरणाभ्यामिवाग्निहोत्राद्यकरणतत्करणाभ्यां निन्दाप्रशंसे उपपद्येते ॥

‡ नचानुष्ठानकालाभावः जरया विमुच्यत इत्युक्तेः ॥

§ ननु काम्यानां कामनाविरहेण त्यागसम्भवेऽपि नित्यानां कथं त्यागः श्रूयते हि यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयादिति तत्राह ॥

समारोपादात्मन्यप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६१ ॥

How the eternal duties do not exclude Emancipation.

Aph. 61.—This is no objection [to Emancipation], because it is imputed to the soul.

a. The objection to Emancipation is not proper, because we are instructed to attribute these fires to the soul:*—[in short,—when a Bráhman, having reached the age at which he ought to retire from the world, is no longer competent to perform the regular daily duties, he must *imagine* himself performing them;—and this will free him from the bad consequences of *neglecting* them; while, on the other hand, the defect of actual fulfilment will free him from the necessity of having to undergo *reward* for the same].

b. But then, even if burnt sacrifice were not an obstacle [to Emancipation], the very fruit of it, viz., Paradise, must [—says some one—] be an obstacle to Emancipation [from pleasure and pain alike]. To this he replies.†

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः ॥ ६२ ॥

How sacrifice does not debar Emancipation.

Aph. 62.—Because the [required] collection of vessels cannot be had, and [so of other cases], there is not the fruit.

a. In the case of him that possesses knowledge, the 'fruit,' i. e., Paradise, does not take place:—for burnt sacrifice implies a

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* अपवर्गप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः अग्नीनामात्मनि समारोपविधानात् ॥

† नन्वग्निहोत्रस्याप्रतिबन्धकत्वेऽपि तत्फलस्वर्ग एवापवर्गप्रतिबन्धकः स्यादत्राह ॥

'collection of vessels,'—vessels, i. e., vessels for burnt sacrifice,—a collection of such,—an arrangement of them with respect to the members of the victim, the thing sacrificed,—according to the direction "In the mouth a ladle filled with butter," and so in order. Since these cannot be provided by a *beggar* [—which every Bráhman, when he becomes aged, is bound to be—], and since, therefore, the fruit of the burnt sacrifice, from the want of these things, does not take place, still the fruits of the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice, and of bathing in the Ganges, &c., and [on the other hand] of injuries, &c., might be [supposed to be] obstacles [to Emancipation], therefore, in order to include other reasons [why Emancipation should not be eternally impossible], an "and" [—equivalent to an "&c"—] is inserted [in the aphorism]. And thus the import is, that actions, other than those done in a former state of existence, are obliterated by *knowledge* simply;*—[for it is he "that possesses knowledge" who can both perform the 'constant duties,' so as to avoid the guilt of their neglect, and at the same time escape the opposite Charybdis of having to *suffer the reward* of them in Paradise].

b. He censures [the notion—see §59—that Emancipation is rendered impossible by] the constant attendance of distress.†

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* ज्ञानिनः फलस्य स्वर्गस्याभावः अग्निहोत्रं हि पात्रचयान्तं पात्राण्यग्निहोत्रपात्राणि तेषाञ्चयः यजमानस्याङ्गेषु विन्यासः मुखे घृतपूर्णां स्रुचमिति क्रमेण भिक्षोस्तदनुपपत्तेः तेन तत्परित्यागात् अग्निहोत्रफलाभावेऽपि ज्योतिष्टोमगङ्गास्नानादिहिंसादिफलानां प्रतिबन्धकत्वं स्यादतो हेत्वन्तरसमुच्चयाय चकार उपन्यस्तस्तथाच प्रारब्धातिरिक्तकर्म्मणां ज्ञानादेव क्षय इत्याशयः ॥

† क्लेशानुबन्धं दूषयति ॥

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः ॥ ६३ ॥

In Emancipation distress cannot be.

Aph. 63.—As he who is sound asleep, when he sees no dream, has no distress,—so is it in the case of Emancipation.

a. In the case of one sound asleep, at the time of seeing no dream, as, from the absence of any cause, there is the absence of pain, so also in Emancipation, from the absence of Desire, &c., there must be the absence of pain.*

b. He censures [the notion of] the impossibility of Emancipation, because of the constant attendance [—alleged at §59—] of exertion.†

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानाय हीनक्लेशस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

Exertion does not render Emancipation impossible.

Aph. 64.—The Exertion of him that has got rid of the Distresses does not tend to obstruct.

a. The 'Distresses, are Desire, &c., because people are distressed through these. The Exertion of him who is freed therefrom 'does not tend to obstruct,' i. e., it is no obstacle [to his Emancipation]; that is to say it generates neither merit nor demerit,‡ [the reward or punishment of which would require his continuance in the body].

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* स्वप्नादर्शनकाले सुषुप्तस्य यथा हेत्वभावेन दुःखाभावस्तथाऽपवर्गेऽपि रागाद्यभावेन दुःखाभावः स्यात् ॥

† प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावं दूषयति ॥

‡ क्लिश्यन्तेऽनेनेति क्लेशा रागादिः तद्विरहिणाया प्रवृत्तिः सा प्रतिसन्धानाय प्रतिबन्धाय न भवति धर्म्माधर्म्मौ न जनयतीत्यर्थः ॥

b. Some one, not able to endure [this view of] the non-existence of the Distresses [§64, *a*], doubts as follows.*

न क्लेशसन्ततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥

Whether distress can cease. *Aph.* 65.—Not so [—says some one—is there a cessation] of the continuance of Distress, because it is essential.

a. A termination of the continuance of distress is not proper [to be asserted], because it exists through its own nature,† [and is not dependent on any arrangement of causes, the absence of which could involve its cessation].

b. A partially informed person clears [—or attempts to clear up—] this as follows.‡

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत् स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वं
अणुश्यामताऽनित्यत्ववद्वा ॥ ६६ ॥

An imperfect reply. *Aph.* 66.—Even though essential [—suggests some one—], it is uneternal, just as the non-existence that was antecedent to production is not eternal, —or as the blackness of an atom is not eternal.

a. It may perish, 'just as the non-existence that was antecedent to production is not an eternal thing,' i. e., just as antecedent non-existence [e. g., of a jar before it was made,] is not eternal, [though it was *from* eternity up to the time of the making of the jar],—or as the blackness of an atom [—say of Earth—],

* क्लेशाभावमसहमानः शङ्कते ॥

† क्लेशसन्ततेरुच्छेदो न युक्तः स्वाभाविकत्वात् ॥

‡ एकदेशी समाधत्ते ॥

which was from eternity, perishes* [when the jar, of which it is a constituent, is baked *red* in the kiln].

b. Rejecting both of these views, he states the tenet.†

न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनां ॥ ६७ ॥

The point settled. *Aph.* 67.—Not so,—because Desire, &c., are caused by the fancying [something] to be good.

a. What has been asserted is not proper;—why?—because Desire, &c., [see §64, *a*] are [not self-existent, but] 'caused by the fancying to be good,'—they are things the cause of which is a 'fancying to be good,' i. e., a false notion;—and so, since false notions are put an end to by knowledge of the truth, it is quite fitting that Desire, &c., should have an end:—such is the import.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination of Emancipation.§

c. The First Diurnal Portion of the Fourth Book is completed.||

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* प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्प्रागभावानित्यत्ववत् अनादेः परमाणुश्यामताया विनाशवद्वा विनाशः ॥

† मतद्वयमुपेक्ष्य सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

‡ नोक्तं युक्तं कुतो रागादीनां सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वात् संकल्पो मिथ्याज्ञानं निमित्तं येषां तथाच तत्वज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तौ रागादिनिवृत्तिर्युज्यत एवेति भावः ॥

§ समाप्तमपवर्गपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

|| समाप्तं चतुर्थाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकं ॥

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

d. Now the pre-eminent motive for this Institute is Emancipation; and this, though it has been enounced [in B. I. §], and defined [at B. I. §22], and examined [in the section preceding this one], does no good, because its *cause* has not been displayed. But then [—some one may say—], in the aphorism [B. I. §2] beginning "Pain," &c., in the order of the removal of causes, Emancipation is the absence of *pain*;—[well] if [any one says this], it is the truth;—but the *cause* of the departure of error is not explained. If you say that the cause thereof is the 'knowledge of truth,' then it ought to be mentioned of *what* the truth requires to be known;—so, regard being had to this, it is just the examination of the 'knowledge of truth' that is the matter of the [present] Diurnal Portion. And in this there are six sections. First there is the section regarding the *production* of the knowledge of truth; and the others will be mentioned as they present themselves. In regard to this matter there is an aphorism conveying a tenet.*

SECTION XIV.

CONCERNING THE PRODUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH.

दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ॥ ६८ ॥

The notion of one's personality to be got rid of.

Aph. 68.—Through the knowledge of the truth in respect of the causes of the 'Faults' [B. I. §18], there is cessation of the notion of one's personality.

* अथ शास्त्रस्य परमं प्रयोजनमपवर्गः सचोद्दिष्टो लक्षितः परीक्षितोऽप्यकिञ्चित्करः कारणानिरूपणात् नन्वभिहितमेव दुःखादिसूत्रे कारणनाशक्रमेण दुःखाभावोऽपवर्गः

a. 'The notion of one's personality' (*ahankára*) is the fancy which reveals itself in the expression "I"; and what is so called is an error, the object of which is the Body, and other things; and this [error] is put an end to by a knowledge, in regard to 'the causes of the Faults,' viz., the Body, &c., of 'the truth,' viz., that these are not the Soul:—for, fancying the Body, &c., to be the Soul, one is attracted by things pleasing [to the Body], and irritated by things offensive.*

b. But then [some one may ask],—what, in short, are those attractive matters, whereby being attracted one remains mundane?—so, to discriminate these, he exhibits them.†

दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः सङ्कल्पकृताः ॥ ६९ ॥

Desire, &c, whence.

Aph. 69.—The cause of the 'Faults' [B. I. § 18] is Colour, and other objects regarded as *good.*

इतीति चेत्सत्यं मिथ्याज्ञानापगमहेतुर्नाभिहितः तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्रहेतुरिति चेत्कस्य तत्त्वं ज्ञातव्यमित्यभिधानीयमित्याशयेन तत्त्वज्ञानपरीक्षा सैव चाह्निकार्थः तत्र च षट् प्रकरणानि आदौ तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रकरणं अन्यानि च यथायथं वक्ष्यन्ते तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

* अहङ्कारोऽहमित्यभिमानः तत्र शरीरादिविषयको मिथ्याज्ञानमुच्यते तच्च दोषनिमित्तानां शरीरादीनां तत्त्वस्य अनात्मत्वस्य ज्ञानान्निवर्त्तते आत्मत्वेन हि शरीरादौ मुह्यन् रञ्जनीयेषु रज्यति कोपनीयेषु कुप्यति ॥

† ननु के यावदनुरञ्जनीयाविषयाः येषु रज्यन्संसरतीत्यतो विवेकाय तानुपदिशति ॥

a. 'Regarding as good' (*sankalpa*) means regarding as a good thing. Colour, &c., made the objects of this [fancy that they are good], are the cause of 'Fault,' i. e., of Desire, &c. Perceiving that "This woman is beautiful," one feels Desire;—and [again] that "This is an enemy," one feels Aversion. These, Colours, &c., are in the first place to be regarded as what is to be shunned. Thence comes the discrimination between Body and Soul.*

b. But then [some one may say], Desire, &c., is hard to got rid of even by Brahma when he looks on beauty, &c. This is stated in the following verse,—"For the mind, O Krishṇa, is unstable, violent, energetic, powerful," &c. Therefore, showing a method for the removal of Desire, &c., he says.†—

तन्निमित्तन्त्ववयव्यभिमानः ॥ ७० ॥

Suggestions for the removal of Desire, &c.

Aph. 70.—But the cause thereof is a conceit in respect of something made up of parts.

a. 'In respect of something made up of parts,' e. g., the body of a maiden,—a 'conceit,' i. e, a notion of beautiful,—is 'the cause thereof,' i. e., the cause of Desire, &c:—and so this notion

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* सङ्कल्पः समीचीनत्वेन भावनं तद्विषयीकृता रूपादयः दोषस्य रागादेर्निमित्तं सुन्दरीयमिति जानन् रज्यति शत्रुरयमिति द्वेष्टि ते रूपादयो हेयत्वेन भावनीयाः प्रथमं ततः शरीरात्मविवेकः ॥

† ननु सौन्दर्य्यादिकं पश्यतो रागादिर्ब्रह्मणोऽपि दुष्परिहरः तदुक्तं चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद्दृढमित्यतो रागादिनिवृत्त्युपायं दर्शयिष्यन्नाह ॥

is to be got rid of * [by means of dwelling on repulsive aspects of the body, after the manner of Dean Swift].

b. Here ends the section on the production of the knowledge of truth.†

c. Now, since the matter presents itself [—though already in some measure discussed in B. II.—], there is a section on [wholes, or] 'what is made up of parts.' There is an aphorism for the purpose of displaying a doubt in regard to this.‡

SECTION XV.

Concerning parts and wholes.

विद्याविद्याद्वैविध्यात्संशयः ॥ ७१ ॥

Whether there be wholes.

Aph. 71.—There is a doubt [whether there be such things as wholes], because there are two sorts of [knowledge, viz.,] knowing and mistaking.

a. In connection with 'doubt,' supply "whether there be such things as wholes." Since [the existence of] a whole is established by sense-evidence, the evasion of it is hardly possible, therefore he says 'knowing,' &c;—that is to say, because, through the distinction of right notion and wrong notion, knowledge is of two sorts. The meaning is, that, there is a doubt whether there be such things as wholes, because there is a doubt whether *know-*

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* अवयविनि तरुण्यादिशरीरे अभिमानः सपरिष्कार-बुद्धिस्तन्निमित्तं रागादिर्निमित्तं तथाच सा बुद्धिर्हेया ॥

† समाप्तं तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रकरणं ॥

‡ अथ प्रसङ्गादवयविप्रकरणं। तत्र संशयप्रदर्शनाय सूत्रम् ॥

ledge be correctly instructive, since we see that the character of *being knowledge* is a character common* [both to right notion and wrong notion].

b. He clears up this point.†

तदसंशयः पूर्व्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् ॥ ७२ ॥

The doubt repelled.

Aph. 72.—There is no doubt in regard to this, because the preceding arguments are quite established.

a. 'In regard to this,' i. e., in regard to [the existence of] wholes,—'because the preceding arguments are quite established,' i. e., because wholes were emphatically proved [to exist] by the arguments stated in the Second Book.‡

b. He entertains a doubt as to whether there be not something self-contradictory in [the notion of] a whole.§

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि संशयानुपपत्तिः ॥ ७३ ॥

Possibility of a whole questioned.

Aph. 73.—Since it is strictly impossible for it [the whole] to reside [anywhere—says

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* संशयइत्यस्य अवयविनीत्यादिः अवयविनः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्तदपलापो दुःशक्य इत्यत उक्तं विद्येति प्रमाभ्रमभेदेन ज्ञानद्वैविध्यात् ज्ञानत्वलक्षणसाधारणधर्म्मदर्शनात् ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यसंशयादवयविनि संशयइत्यर्थः ॥

† समधत्ते ॥

‡ तत्रावयविनि न संशयः पूर्व्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् द्वितीयाध्यायोक्तयुक्तिभिरवयविनः प्रकर्षेण सिद्धत्वात् ॥

§ अवयविनि बाधकं शङ्कते ॥

some one—], therefore there is no room for a doubt [as to whether there be wholes].

a. 'Strictly' [—as we here render *api*—] gives the force of precision [to the statement]. Then there is no room for *doubt*, because there is strictly no such thing as a whole, since it is impossible for it to reside [anywhere]. The author of the *Bháshya* explains this impossibility of its having any residence, thus:—"Parts constitute no whole, because this must reside either wholly or partially. For, is the whole, in each separate part, *wholly* or *partially*? Not the first, because their dimensions are unequal. On the latter alternative, again, is it in the shape of that same part or another one [that the whole resides in the part]? Not the first, for it is contradictory that a thing should reside in *itself;* nor is it the latter, because one part cannot reside in another part."*

b Still, how is it that there is no whole? In regard to this the *Bháshya* says—"And since it does not reside in those, there is no whole;" that is, since, for the foregoing reasons [§73, *a*], it is not present 'in those,' i. e., in the parts, there is no such thing as a whole;—for you cannot assume that which shall have *no residence;*—such is the import. Others again say that this [last quotation from the *Bháshya*] is really an aphorism† [of Gautama's].

* अपिरवधारणे तर्हि संशयानुपपत्तिर्वृत्त्यनुपपत्तितोऽवयव्यभावादेव स्यादित्यर्थः। वृत्त्यनुपपत्तिं विवृणोति भाष्यकारः कार्त्स्न्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः अवयवी हि एकैकावयवे कार्त्स्न्येन एकदेशेन वा नाद्यः विषमपरिमाणत्वात् अन्त्येऽपि तेनैवावयवेनान्येन वा नाद्यः स्वस्मिन्वृत्तिविरोधात् नान्त्यः अवयवान्तरस्यावयवान्तरावृत्तेः॥

† तथापि कथमवयव्यभाव इत्यत्र भाष्यं तेषु चावृत्तेरव-

With reference to the doubt, viz., but then, grant that the whole really have no residence,—there is an aphorism of one who adopts a primâ facie view.*

पृथक्चावयवेभ्योऽवृत्तेः ॥ ७४ ॥

Granting the possibility, its existence questioned.

Aph. 74.—And [there is no whole] different from the parts, because it has no residence.

a. Complete thus,—'there is no whole different from the parts.' If the passage [§73, *b*] "And since it does not reside in those," &c., be an *aphorism,* then it is from this that the expression "there is no whole" is borrowed. Why [do we say that there is no whole]?—'because it has no residence.' If it have no residence, then we should find that this whole [—if it existed at all—] is something *eternal;*—and no eternal whole is perceived,—therefore there is no whole at all;—such is the import.†

b. But then [some one may say], let the relation between

यव्यभावः तेषु अवयवेषु पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या अभावादवयवी नास्ति नह्यसाववृत्तिस्त्वयाऽभ्युपेयत इति भावः। सूत्रमेवेदमित्यपि वदन्ति ॥

* नन्वास्तामवृत्तिरेवावयवीति शङ्कायां पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रं ॥

† अवयवेभ्यः पृथक् अवयवी नास्तीति शेषः। तेषु चावृत्तेरित्यस्य सूत्रत्वे अवयव्यभाव इत्यनुवर्त्तते। कुतः। अवृत्तेः वृत्त्यभावेऽवयविनो नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः नच नित्योऽवयव्युपलभ्यते ततो नास्त्येवावयवीति भावः ॥

parts and the whole be just that of *identity*. To this he replies.*—

न चावयव्यवयवाः ॥ ७५ ॥

Parts and the whole not identical.

Aph. 75.—And the parts are not the whole.

a. For no one considers that the thread is the web, or that the pillar is the house; nor is it reasonable that the relation of lodging and lodger should be without any distinction† [between the two].

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.‡

एकस्मिन् भेदाभावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेर-
प्रश्नः ॥ ७६ ॥

The tenet.

Aph. 76.—Since the employment of the term *difference*, where there exists no difference, is unjustifiable,—there is no [room for the] question.

a. The question [mooted under § 73], viz., "does the whole abide totally or partially [in each part]?"—is not proper;—because, 'in respect of what is *one*,' i. e., in respect of a whole,—the employment of language regulated by [consideration of] *difference* is improper, inasmuch as there is *no* difference [in what is *one*]. For 'totality' means there being, in the case of several, none left out; and 'partialness' means there being, out of what

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* नन्ववयवावयविनोस्तादात्म्यमेव सम्बन्धः स्यादत आह ॥

† नहि तन्तुः पटस्तम्भो गृहमिति कश्चित्प्रत्येति नवाऽभेदेनाधाराधेयभाव उपपद्यते ॥

‡ सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

constitute an aggregate, some;—and this is inapplicable to what is *one* [and indivisible]; such is the import.*

b. And for the following reason the [pretended] dilemma as to the residence [of the whole] is not proper,—so he says.†—

अवयवान्तरभावेऽप्यवृत्तेरहेतुः ॥ ७७ ॥

The opponent's dilemma shown to be wide of the mark.

Aph. 77.—It is no argument [that pretended dilemma of our opponent's], because, even if another part could be [in a given part], there would be no residence [for the *whole*,—the question of which, therefore, this dilemma does not touch].

a. The argument of our opponents [§73, *a*], that a whole does not reside in its own parts partially, because there cannot be [in any part] another part,—is not a proper one. Why?—'because, even if another part could be there, there would be no residence,' —that is to say, because, even if another part could be actually existent [in some given part], it is only of that same [*part*] that the residence would offer itself,—but not also of the *whole*.‡

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* अवयवी कार्त्स्न्येन एकदेशेन वा वर्त्ततइति प्रश्नो न युक्तः एकस्मिन्नवयविनि भेदाभावाद्भेदनियतशब्दप्रयोगस्यायुक्तत्वात् अनेकस्याशेषता हि कार्त्स्न्यं समुदायिनां किञ्चित्त्वमेकदेशत्वं नचैकस्य तत्सम्भवइति भावः ॥

† इतश्च वृत्तिविकल्पो न युक्तइत्याह ॥

‡ अवयवी स्वावयवेषु नैकदेशेन वर्त्तते अवयवान्तराभावादिति यः परेषां हेतुः स न युक्तः। कुतः। अवयवान्तरभावेऽप्यवृत्तेः अवयवान्तरसत्त्वेऽपि तस्यैव परं वृत्तिरायाति नत्ववयविनोऽपीति ॥

b. By this [§72], viz., "There is no doubt in regard to this, because the preceding arguments are quite established," an argument previously mentioned [at B. II. §34] is brought to mind,—viz., "Everything would be imperceptible, were there no wholes." One holding a primâ facie view proceeds to censure this.*

केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥ ७८ ॥

Whether things imperceptible in detail may be perceptible in the mass.

Aph. 78.—It is perceived [says some one], just as a collection of hairs [to him separately imperceptible] is perceived by the purblind.

a. As a single hair is not perceived 'by the purblind,' i. e., by one whose organ of vision is affected by gutta serena, but a collection thereof is,—so a single atom is imperceptible,—but a jar, or the like, consisting of a collection thereof, may be perceptible.†

b, He replies.‡

स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणेन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावात् विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावो नाविषये वृत्तिः ॥ ७९ ॥

The senses are powerless except in reference to their proper objects.

Aph. 79.—Since a sense is acute or dull without [however] trans-

* तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वादित्यनेन सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेरिति पूर्वोक्तयुक्तिः स्मारिता पूर्वपक्षी । तां दूषयितुमुपक्रमते ॥

† यथा तैमिरिकस्य तिमिरग्रस्तचक्षुषोनैकः केशः प्रत्यक्षः किन्तु तत्समूहः एवमेकः परमाणुरप्रत्यक्षः तत्समूहरूपघटादिः प्रत्यक्षः स्यात् ॥

‡ उत्तरयति ॥

cending its own sphere, such is their case in respect of their apprehending objects;—there is no functioning [of any sense] in reference to what is not the object [of the sense].

a. If the senses be acute, there is acuteness, vivacity, in the apprehending of the object;—if the senses be dull, there is dullness, deficiency, in the apprehending thereof;—but it is not the case that a more acute Sight apprehends a Sound;—this is declared in the expression 'without transcending its own sphere.' He states the meaning in full, when he says 'there is no functioning in reference to what is not the object;'—and so, how can the Sight apprehend an *atom*, which is *not* its object [—an atom being invisible—], even though this exist in the state of a collection? Such is the import.*

b. Here is an aphorism in order to declare another censure.†

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात् ॥ ८० ॥

How the opponent's dilemma would lead to nihilism.

Aph. 80.—And in that way we should find both parts and wholes [obnoxious to your dilemma], up to the annihilation [of everything whatever].

a. 'In that way,' i. e., in the way alleged [at §73, *a*], the fault of [being obnoxious to] the dilemma, as to where the thing resides, presents itself in the whole and in the part alike;—'up to

* इन्द्रियाणां पाटवे विषयग्रहणस्य पाटवं प्रकर्षः इन्द्रियाणां मान्द्ये तद्ग्रहणस्य मान्द्यमपकर्षः न तु पटुतरं चक्षुः शब्दं गृह्णाति तदिदमुक्तं स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणेति। फलितार्थमाह नाविषये वृत्तिरिति। तथाच स्वाविषयं परमाणुं समूहत्वापन्नमपि कथं चक्षुर्गृह्णीयादिति भावः ॥

† दोषान्तराभिधानाय सूत्रं ॥

annihilation':—annihilation means non-existence,—and so *every-thing* would be non-existent,—nothing whatever would be perceived;—therefore it was properly said [at B. II. §34] "Everything would be imperceptible, were there no wholes."*

b. Let everything be non-existent [—says some one],—to which he replies.†

न प्रलयोऽणुसद्भावात् ॥ ८१ ॥

Whatever perishes, the atoms must survive.

Aph. 81.—There cannot be annihilation [of all], because the atoms have a real existence.

a. What *is* an atom? To this he replies.‡

परम्वा त्रुटेः ॥ ८२ ॥

An atom what.

Aph. 82.—What is absolutely beyond being cut [or destroyed].

a. An atom is that which, being excessively minute, is beyond cutting. The word [*vá*, here rendered] 'absolutely,' is for the sake of precision.§

b. Here ends the section regarding parts and wholes.||

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* एवमुक्तप्रकारेण वृत्तिविकल्पदोषोऽवयविन्यवयवे च प्रसक्तः आप्रलयात् प्रलयोऽभावस्तथाच सर्व्वाभावएव स्यान्न कस्यापि ग्रहणमिति साधूक्तं सर्व्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेरिति ॥

† अस्तु सर्व्वाभावइत्यत्राह ॥

‡ परमाणुरेव कइत्यत्राह ॥

§ त्रुटेः परं यदतिसूक्ष्मं तत्परमाणुः । वाशब्दोऽवधारणे ॥

|| समाप्तमवयवावयविप्रकरणं ॥

Now, in order to confute the opinion that, since all is void, where is the possibility of atoms?—there is a section regarding what has no parts. In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.*

SECTION XVI.

Respecting the Indivisible.

आकाशव्यतिभेदात्तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ ८३ ॥

The possibility of atoms questioned.

Aph. 83.—Such a thing cannot be, because it must be divided throughout by [the Ether or] Space.

a. 'Such a thing,' as an atom devoid of parts, cannot be. Why?—'because it must be divided throughout by Space,' i. e., it must be enveloped by [Ether] or Space within and without, —and so it must have parts, and therefore it cannot be eternal.†

b. Now if it were *not* pervaded by [Ether or] Space, then Space would not be all-pervading;—so he [the objector] says.‡—

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* अथ विश्वस्य शून्यत्वात् क परमाणुसम्भावनेति मतनिराकरणाय निरवयवप्रकरणं। तत्र पूर्व्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

† तस्य निरवयवस्याणोरनुपपत्तिः। कुतः। आकाशव्यतिभेदात् अन्तर्वहिश्चाकाशसमावेशात्। तथाच सावयवत्वतस्मानित्य इति ॥

‡ अथ नाकाशव्यतिभेदस्तर्हि आकाशस्यासर्व्वगतं स्यादित्याह ॥

आकाशासर्व्वगतत्वं ॥ ८४ ॥

Ground of the doubt.

Aph. 84.—Else Space [would be] not all-pervading.

a. Supply "would be."*

b. He clears up this point.†

अन्तर्वहिरिति कार्य्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्य्ये तदभावः ॥ ८५ ॥

Atoms have no within and without.

Aph. 85.—The expressions "within and without" apply to a thing that is a *product*; they do not apply to that which is no product, because they speak of something else than *causes*.

a. The word 'within,' and the word 'without,' express certain *parts* of something that is a product; and it is impossible that what is no product should have parts;—such is the meaning.‡

b. *Let* it be [—says some one—with allusion to §84—] that the Ether is *not* omnipresent. To this he replies.§

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्व्वगतं ॥ ८६ ॥

How the Ether must be omnipresent.

Aph. 86.—And it is omnipresent, because of the omnipresence of the conjunction [which is the cause] of Sound.

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* स्यादिति शेष ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अन्तःशब्दो वहिःशब्दश्च कार्य्यद्रव्यस्यावयवविशेषवाची न चाकार्य्येऽवयवसम्भवइत्यर्थः ॥

§ आकाशस्यासर्व्वगतत्वं स्यादित्यत्राह ॥

a. The omnipresence of Souud, and of Conjunction,—or [to construe it another way] the 'omnipresence,' i. e., the being everywhere, of that Conjunction which generates Sound,—from this, again, that the Ether is all-pervading [is inferred],—so much is to be supplied [to complete the aphorism]. Since, from the production of Sound in every place, the Conjunction of the producer thereof is inferred, it is settled that this [producer of Sound, viz., the Ether,] has an omnipresence in the shape of its being something in conjunction with everything finite.*

b. If the Ether were in conjunction with everything [says some one], then there must be repulsion and obstruction [to which it must be subject];—therefore he says.†—

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि आकाशधर्म्माः ॥ ८७ ॥

Properties of the Ether.

Aph. 87.—That it is un-repelled, unobstructed, and all-pervading, are properties of the Ether.

a. 'Repulsion' is the turning back of that which is repelled. 'Obstruction' is the hindering of motion towards another place. Neither of these belongs to the Ether, because it is intangible.‡

* शब्दस्य संयोगस्य च यो विभवः अथवा शब्दजनकसंयोगस्य यो विभवः सार्व्वत्रिकत्वं तस्मात्पुनः सर्व्वगतं आकाशमिति शेषः। सर्व्वदेशे शब्दोत्पत्त्या तज्जनकसंयोगानुमानात् सर्व्वमूर्त्तसंयोगित्वरूपसर्व्वगतत्वं तस्य सिद्धं ॥

† आकाशस्य सर्व्वसंयोगित्वे व्यूहनविष्टम्भौ स्यातामत आह ॥

‡ व्यूहः प्रतिहतस्य परावर्त्तनं विष्टम्भस्त्वन्यदेशगतिप्रतिबन्धः आकाशे तयोरभावः निःस्पर्शत्वात् ॥

b. The holder of the primâ facie view ventures another argument.*

मूर्त्तिमताञ्च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भावः ॥ ८८ ॥

Whether an atom can be without parts.

Aph. 88.—And there really are parts [of an atom,—contends some one—], because things that have form must have a collocation [of parts].

a. Supply "of an atom."†

b. He mentions another argument.‡

संयोगोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ८९ ॥

This doubt reinforced.

Aph. 89.—And [—insists some one,—atoms really have parts,] because this is consistent with the conjunction [of atoms].

a. That "atoms have parts" is borrowed [from the preceding aphorism]. The meaning of the argument is, because they are capable of being in conjunction. If you ask how it is that their being possessed of parts is inferred from their being capable of being in conjunction, it is thus, viz., because conjunction is a state other than being co-extensively present; and a state other than that of being co-extensively present cannot exist without some sort of barrier, and the barrier [to co-existent presence] is a *part*,§ [—the atoms being conjoined only in the parts next to one another].

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* पूर्व्वपक्षी युक्त्यन्तरमाशङ्कते ॥

† परमाणोरिति शेषः ॥

‡ युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

§ अवयवसद्भावइत्यनुवर्त्तते । संयोगवत्त्वादिति हेत्वर्थः । संयोगवत्त्वात् कथं सावयवत्वमितिचेत् इत्थं संयोगस्याव्या-

b. He clears up the point.*

अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रति-
षेधः ॥ ९० ॥

This point cleared up.

Aph. 90.—This [indivisibility of atoms] is not to be refuted, because this would occasion a regressus in infinitum, and because a regressus in infinitum is not proper.

a. It is not proper to set aside, by the arguments aforesaid, the fact that atoms have not parts;—why?—'because this would occasion a regressus in infinitum.' Let the regressus in infinitum [says some one] be legitimate;—therefore he adds 'and because a regressus in infinitum is not proper.' Were all things indefinitely divisible, we should find Mount Meru and a mustard-seed [—as containing an equally infinite number of parts—] to be equal in dimension.†

b. Here ends the section respecting what has no parts.‡

c. But then [some one may say], since nothing external exists, how should there be the arrangement of parts and whole? To remove this opinion, he enters upon a refutation of the denial of

प्यवृत्तित्वादव्याप्यवृत्तित्वञ्चावच्छेदकभेदं विना नोपपद्यते अवच्छेदकञ्चावयववदिति ॥

* समाधत्ते ॥

† पूर्व्वोक्तयुक्त्या परमाणोर्निरवयवत्वप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः कुतः अनवस्थाकारित्वात् प्रामाणिकीयमनवस्था स्यादत आह अनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चेति सर्व्वेषामनवस्थितावयवत्वे मेरुसर्षपयोस्तुल्यपरिमाणत्वापत्तिः ॥

‡ समाप्तं निरवयवप्रकरणं ॥

external things. The doubt presents itself, viz., is the fact of being an *object* of right knowledge invariably attended by the fact of being *knowledge*?—[or, to put the question in the language of the successors of Locke, is every *thing* an *idea*?] In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.*

SECTION XVII.

Confuting the denial of the External.

बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् ॥ ९१ ॥

Whether things are other than ideas.

Aph. 91.—But, in consequence of their being undistinguishable from thought, there is no apprehension of any possession of a separate self in entities,—just as there is no apprehension of the actual existence of a web when the threads have been removed.

a. The 'but' is for the sake of dividing the section† [from that which went before].

b. Since things are 'undistinguishable from thought,' i. e., since they are expressed indifferently [by the terms which denote ideas], 'there is no apprehension of,' i. e, there cannot be, 'any possession of a separate self,' viz., in the shape of being different from an idea. For, there is such a case of consciousness as [may be represented in the expression] "The knowledge—a *jar*—has

* ननु वाह्यार्थाभावात् कुतोऽवयवावयविव्यवस्थेति मतमपाकर्त्तुं वाह्यार्थभङ्गनिराकरणमारभते । प्रमेयत्वं ज्ञानत्वव्याप्यं नवेति संशयः । तत्र पूर्व्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

† तुः प्रकरणविच्छेदार्थः ॥

occured to me:"—in this instance, by the expressions [placed in opposition, viz.,] "a jar" and "the knowledge," the indifference of the knowledge and the jar is expressed;—therefore a thing is not other than the idea; just as, when a web is discerned, if the threads themselves be removed, or the like, no separate thing [called "web"] remains;—so moreover the thread is nothing other than its [own constituent] fibres:—but what constitutes a jar, or the like, is just a certain form of knowledge [or modification of thought]:—such is the import.*

c. He clears up this.†

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ ९२ ॥

This denied. *Aph.* 92.—This is no argument because of the falsehood [of the assertion.]

a. The alleged argument is not proper, 'because of the falsehood of the assertion;'—for a web, in our mental conception of it, is *not* something in the shape of threads;—for, what is cognized is, that, "*Of* threads there is a web," but not, that, "The threads are a web." In like manner the garment is [formed] by the web, but not by the threads. Moreover, by the very discrimination between the threads and the web it is proved that there

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* भावानां बुद्ध्या विवेचनादभेदोल्लेखात् याथात्म्यस्य ज्ञानभेदलक्षणस्यानुपलब्धिरनुपपत्तिः घटइति ज्ञानं मम जातमिति ह्यनुभूयते तत्र घटइतिज्ञानमित्यनेन ज्ञानघटयोरभेद उल्लिख्यते ततो न ज्ञानातिरिक्तो विषयः यथा पटे विविच्यमाने तन्तूनामेवापकर्षणादावतिरिक्तं न वस्तु एवं तन्तुरपि नांशुव्यतिरिक्तइति घटत्वादिस्तु ज्ञानस्यैवाकारविशेषइति भावः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

are external things. But it is not declared by the idea that there is no distinction between itself and the web, because if [the idea] is not its own object; but, by reflection, it is declared that, when there is an effort of attention, it is the web [—or other external thing—] that is the object.*

b. But then [some one may say], if the threads and the web were different things, they might be perceived separately [—e. g., the web without the threads—], so to this he replies.†

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्ग्रहणं ॥ ९३ ॥

An objection met. *Aph.* 93.—It is not perceived separately, because it consists thereof.

a. If you mean by 'perception separately' that the web should be the object of a perception whereof the threads were *not* the object, then to this he replies 'because it consists thereof,' &c: for the web consists of the threads; therefore, as the totality [of the causes of the perception of the threads] is present, the perception of the web *has* the threads as its object. And if you mean [by 'perception separately'] the conviction of a difference, then [we grant you] there really *is* one :—such is the import.‡

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* उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः व्याहतत्वात् नहि बुद्ध्या विवेचने पटस्य तन्तुरूपता सिध्यति तन्तुतः पटइति हि प्रतीयते न तु तन्तुः पटइति । एवं पटेन प्रावरणं न तु तन्तुभिः । किञ्च तन्तुपटविवेचनादेव वाह्यार्थसिद्धिः ज्ञानेन तु स्वस्मिन् पटाभेदो नोल्लिख्यते स्वाविषयकत्वादनुव्यवसायेन तु पटविषयकत्वं व्यवसाये समुल्लिख्यते ॥

† ननु तन्तुपटयोर्भेदे पार्थक्येन ग्रहणं स्यादित्यत्राह ॥

‡ पृथग्ग्रहणं यदि तन्त्वविषयकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं पटस्यापाद्यते तत्रोत्तरं तदाश्रयत्वादिति पटो हि तन्त्वाश्रितः तेन

h. But then [some one may say], since both parties have settled that there are ideas; and since it is simpler to suppose that this [the idea] alone is the *thing*, it should be settled that there is no "thing" other than that [viz., other than an idea];—so to this he replies.*

प्रमाणातश्चार्थप्रतिपत्तेः ॥ ९४ ॥

A false simplification rejected.

Aph. 94.—And since things are established by proofs, [the argument from simplicity is not in point.]

a. The "and" connects the preceding argument† [with the present one].

b. Since 'things,' i. e., jars, and the like, 'are established,' i. e., are due to proofs [or "causes of *right* notion"]. And so, in the case of a thing that is established by [irrefragable] evidence, cumbrousness does not exclude: such is the import. Otherwise even *knowledge* would not be proved to exist, because [forsooth] of the cumbrousness [of the hypothesis]; so that we should come [for simplicity] to there being *nothing at all*.‡

सामग्रीसत्त्वात्पटप्रत्यक्षस्य तन्तुविषयकत्वं। यदि च भेद-प्रत्यय आपाद्यते तदा भवत्येवेति भावः ॥

* ननु ज्ञानस्योभयवादिसिद्धत्वात्तन्मात्रपदार्थकल्पने लाघवात्तदतिरिक्तपदार्थाभावसिद्धिः स्यादित्यत आह ॥

† पूर्वोक्तहेतुं समुच्चिनोति चकारः ॥

‡ अर्थस्य घटादेः प्रतिपत्तेः प्रमाणाधीनत्वात्। तथाच प्रामाणिकेऽर्थे गौरवं न बाधकमिति भावः अन्यथा ज्ञानमपि न सिध्येद्गौरवादिति शून्यतापत्तिः ॥

c. Nor is it possible to prove that external things do *not exist*,—so he says.*

प्रमाणोपपत्त्यनुपपत्तिभ्यां ॥ ९५ ॥

That the external does not exist cannot be proved.

Aph. 95.—By there being, or not being, a proof, [the non-existence of external things is incapable of being demonstrated].

a. Supply—the non-existence of the external cannot be proved, because there is an inconsistency. In regard to the proposition "The external is not," if there be any proof of it, then, since the proof, which is something external, exists, it is not true that the external does not exist Again, if there is not [any proof], then it [the proposition] is not established, because it is destitute of evidence. Moreover, if there is any proof that there is a jar, or the like, then by *that* it is established that there is something external:—now if there be no such proof, then how dost thou suppose, when speaking of "a jar," that the knowledge has the form of a jar?—for mere knowledge does not spring up† [—without being the knowledge of something or other].

b. But then [some one may say], this talk about proof and object of proof does not go to the bottom of the question, but cognitions of this or that form, just in virtue of the ripening of

* नवा वाह्यार्थाभावसाधनं सम्भवतीत्याह ॥

† व्याघाताद्व वाह्याभावइति शेषः। वाह्यं नास्तीत्यत्र यदि प्रमाणमस्ति तदा प्रमाणस्य वाह्यस्य सत्त्वान्न वाह्याभावः। अथ नास्ति तदा निष्प्रमाणकत्वान्न तत्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः। किञ्च घटादौ यदि प्रमाणमस्ति तदा ततएव वाह्यार्थसिद्धिः। अथाप्रमाणं तदा कथं घटइति ज्ञानस्य घटाकारत्वं मन्यसे ज्ञानस्यैवानुत्पत्तेरिति ॥

mental impressions [—see Yoga Aphorisms B. II. §13, *b*,—], display themselves, just like cognitions in a dream, or like perceptions produced by magic:—so, with reference to this, he dubitates through two aphorisms.*

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ ९६ ॥

Whether external appearances are delusive.

Aph. 96.—Like the conceit of things in a dream [—says some one—], is this conceit of proofs and objects of proof.

मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णावद्वा ॥ ९७ ॥

Aph. 97.—Or like jugglery, or the city of the celestial quiristers, or the mirage.

a. [The meaning of this is] plain.†

b. He clears up the point.‡

हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः ॥ ९८ ॥

This denied.

Aph. 98.—This is not proved, because of the absence of any proof.

a. It is not proved that the external does not exist, 'because of the absence of any proof,' i. e., because there is no evidence [that such is the fact]. Or the meaning is, if you do not admit the existence of 'proofs,' such as Sight, &c., you can have no such notions as "This is a jar," &c. And you are not to say that

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* ननु प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारो न पारमार्थिकः परन्तु विज्ञानानि तत्तदाकारकाणि वासनापरिपाकवशादेव स्वाप्नप्रत्ययवदैन्द्रजालिकप्रतीतिवच्चाविर्भवन्तीत्याशयेन शङ्कते सूत्राभ्यां ॥

† स्पष्टं ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

this [possession of notions of things, without there being any-thing external,] may be through the power of mental impressions; because, if these mental impressions are something other [than knowledge], then it seems that you do admit something external. We may hint, too, that since these mental impressions are continuous, we should [—if vision, &c., depended thereon—] find the visible, &c., to be continuous, [whereas, on the contrary, we find that we see only so long as what we call the object remains in view].*

b But then [some one may say], like cognitions in a dream, or like imaginary cognitions, other cognitions also may be devoid of real objects, and also destitute of a cause;—therefore he says.†

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवच्च स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः ॥ ९९ ॥

The stuff of dreams what. *Aph.* 99.—The conceit of objects in a dream is as in the case of remembrance and imagination.

a. Supply,—it has for its objects what had been previously perceived.‡

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* वाह्याभावस्यासिद्धिः हेत्वभावात् प्रमाणाभावात् अथवा हेतोश्चक्षुरादेरनभ्युपगमे घटोऽयमित्यादिज्ञानानामसिद्धिरित्यर्थः । नच वासनावशात्स्यादिति वाच्यं वासनाया अतिरिक्तत्वे वाह्योपगमप्रसङ्गात् वासनायाः सन्तन्यमानतया चाक्षुषादेरपि सन्तानापत्तिरिति दिक् ॥

† नन्वसद्विषया अहेतुका अपि स्वाप्नप्रत्ययाद्इव भावनाप्रत्यया इव परेऽपि प्रत्यया भवेयुरित्यत आह ॥

‡ पर्व्वोपलब्धविषयइति शेषः ॥

b. But then, if even error has its real objects, how is it to be averted? Pondering this doubt, he says.*—

मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् प्रतिबोधे ॥ १०० ॥

How false notions may cease. *Aph.* 100.—False apprehension is put an end to by knowledge of the truth, just as the conceit of [the existence of] the objects in a dream comes to an end on awaking.

a. But he who is called a Mádhyamika, having come to the conclusion of the non-existence of the external;—in conformity with that example, makes out the non-existence of knowledge also. It is in opposition to this person that he says.†—

बुद्धेश्चैवं निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात् ॥ १०१ ॥

Knowledge really is. *Aph.* 101.—And in the same way [there is no reasonable denial of the existence] of knowledge, because we are conscious of the reality of its cause.

a. 'In the same way,' i. e, as in the case of the external, knowledge also is not to be denied [to exist], 'because we are conscious of the reality of its cause,'—for that which has a cause is a real thing,‡ [—and the cause of knowledge is the

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* ननु भ्रमस्यापि सद्विषयकत्वे तत्प्रतिरोधः कथं स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† माध्यमिकस्तु वाह्यासत्त्वं प्रसाध्यते तद्दृष्टान्तेन बुद्धेरप्यसत्त्वं साधयति तं प्रत्याह ॥

‡ एवं वाह्यवद्बुद्धेरपि न प्रतिषेधः निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात् सद्धेतुकत्वस्य प्रमितत्वात् ॥

object,—the non-existence of which we refuse to concede to the Mádhyamika,—and the conjunction of the sense-organ there-with—].

b. Nor, by [instancing] the example of false notion, can it be [proved] that knowledge in general has an absolutely unreal object, or has not any real object ;—so he says.*—

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धेर्द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः ॥ १०२ ॥

The precise nature of a mistake.

Aph. 102.—And we find that there is a two-fold character [even] in a false cognition, because of the distinction between the reality and the principal [appearance—such as offers itself.]

a 'The reality,' i. e., the nature of the thing ;—'the principal [appearance,'] i. e., what is imputed, [as when the imputation of silver is cast on mother o'pearl, or that of a snake is cast upon a rope seen in the twilight,—see *Vedánta-Sára* §20 :] —and so, in the case of a mistake, there is the fact of being right knowledge in one part, viz , in the thing [—for, when one, mistakingly, thinks "This is silver,"—it being actually mother o'pearl,—he is right in thinking "This is"—], and there is the nature of error in one part, viz., in the imputed character of silver ;—so that the example [by which the opponent thought to prove his case] is not a fact :—such is the import.†

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* नवा मिथ्याबुद्धिदृष्टान्तेन ज्ञानमात्रस्यासन्मात्रविषयकत्वं सद्विषयकत्वाभावो वा सम्भवतीत्याह ॥

† तत्त्वं धर्म्मिस्वरूपं प्रधानं आरोप्यं तथाच भ्रमे धर्म्म्यंशे प्रमात्वमारोप्यरजतत्वाद्यंशे च भ्रमत्वमिति दृष्टान्तासिद्धिरिति भावः। केचित्तु प्रमात्वाप्रमात्वयोर्विरोधान्नैकत्र समावेश इत्यत आह तत्त्वेति। तथाच विषयभेदान्न विरोध इति भाव इत्याहुः ॥

b. Here ends the section confuting the denial of external things.*

c. But then the knowledge of the truth, due to the Institute, is momentary;—therefore, on its perishing, there must be just false notions; for no knowledge whatever is such as to be adequate to the uprooting of false notions firmly founded and habitual; therefore he commences a section on the augmentation of the knowledge of truth. The augmentation [or re-inforcement] of the knowledge of truth means the *habit* of thinking the truth; and it is therefrom that there is the complete annihilation of false notions. Here he states the means of the augmentation of the knowledge of truth.†

SECTION XVIII.

HOW THE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH IS TO BE RE-INFORCED.

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात् ॥ १०३ ॥

The habit of right knowledge how acquired.

Aph. 103.—[Knowledge of the truth is rendered habitual] by the practice of special meditation.

a. 'Meditation' is fixedness of thought upon some chosen object [—see Yoga Aphorisms B. I. §17 and 51—]; its perfection consists in abstractedness from all other objects; by the 'prac-

* समाप्तं वाह्यार्थभङ्गनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

† ननु शास्त्राधीनं तत्त्वज्ञानं क्षणिकमतस्तन्नाशे मिथ्याज्ञानं स्यादेव नहि तादृशं किञ्चिदेव ज्ञानं दृढभूमिसवासनमिथ्याज्ञानसमुन्मूलनक्षममतस्तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिप्रकरणमारभते । तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिस्तत्त्वज्ञानवासना। ततस्तात्यन्तिको मिथ्याज्ञाननाशः तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धौ हेतुमाह ॥

tice,' or re-iteration, thereof, there is augmentation of the knowledge of truth.*

b. But then, objects some one in a couple of aphorisms, Meditation positively does not commence, by reason of obstruction through Desire, &c †

नार्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् ॥ १०४ ॥

क्षुधादिभिः प्रवर्त्तनाच्च ॥ १०५ ॥

Whether Meditation be possible.

Aph. 104.—Not so [—objects some one—], by reason of the predominance of some particular object.

Aph. 105.—And by reason of one's being impelled to action by hunger, &c.

a. By reason of the 'predominance of,' i. e., the inveterate association, of affection for 'some particular object,' e. g , a son, a wife, or the like, it is impossible to leave off one's attention thereto; so that it [Meditation] cannot take place:—and it may be prevented by one's perceiving the thundering of a cloud, and so on. Likewise, being obstructed by hunger, thirst, fear, &c., one must exert one's self for the removal of these,‡ [and this is incompatible with Meditation.]

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* समाधिः चित्तस्याभिमतविषयनिष्ठत्वं तस्य प्रकर्षो विषयान्तरानभिष्वङ्गलक्षणस्तस्याभ्यासात् पौनःपुन्यात् तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिः ॥

† ननु रागादिभिः प्रतिबन्धात् समाधिरेव नोदेतीत्याक्षिपति सूत्राभ्यां ॥

‡ अर्थविशेषस्य तनयवनितादिरागस्य प्राबल्याच्चिरकालानुबन्धात्तदनुसन्धानमवर्ज्जनीयमिति तदभावः स्याच्च

b. He refutes this.*

पूर्व्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ १०६ ॥

How Meditation is possible.

Aph. 106.—It may arise through the possession of the fruits of former works.

a. That is to say, Meditation [may be effected] through the force of the habit generated by meditation practised in a previous life.†

b. He informs us of the places [suitable] for the practice of Meditation.‡

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशात् ॥ १०७ ॥

Places suitable for Meditation.

Aph. 107.—For we are instructed to practice Meditation in a forest, a cave, an alluvial island, or the like.

a. That is to say, steadiness of thought is possible in such places. Some say that this is not an aphorism, but [a passage of the] *Bháshya.*§

घनगर्जितादिज्ञानेन प्रतिबन्धः । एवं क्षुत्तृष्णाभयादिभिः प्रतिरुद्धस्तदुपशमाय प्रयतेत ॥

* परिहरति ॥

† जन्मान्तरकृतसमाधिजन्यसंस्कारवशात् समाधिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ योगाभ्यासस्थानमुपदिशति ॥

§ तत्र स्थिरचित्तता स्यादिति भावः । इदं न सूत्रं किन्तु भाष्यमिति केचित् ॥

b. An indifferent person throws out a doubt.*

अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ १०८ ॥

A doubt. *Aph.* 108.—At that rate, it [viz., attachment to loved objects,] would present itself even in Emancipation.

a. 'At that rate [—referring to §104—] it would present itself,'—i. e., by reason of the predominance of some particular object, the conception of the object would present itself.†

b. He clears up this.‡

न निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात् ॥ १०९ ॥

This disposed of. *Aph.* 109.—Not so,—because that which he has gone out of is what must necessarily be, [—otherwise the thoughts which you refer to cannot occur—].

a. 'That which he has gone out of,' i. e., the body, &c. Because this is 'what must necessarily be,' i. e., because this is what is the cause,—supply—in respect of notions, &c.,§ [which, therefore do not belong to the disembodied].

b. But then, what has that to do with the case?—so he tells us.||

तदभावश्चापवर्गे ॥ ११० ॥

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* तटस्थः शङ्कते ॥

† एवं प्रसङ्गः अर्थविशेषप्राबल्याद्विषयावभासप्रसङ्गः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ निष्पन्नस्य शरीरादेः अवश्यम्भावित्वात् कारणत्वात् ज्ञानादिष्विति शेषः ॥

|| ननु किमेतावतेत्यत आह ॥

The emancipated are disembodied.

Aph. 110.—And in Emancipation there is the non-existence of that.

a. There is the non existence 'of that,' i. e., of the body, &c:—because of the having got rid of the merit and demerit which originate it [—see B. III. §132—] : such is the import.*

b. He mentions the means of accomplishing Meditation.†

तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चात्मविध्युपायैः ॥ १११ ॥

Practical rules.

Aph. 111.—With a view thereto, let there be a purifying of the soul by abstinence [from evil] and observance [of duties], and by the means of those rules regarding the soul [which are to be learned] from the Yoga Institute.

a. 'With a view thereto,' i. e., with a view to Emancipation. Or, as in the *Bháshya,* &c., 'with a view thereto' means with a view to Meditation ‡ [Regarding the terms in this aphorism, see the Yoga Aphorisms B. II. §29].

b. But then at that rate [—i. e., if the chief End of Man be attainable through the rules of the Yoga—] what is the use of [the present Institute of] Logic. To this he replies.§

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासस्तद्विद्यैः सह संवादः ॥ ११२ ॥

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* तस्य शरीरादेरभावः तदारम्भकधर्म्माधर्म्मविरहादिति भावः ॥

† समाधिसाधनान्याह ॥

‡ तदर्थमपवर्गार्थमिति भाष्यादौ तदर्थं समाध्यर्थमिति वा ॥

§ नन्वेवं किमान्वीक्षिक्येत्यत आह ॥

Use of the present Institute.

Aph. 112.—The practice of perusing this Institute, and communication with those learned in it, [are advisable with a view to Emancipation].

a. 'With a view thereto' is borrowed [from §111]. The 'institute,' i. e., that whereby something is understood,—meaning the present Institute.*

b. With a view to showing the method of communication, he says.†

तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोऽर्थिभिरनसू-
युभिरभ्युपेयात् ॥ ११३ ॥

With whom we should communicate.

Aph. 113.—He should approach him, [and he should also communicate] with disciples, preceptors attended by disciples, eminent persons, desirous of Emancipation,—they being unenvious.

a. 'Him,' i. e., him who understands it [viz., the Nyáya Institute]. 'Attended by disciples,' i. e., having readers with them. 'Eminent,' i. e., pre-eminently intelligent. 'Desirous of emancipation,' i. e., wishing for salvation. Some one says that the word *(viśishṭa)* which we have translated 'eminent,' means 'other than those mentioned earlier in the list.' He says 'unenvious' in order to exclude those who desire [not truth but] victory.‡

b. He states the manner of communication.§

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* तदर्थमित्यनुवर्त्तते ज्ञायतेऽनेनेति ज्ञानं शास्त्रं प्रकृतं ॥

† संवादप्रकारं दर्शयितुमाह ॥

‡ तं तद्विदं। सब्रह्मचारी सहाध्यायी। विशिष्टः प्रकृष्टज्ञानवान्। श्रेयोऽर्थी मुमुक्षुः। विशिष्टः पूर्व्वोक्तभिन्न इत्यर्थ इति कश्चित्। विजिगीषुव्यावृत्त्यर्थं अनसूयुभिरिति ॥

§ संवादप्रकारमाह ॥

प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे ॥ ११४ ॥

How we should communicate.

Aph. 114.—Moreover, verily, for the sake of the motive [viz., certainty], so as that there be no opposite opinion, [one should communicate with those learned in the Institute,]—provided all desire the object [truth].

a. The word 'verily' [—as we have here rendered the particle *vá*—] is intended for precision. 'Provided all desire the object,' i. e, there being a desire to know the truth. 'For the sake of the motive,' i. e., for the sake of ascertaining the truth. 'So as that there be no opposite side,' i. e., so as that there may be no adverse side,—so should he enter upon [this communication with the unenvious learned]. And to this effect the *Bháshya* says—"Not having established any side of his own, he should clear his own view;"—the import being, that, through desire of ascertaining the truth, one should take up no side.*

b. Here ends the section regarding the augmentation of the knowledge of truth.†

c. In order that there may not be the mistake of supposing that, when we say [§112] "communication with those learned in it," &c., communication is to be made with those who are

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* वाशब्दो निश्चयार्थः। अर्थित्वे तत्त्वबुभुत्सायां सत्यां। प्रयोजनार्थं तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थं। प्रतिपक्षहीनं प्रतिकूलपक्षहीनं यथा स्यात्तथाऽभ्युपेयात्। तथाच भाष्यं स्वपक्षमनवस्थाप्य स्वदर्शनं परिशोधयेदिति। तत्त्वनिर्णीषुतया न पक्षपात इति भावः॥

† समाप्तं तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिप्रकरणं॥

outside the pale of the triad [of Vedas], he commences a section on the preservation of the knowledge of truth.*

SECTION XIX.

On the guarding the knowledge of the truth.

तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

The function of wrangling, &c.

Aph. 115.—For the sake of guarding the knowledge of the truth, there are wranglings and cavils, just as, for the sake of guarding the growth of the seed, there is the clothing of the branches with thorns.

a. 'The knowledge of the truth,' i. e, certainty as to the truth. 'Guarding' means the dispelling of doubts as to one's correctness by destroying the objections alleged by others. For this purpose are the wranglings and cavils already mentioned [at B. I. §§42 and 43]:—so much is to be supplied.†

b. But then, what is to be done with these two [—viz., wrangling and cavilling—]? To this replied.‡

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* तद्विद्यैः सह संवाद इत्यत्र त्रयीवाह्यैः सह संवादः कर्त्तव्य इति भ्रमो मा भूदिति तत्त्वज्ञानपरिपालनप्रकरणमारभते ॥

† तत्त्वाध्यवसायस्य तत्त्वनिर्णयस्य संरक्षणं परोक्तदूषणास्कन्दनेनाप्रामाण्यशङ्काविघटनं तदर्थं जल्पवितण्डे पूर्व्वमुक्ते इति शेषः ॥

‡ ननु ताभ्यां किङ्कार्य्यमित्यत आह ॥

ताभ्यां विगृह्य कथनं ॥ ११६ ॥

The occasion for this.

Aph. 116.—Discourse [is to be made] with these [appliances], when *contending*, [i. e., when arguing against *heretics*].

a. The meaning is this, that, if his view is called in question by those [heretics] who are outside the pale of the triad [of Vedas], wrongly thinking persons who are ill-disposed towards the study of this Institute, or others, then [he is to discourse] 'with these two,' i. e., with wranglings and cavillings. And this is [enjoined] with strict limitation [to the case of heretics]; but when those [orthodox] who fall within the pale of the triad make objections, he may discourse either with honest discussion [B. I. §41], or with wrangling, or with cavilling, accordingly as he pleases:—such is the import.*

b. But in reality he who is desirous of Emancipation holds no communication with such, because he is devoid of desire; nor, moreover, is it any aim of his to defend the Institute; nor does he go to the Institute with any positive contempt for this [business of defending it,—which he nevertheless neglects]; but he should habitually study the Institute,—such is the fact.†

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* अयमर्थः त्रयीवाह्यैः तद्दर्शनाभ्यासाद्दितकुज्ञानैरपरैर्वा यदि स्वपक्ष आक्षिप्यते तदा ताभ्यां जल्पवितण्डाभ्यां । सावधारणं चेतत् । त्रय्यन्तःपातिनामाक्षेपे तु वादजल्पवितण्डाभिर्यथेच्छङ्कथयेदिति भावः ॥

† वस्तुतस्तु मुमुक्षोर्न तादृशैः सह संवादो वीतरागत्वान्नहि शास्त्रपरिपालनमपि तदुद्देश्यं नवा तदुपेक्षयैव शास्त्रं गच्छति किन्तु शास्त्रमभ्यस्येतेति तत्त्वमिति ॥

c. Here ends the section on the guarding of the knowledge of the truth *

d. Here ends the Second Diurnal Portion of the Fourth Book.†

e. So much for the Fourth Book of the Commentary on the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, the work of the venerable Viśwanátha Siddhántapanchánana Bhaṭṭáchárya, the son of the great teacher the venerable Vidyánivása Bhaṭṭáchárya.‡

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* समाप्तं तत्त्वज्ञानपरिपालनप्रकरणं ॥

† समाप्तं चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकं ॥

‡ इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीमद्विद्यानिवासभट्टाचार्य्यात्मज-श्रीविश्वनाथसिद्धान्तपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्य्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः ॥

END OF BOOK IV.

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10.	Ditto Ditto, " 2, ...	8 do.	Ditto Ditto.
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पुस्तकनाम	मौल्य रुपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम
१ इङ्गलिश प्रिमर	:	१	:	अङ्गरेज़ी
२ इण्ट्रोडक्शन् टु लाजिक	:	८	:	तथा
३ लेक्चुर्ज़ आन किमिस्त्री	:	१२	:	तथा
४ औट्लाइन्ज़ आफ़ मेटेफिज़िक्स	:	८	:	तथा
५ पेरेफ्रेज़ आफ़ मक्बेठ [शेक्सपीर्ज़]	१	८	:	तथा
६ भाषापरिच्छेद और सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली पहला भाग	:	७	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी
७ एलिमेण्ट्स् आफ़ इङ्गलिश ग्रामर	:	१२	:	तथा
८ लघुकौमुदी पहला भाग १	:	८	:	तथा
९ भाग २	:	८	:	तथा
१० भाग ३	:	८	:	तथा
११ तथा भाग १	:	८	:	संस्कृत और हिन्दी
१२ लेक्चुर्ज़ आन दि सब्डिविज़ंज़ आफ़ नालेज वा विद्याचक्र भाग १ २ ३ ४ प्रत्येक	:	४	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी

पुस्तकनाम	रुपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम
१३ औटलाइंज़ आफ़ संस्कृत ग्रामर वा बालबोध	:	८	:	संस्कृत और हिन्दी
१४ रीडिंग्स् फार दि पण्डित्स् भाग १	:	४	:	अङ्गरेज़ी
१५ भाग २	:	८	:	तथा
१६ भाग ३	:	१२	:	तथा
१७ भाग ४	:	८	:	तथा
१८ भाग ५	:	८	:	तथा
१९ लेक्चुर्ज़ आन दि न्याय फिलासोफी वा तर्कसंग्रह	:	८	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी
२० लेक्चुर्ज़ आन दि सांख्य फ़िलासोफ़ी वा तत्त्वसमास	:	७	:	संस्कृत अङ्ग-रेज़ी
२१ तथा वेदान्त	:	८	:	तथा
२२ फर्स्ट लेसंज़ इन् संस्कृत ग्रामर	:	४	:	तथा
२३ हितोपदेश भाग १	:	४	:	हिन्दी
२४ स्केच आफ़ आपरे-शंज़ इन् दि बनारस कालिज	:	४	:	अङ्गरेज़ी
२५ न्यायसूत्र	:	८	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेज़ी

पुस्तकनाम	रुपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम
२६ वैशेषिकसूत्र	:	७	:	तथा
२७ मीमांसासूत्र	:	७	:	तथा
२८ साङ्ख्यसूत्र	:	१२	:	तथा
२९ योगसूत्र भाग १ और २ प्रत्येक	:	८	:	तथा
३० वेदान्तसूत्र	:	७	:	तथा
३१ तर्कसंग्रह	:	८	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेज़ी हिन्दी
३२ सिनाप्सिस् आफ़ सेअं र न्यायकौमुदी भाग १	१	:	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेज़ी
३३ भाग २	:	१४	:	तथा
३४ तथा भाग १	:	८	:	हिन्दी और अङ्गरेज़ी
३५ बेकन्ज़् नोवम् आरगनम् बेकनीयसूत्रव्याख्यान	:	१२	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी
३६ पुनः शोधित और मुद्रित तर्कसंग्रह	:	१०	:	तथा
३७ एलिमेण्टस् आफ़ लाजिक	१	२	:	अङ्गरेज़ी
३८ न्यायसूत्र भाग ३ और ४ प्रत्येक	१	६	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेज़ी
३९ मेटेफिज़िक्स एण्ड मेंटल फिलासोफी	२	:	:	अङ्गरेज़ी